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Abstract
The block cipher is one of the most important primitives in modern cryptogra-
phy, information and network security; one of the primary purposes of such ciphers
is to provide confidentiality for data transmitted in insecure communication en-
vironments. To ensure that confidentiality is robustly provided, it is essential to
investigate the security of a block cipher against a variety of cryptanalytic attacks.
In this thesis, we propose a new extension of differential cryptanalysis, which we
call the impossible boomerang attack. We describe the early abort technique for
(related-key) impossible differential cryptanalysis and rectangle attacks. Finally, we
analyse the security of a number of block ciphers that are currently being widely
used or have recently been proposed for use in emerging cryptographic applications;
our main cryptanalytic results are as follows.
• An impossible differential attack on 7-round AES when used with 128 or 192
key bits, and an impossible differential attack on 8-round AES when used with
256 key bits. An impossible boomerang attack on 6-round AES when used
with 128 key bits, and an impossible boomerang attack on 7-round AES when
used with 192 or 256 key bits. A related-key impossible boomerang attack
on 8-round AES when used with 192 key bits, and a related-key impossible
boomerang attack on 9-round AES when used with 256 key bits, both using
two keys.
• An impossible differential attack on 11-round reduced Camellia when used with
128 key bits, an impossible differential attack on 12-round reduced Camellia
when used with 192 key bits, and an impossible differential attack on 13-round
reduced Camellia when used with 256 key bits.
• A related-key rectangle attack on the full Cobra-F64a, and a related-key dif-
ferential attack on the full Cobra-F64b.
• A related-key rectangle attack on 44-round SHACAL-2.
• A related-key rectangle attack on 36-round XTEA.
• An impossible differential attack on 25-round reduced HIGHT, a related-key
rectangle attack on 26-round reduced HIGHT, and a related-key impossible
differential attack on 28-round reduced HIGHT.
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In terms of either the attack complexity or the numbers of attacked rounds, the
attacks presented in the thesis are better than any previously published cryptanalytic
results for the block ciphers concerned, except in the case of AES; for AES, the
presented impossible differential attacks on 7-round AES used with 128 key bits and
8-round AES used with 256 key bits are the best currently published results on AES
in a single key attack scenario, and the presented related-key impossible boomerang
attacks on 8-round AES used with 192 key bits and 9-round AES used with 256 key
bits are the best currently published results on AES in a related-key attack scenario
involving two keys.
6
Contents
1 Introduction 15
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.2 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.3 Organisation of Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2 Block Cipher Cryptanalysis 20
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2 Cryptanalytic Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.1 Cryptanalysis Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2.2 Elementary Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2.3 Mathematical Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2.4 Differential Cryptanalysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2.5 Linear Cryptanalysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.2.6 Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.2.7 Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.2.8 Boomerang and Rectangle Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.2.9 Related-Key Cryptanalysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3 The Impossible Boomerang Attack 42
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2 The Impossible Boomerang Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.2.1 The Basic Impossible Boomerang Attack . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.2.2 The Impossible Boomerang Attack Using More Tuples . . . . 47
3.3 The Related-Key Impossible Boomerang Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.4 A Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4 The Early Abort Technique 50
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.2 Early Abort for (Related-Key) Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis 51
4.3 Early Abort for the Rectangle Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.4 Early Abort for the Related-Key Rectangle Attack . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5 Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round AES 59
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
7
CONTENTS
5.2 The AES Block Cipher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.2.1 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.2.2 Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.2.3 Generation of Subkeys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.2.4 Encryption Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.3 Previous Cryptanalytic Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.4 Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round AES . . . . 66
5.4.1 General Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.4.2 Attacking 7-Round AES-128 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.4.3 Attacking 7-Round AES-192 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.4.4 Attacking 8-Round AES-256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.5 Impossible Boomerang Attack on Reduced-Round AES . . . . . . . 91
5.5.1 4-Round Impossible Boomerang Distinguishers . . . . . . . . 91
5.5.2 Attacking 6-Round AES-128 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.5.3 Attacking 7-Round AES-192 and 7-Round AES-256 . . . . . 96
5.6 Related-Key Impossible Boomerang Attack on Reduced-Round AES 99
5.6.1 Attacking 8-Round AES-192 Using Two Related Keys . . . . 100
5.6.2 Attacking 9-Round AES-256 Using Two Related Keys . . . . 101
5.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
6 Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced Camellia 105
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
6.2 The Camellia Block Cipher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.2.1 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.2.2 Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.2.3 Generation of Subkeys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
6.2.4 Encryption Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
6.3 Previous Cryptanalytic Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
6.4 8-Round Impossible Differentials of Camellia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
6.5 Attacking 13-Round Camellia-256 without the FL Functions . . . . 110
6.5.1 Preliminary Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
6.5.2 Attack Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.5.3 Complexity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
6.6 Attacking 12-Round Camellia-192 without the FL Functions . . . . 116
6.7 Attacking 11-Round Camellia-128 without the FL Functions . . . . 117
6.7.1 Attack Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
6.7.2 Complexity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
6.8 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
7 Related-Key Cryptanalysis of the Full Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b120
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
7.2 Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
7.2.1 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
7.2.2 Functions and DDP-Boxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
7.2.3 Generation of Subkeys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
7.2.4 Encryption Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
7.3 Previous Cryptanalytic Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
8
CONTENTS
7.4 Properties of Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
7.5 Related-Key Rectangle Attack on Cobra-F64a . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
7.5.1 A 15-Round Related-Key Rectangle Distinguisher with Prob-
ability 2−123.62 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
7.5.2 Attack Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
7.5.3 Complexity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
7.6 Related-Key Differential Attack on Cobra-F64b . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
7.6.1 A 19.5-Round Related-Key Differential Characteristic with
Probability 2−57 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
7.6.2 Attack Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
7.6.3 Complexity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
7.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
8 Related-Key Rectangle Attack on 44-Round SHACAL-2 142
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
8.2 The SHACAL-2 Block Cipher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
8.2.1 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
8.2.2 Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
8.2.3 Generation of Subkeys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
8.2.4 Encryption Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
8.3 Previous Cryptanalytic Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
8.4 Properties of SHACAL-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
8.5 A 35-Round Related-Key Rectangle Distinguisher with Probability
2−460 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
8.5.1 A 34-Round Related-Key Rectangle Distinguisher with Prob-
ability 2−456.76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
8.5.2 A 35-Round Related-Key Rectangle Distinguisher with Prob-
ability 2−474.76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
8.5.3 A 35-Round Related-Key Rectangle Distinguisher with Prob-
ability 2−460 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
8.6 Attacking the First 44 Rounds of SHACAL-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
8.6.1 Preliminary Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
8.6.2 Attack Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
8.6.3 Complexity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
8.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
9 Related-Key Rectangle Attack on 36-Round XTEA 158
9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
9.2 The XTEA Block Cipher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
9.2.1 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
9.2.2 Generation of Subkeys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
9.2.3 Encryption Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
9.3 Previous Cryptanalytic Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
9.4 A 24-Round Related-Key Rectangle Distinguisher with Probability
2−124.92 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
9.5 Attacking Rounds 16 to 51 of XTEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
9.5.1 Preliminary Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
9
CONTENTS
9.5.2 Attack Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
9.5.3 Complexity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
9.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
10 Cryptanalysis of Reduced HIGHT 173
10.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
10.2 The HIGHT Block Cipher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
10.2.1 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
10.2.2 Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
10.2.3 Generation of Subkeys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
10.2.4 Encryption Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
10.3 Previous Cryptanalytic Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
10.4 Properties of HIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
10.5 Impossible Differential Attack on 25-Round HIGHT . . . . . . . . . 179
10.5.1 16-Round Impossible Differentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
10.5.2 Attacking Rounds 6 to 30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
10.6 Related-Key Rectangle Attack on 26-Round HIGHT . . . . . . . . . 187
10.6.1 18-Round Related-Key Rectangle Distinguishers with Proba-
bility 2−92.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
10.6.2 Attacking Rounds 1 to 26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
10.7 Related-Key Impossible Differential Attack on 28-Round HIGHT . . 195
10.7.1 19-Round Related-Key Impossible Differentials . . . . . . . . 195
10.7.2 Attack Rounds 2 to 29 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
10.8 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
11 Conclusions and Future Research 203
11.1 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
11.2 Possible Directions for Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
10
List of Figures
2.1 The boomerang and amplified boomerang distinguishers . . . . . . . 34
2.2 A related-key rectangle distinguisher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.1 Impossible boomerang and related-key impossible boomerang distin-
guishers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.1 A Feistel round structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.2 The rectangle and related-key rectangle attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.1 An example of the early abort technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.2 4-round impossible differentials of AES of Biham et al. . . . . . . . . 71
5.3 Impossible differential attack on 7-round AES-128 . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.4 Impossible differential attack on 7-round AES-192 . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.5 The differentials in the 4-round impossible boomerang distinguisher 92
6.1 Impossible differential attack on 13-round Camellia-256 . . . . . . . 113
7.1 (a) Pn,m; (b) P2,1; (c) P4,4; (d) P−14,4; (e) P8,12; (f) P
−1
8,12; (g) P32,96
and P−132,96 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
7.2 (a) P(ω)96,1; (b) P
(ω)
32,32 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
7.3 (a) F of Cobra-F64a; (b) F of Cobra-F64b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
7.4 The P32,96 in P
(0)
32,32(∆X = 0,∆V = e1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
9.1 The ith encryption round of XTEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
10.1 The ith encryption round of HIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
11
List of Tables
5.1 Subkey differences for the 8-round AES-192 attack . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.2 Subkey differences for the 9-round AES-256 attack . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.3 Cryptanalytic results on AES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.1 Cryptanalytic results on Camellia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
7.1 The key schedules of Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b . . . . . . . . . . 125
7.2 The related-key differentials in the 15-round related-key rectangle dis-
tinguisher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
7.3 The 19.5-round related-key differential characteristic . . . . . . . . . 137
7.4 Cryptanalytic results on Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b . . . . . . . . 141
8.1 Differential distribution of the functions Ch and Maj . . . . . . . . 147
8.2 The 25-round related-key differential characteristic for Rounds 1 to 25 150
8.3 The 10-round differential characteristic for Rounds 26 to 35 . . . . . 151
8.4 Cryptanalytic results on the 512-bit key version of SHACAL-2 . . . 157
9.1 The key schedule of XTEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
9.2 The first related-key differential in the 24-round related-key rectangle
distinguisher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
9.3 Cryptanalytic results on XTEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
10.1 The key byte used to generate the round subkey KS i . . . . . . . . . 177
10.2 The two 8-round differentials in the 16-round impossible differential 180
10.3 The two related-key differentials in the 18-round related-key rectangle
distinguisher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
10.4 The two related-key differentials in the 19-round related-key impos-
sible differential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
10.5 Cryptanalytic results on HIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
12
Abbreviations
ACPC Adaptive Chosen Plaintexts and Ciphertexts
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AES-128/192/256 AES when used with a key length of 128, 192 or 256 bits
Camellia-128/192/256 Camellia when used with a key length of 128, 192 or 256 bits
CP Chosen Plaintexts
CRYPTREC Cryptography Research and Evaluation Committees
http://www.cryptrec.jp/english
DES Data Encryption Standard
IEEE The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
http://www.ieee.org
IETF The Internet Engineering Task Force
http://www.ietf.org
IPsec Internet Protocol security
ISO International Organization for Standardization
http://www.iso.org
KP Known Plaintexts
MA Memory Accesses
MAC Message Authentication Code
NESSIE New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity, and Encryption
https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/nessie
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.A.
https://www.nist.gov
RFID Radio-Frequency IDentification
RK-CP Related-Key Chosen Plaintexts
SPN Substitution-Permutation Network
13
Notation
Throughout this thesis, a number without a prefix is in decimal (base 10) notation, a
number with prefix 0x is in hexadecimal (base 16) notation, and a number preceded
and followed by 〈 and 〉2 is in binary (base 2) notation. The bits of an n-bit value
are numbered from 1 to n from left to right. We use the following notation.
⊕ bitwise logical exclusive OR (XOR) of two bit strings of the same length
& bitwise logical AND of two bit strings of the same length
¬ bitwise logical complement of a bit string
¯ dot product of two bit strings of the same length
¢ addition modulo 2n
¯ subtraction modulo 2n
£ multiplication modulo 2n
<< (>>) left (right) shift of a bit string
≪ (≫) left (right) rotation of a bit string
|| string concatenation
∆ difference with respect to the ⊕ operation
◦ functional composition. When composing functions X and Y, X ◦Y denotes
the function obtained by first applying X and then applying Y
e the base of the natural logarithm, (e = 2.71828 . . .)
|X| the number of elements in a set X
bxc the largest integer that is less than or equal to x
ej an n-bit value with zeros everywhere except for bit position j, (1 ≤ j ≤ n)
ei1,··· ,ij the n-bit word equal to ei1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ eij , (1 ≤ i1, · · · , ij ≤ n)
ej,∼ an n-bit value that has zeros in bit positions 1 to j − 1, a one in bit position j
and indeterminate values in bit positions (j + 1) to n, (1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1)
ej,∼ an n-bit value that has zeros in bit positions 1 to j and indeterminate values in
bit positions (j + 1) to n, (1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1)
? an arbitrary n-bit value, where two values represented by the ? symbol may
be different
X ∼ Poi(λ) a random variable X follows the Poisson distribution with parameter λ, where
λ is the expected value of X. See [72] for the details of Poisson distribution
X ∼ Bin(N, p) a random variable X follows the binomial distribution with parameters N and
p, where N is the number of trials, and p is the success rate for each trial. See
[72] for the details of binomial distribution
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Introduction
In this chapter, we give the motivation for our research. We also describe the con-
tributions of this thesis, present its overall structure, and give the notation used
throughout this thesis.
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1.1 Motivation
Since the first computer network was established in 1956, Internet technologies have
developed very quickly. A wide variety of communications networks, including Pub-
lic Switched Telephone Networks (PSTNs), Public Switched Data Networks (PS-
DNs), Integrated Service Networks (ISNs) and mobile communication systems, are
becoming ever more important in our daily lives, and they have greatly changed the
way we live. As a consequence, as the science of secure communications, cryptology
has received considerable attention.
Cryptology has two main branches — cryptography and cryptanalysis. Cryptogra-
phy is the study of how to design algorithms that provide confidentiality, authen-
ticity, integrity and other security-related services for data transmitted in insecure
communication environments. Confidentiality protects data from leaking to unau-
thorised users. Authenticity provides assurance regarding the identity of a communi-
cating party, which protects against impersonation. Integrity protects data against
being modified (or at least enables modifications to be detected).
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Modern cryptography involves secret-key (symmetric) cryptography and public-key
(asymmetric) cryptography. In secret-key cryptography, when using a secret-key
encryption algorithm, the sender and receiver of a message use the same secret key;
the sender uses the secret key to encrypt the message, and the receiver uses the same
secret key to decrypt the message. In public-key cryptography, introduced in 1976
by Diffie and Hellman [23], each participating party has a pair of keys, one called the
public key and the other called the private key; the public key is typically published
in a trusted directory, while the private key is kept secret. When using a public-key
encryption algorithm, the sender uses the public key of the receiver to encrypt the
message, and the receiver uses his/her private key to decrypt the message.
Cryptanalysis studies how to evaluate or break cryptographic algorithms. This helps
to enable more secure algorithms to be designed.
The block cipher is an important primitive in secret-key cryptography; one main
purpose of a block cipher is to provide confidentiality for data transmitted in inse-
cure communication environments. A block cipher can also be used to build other
secret-key cryptographic primitives, such as stream ciphers, hash functions, message
authentication codes (MACs), and cryptographically secure pseudorandom number
generators. Block ciphers are also widely used as a fundamental component in
public-key cryptography, information security, network security, computer security,
and other security applications. It is thus of great importance to investigate the
security of a block cipher algorithm against a variety of cryptanalytic attacks.
1.2 Contributions
In this thesis we propose a new extension of differential cryptanalysis, which we
call the impossible boomerang attack. We describe the early abort technique for
(related-key) impossible differential cryptanalysis and rectangle attacks. Finally, we
analyse the security of a number of block ciphers that are currently being widely
used or have recently been proposed for use in emerging cryptographic applications;
our main cryptanalytic results are as follows.
• An impossible differential attack on 7-round AES-128, 7-round AES-192, and
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8-round AES-256. An impossible boomerang attack on 6-round AES-128, 7-
round AES-192, and 7-round AES-256. A related-key impossible boomerang
attack on 8-round AES-192 and 9-round AES-256, using two keys.
• An impossible differential attack on 11-round reduced Camellia-128, 12-round
reduced Camellia-192, and 13-round reduced Camellia-256.
• A related-key rectangle attack on the full Cobra-F64a, and a related-key dif-
ferential attack on the full Cobra-F64b.
• A related-key rectangle attack on 44-round SHACAL-2.
• A related-key rectangle attack on 36-round XTEA.
• An impossible differential attack on 25-round reduced HIGHT, a related-key
rectangle attack on 26-round reduced HIGHT, and a related-key impossible
differential attack on 28-round reduced HIGHT.
In terms of either the attack complexity or the numbers of attacked rounds, the
attacks presented in the thesis are better than any previously published cryptanalytic
results for the block ciphers concerned, except in the case of AES; for AES, the
presented impossible differential attacks on 7-round AES-128 and 8-round AES-256
are the best currently published results on AES in a single key attack scenario, and
the presented related-key impossible boomerang attacks on 8-round AES-192 and
9-round AES-256 are the best currently published results on AES in a related-key
attack scenario using two keys.
Some of the results described in the thesis have previously been presented in [74,
75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80].
1.3 Organisation of Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows.
Literature review: In Chapter 2, we briefly review a number of currently known
cryptanalytic methods for block ciphers. The cryptanalytic methods discussed
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include differential cryptanalysis, linear cryptanalysis, differential-linear crypt-
analysis, impossible differential cryptanalysis, boomerang and rectangle at-
tacks, integral cryptanalysis, and related-key cryptanalysis.
Our new cryptanalytic results: In Chapter 3, we propose the (related-key) im-
possible boomerang attack. In Chapter 4, we give a general description of the
early abort technique for impossible differential cryptanalysis and the rectangle
attack.
In Chapters 5–10, we present our new cryptanalytic results on AES, Camellia,
Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b, SHACAL-2, XTEA, and HIGHT, respectively.
In each chapter we start with a description of the block cipher concerned,
followed by a review of the previously published cryptanalytic results for this
cipher. We then present our new cryptanalytic results. Finally, we compare
our new cryptanalytic results with the previous state of the art.
Conclusions: In Chapter 11, we provide a summary of the main results in this
thesis, and give some possible directions for future research.
1.4 Notation
Throughout this thesis, a number without a prefix is in decimal (base 10) notation, a
number with prefix 0x is in hexadecimal (base 16) notation, and a number preceded
and followed by 〈 and 〉2 is in binary (base 2) notation. The bits of an n-bit value
are numbered from 1 to n from left to right. We use the following notation.
• ⊕: bitwise logical exclusive OR (XOR) of two bit strings of the same length
• &: bitwise logical AND of two bit strings of the same length
• ¬: bitwise logical complement of a bit string
• ¯: dot product of two bit strings of the same length
• ¢: addition modulo 2n
• ¯: subtraction modulo 2n
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• £: multiplication modulo 2n
• << (>>): left (right) shift of a bit string
• ≪ (≫): left (right) rotation of a bit string
• ||: string concatenation
• ∆: difference with respect to the ⊕ operation
• ◦: functional composition. When composing functionsX andY,X◦Y denotes
the function obtained by first applying X and then applying Y
• e: the base of the natural logarithm, (e = 2.71828 . . .)
• |X|: the number of elements in a set X
• bxc: the largest integer that is less than or equal to x
• ej : an n-bit value with zeros everywhere except for bit position j, (1 ≤ j ≤ n)
• ei1,··· ,ij : the n-bit word equal to ei1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ eij , (1 ≤ i1, · · · , ij ≤ n)
• ej,∼: an n-bit value that has zeros in bit positions 1 to j−1, a one in bit position
j and indeterminate values in bit positions (j + 1) to n, (1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1)
• ej,∼: an n-bit value that has zeros in bit positions 1 to j and indeterminate
values in bit positions (j + 1) to n, (1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1)
• ?: an arbitrary n-bit value, where two values represented by the ? symbol may
be different
• X ∼ Poi(λ): a random variable X follows the Poisson distribution with pa-
rameter λ, where λ is the expected value of X. See [72] for the details of
Poisson distribution
• X ∼ Bin(N, p): a random variable X follows the binomial distribution with
parameters N and p, where N is the number of trials, and p is the success rate
for each trial. See [72] for the details of binomial distribution
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Block Cipher Cryptanalysis
In this chapter we first give a definition of a block cipher. We then briefly review
a number of cryptanalytic methods for block ciphers, including differential crypt-
analysis, linear cryptanalysis, differential-linear cryptanalysis, impossible differen-
tial cryptanalysis, boomerang and rectangle attacks, and related-key cryptanalysis.
These techniques underlie the results presented in the remainder of this thesis.
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2.1 Introduction
A block cipher is an algorithm that transforms a fixed-length data block, called
a plaintext block, into another data block of the same length, called a ciphertext
block, under the control of a secret key. Ideally, the set of transformations induced
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by the set of all possible secret keys should be indistinguishable from a random set of
transformations. If a block cipher has a plaintext/ciphertext block length of n bits,
then we refer to it as an n-bit block cipher. Currently, the widely used block lengths
are 64 and 128 bits, and the key length is typically 128, 192 or 256 bits. Note that
in the field of block cipher cryptanalysis the term ‘ciphertext’ is sometimes abused
slightly to mean the result of encrypting a plaintext block using a reduced version
of the block cipher concerned.
In practice, almost all block ciphers are constructed by repeating a simple function
many times, known as the iterated method. The repeated function is called the
round function, every iteration is called a round, the key used in every round is
called a round subkey, and the number of iterations is called the number of rounds
of the block cipher.
An iterated block cipher involves three sub-algorithms — an encryption algorithm,
a decryption algorithm and a key schedule algorithm. The encryption algorithm
takes a plaintext block as input, and outputs a ciphertext block, under the control
of a secret key. The decryption algorithm is the inverse of the encryption algorithm,
when under the control of the same secret user key. The key schedule algorithm
takes a secret user key as input, and generates the required round subkeys.
Most block ciphers are examples of one of two special types of iterated ciphers,
known as Feistel ciphers and Substitution-Permutation Networks (SPNs). In a Feis-
tel cipher, the plaintext is split into two halves. The round function is applied to
one half, and the output of the round function is bitwise exored with the other half;
finally, the two halves are swapped, and become the two halves of the next round.
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) block cipher [91] is an example of a Feistel
cipher. In an SPN cipher, the round function is applied to the whole block, and its
output becomes the input of the next round. The Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) block cipher [90] is an example of an SPN. There also exist block ciphers
with other round structures; one such example is the IDEA block cipher [66]. One
major difference between these two approaches is that, for a Feistel cipher, the round
function can be chosen arbitrarily, whereas, for an SPN, the round function must be
bijective (invertible). A Feistel structure whose round function is bijective is called
a Feistel structure with a bijective round function.
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A round function for an iterative block cipher is typically made up of a bitwise XOR
with a round subkey, followed by sub-block substitutions using non-linear S-boxes,
i.e. fixed functions taking a string of bits as input and giving a string of bits as
output, and, finally, a bit-level permutation. The S-boxes used need to be bijective
for an SPN, but can be arbitrarily chosen for a Feistel cipher. An S-box with an
m-bit input and n-bit output is called an m× n S-box.
The notion of ‘branch number’ [20] is sometimes used to measure the diffusion power
of a linear transformation operating on byte tuples, and is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 Suppose that B = {0, 1}8 and N = {0, 1, 2, 3, · · · }. Let W : B∗ → N
be the function returning the number of non-zero bytes of an input byte tuple. The
branch number of a linear transformation L : Bm → Bn (for specific values of m and
n) is defined to equal the minimum value of W (x)+W (L(x)), where x ∈ Bm−{0m}.
2.2 Cryptanalytic Methods
In the most general sense, a cryptanalytic attack is an algorithm that distinguishes
a cryptosystem from a random function (that operates on data blocks of the same
length). The effectiveness of an attack is usually measured using the following three
metrics.
• Data complexity: the numbers of plaintexts and/or ciphertexts required for
execution of the attack.
• Memory (storage) complexity: the amount of memory required for execution
of the attack.
• Time (computational) complexity: the amount of computation or time re-
quired for execution of the attack. In block cipher cryptanalysis, this is usually
measured in terms of how many encrytions/decryptions of the block cipher or
memory accesses are required.
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2.2.1 Cryptanalysis Scenarios
We start this review of cryptanalytic techniques by considering what assumptions
are normally made regarding the resources of a cryptanalyst.
It is generally agreed that any cryptosystem should meet Kerckhoffs’ principle.
Kerckhoffs’ principle [51] A cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about
the system, except the secret key, is public knowledge.
Kerckhoffs’ principle says that the security of a cryptosystem should rely solely on
the secret key, rather than on the secrecy of the cryptographic algorithm. In other
words, the cryptosystem should be secure even if an attacker knows everything about
the cryptographic algorithm except the secret key.
Following from Kerckhoffs’ principle, there are four widely discussed attack scenar-
ios, each giving slightly differing resources to a cryptanalyst. Each scenario gives the
cryptanalyst more resources than the previous, and, in general, it is highly desirable
for any cryptosystem to be secure even in the final scenario.
• Ciphertext-only attack scenario. In this scenario the attacker is assumed to
have access to a number of ciphertexts. The attacker is also assumed to have
some information about the plaintext, e.g. that conforms to certain format-
ting constraints or that it is written in a particular natural language. (If no
information about the plaintext is available, then it is theoretically impossible
to perform cryptanalysis, except to observe that repeated ciphertext blocks
correspond to repeated plaintext blocks).
• Known-plaintext attack scenario. Here, the attacker is assumed to have access
to a number of ciphertexts and the corresponding plaintexts for at least some
of the ciphertexts.
• Chosen-plaintext/cipertext attack scenario. In this case the attacker can
choose a number of plaintexts (and/or ciphertexts), and be given the cor-
responding ciphertexts (and/or plaintexts).
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• Adaptive chosen plaintext and ciphertext attack scenario. In this final case
the attacker can choose plaintexts (and/or ciphertexts) and be given the corre-
sponding ciphertexts (and/or plaintexts). Based on the information obtained,
the attacker can then choose further plaintexts/ciphertexts, and be given the
corresponding ciphertexts/plaintexts. This process can be iterated.
2.2.2 Elementary Techniques
We next describe three fundamental cryptanalytic techniques that can be applied to
any block cipher. In the description below (and throughout the thesis) we assume
the use of an n-bit block cipher with a k-bit user key, i.e. the cipher is a function
E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, where we write the key input as a subscript, i.e. if
K ∈ {0, 1}k is a key, and P ∈ {0, 1}n is a plaintext block, then the ciphertext is
denoted by EK(P ); sometimes, if there is no ambiguity about the key in use, we
simply write E(P ). Note that, for any fixed K, the restricted function EK acts
as a permutation on the set {0, 1}n, since otherwise unique decryption will not be
possible.
• A dictionary attack involves an attacker building and maintaining a table con-
taining all 2k possible ciphertext blocks corresponding to a particular plaintext
block, with one entry in the table for each possible key. If the attacker obtains
an enciphered version of the particular plaintext block, then he can deduce
the key from the table with high probability, as long as n ≥ k (if n < k, then
the expected number of possible keys will be reduced to 2k−n). This attack
has a data complexity of 2k ciphertexts, a 2k n-bit memory complexity and a
negligible time complexity. Moreover, it requires a one-off precomputation to
generate the table, which has a time complexity of 2k encryptions; however, the
time complexity of the precomputation is typically not counted as part of the
time complexity of an attack, since it can be performed at the cryptanalyst’s
leisure [36].
• A codebook attack requires an attacker to build and maintain a table of the
2n ciphertexts for the 2n plaintexts encrypted using one particular (unknown)
key. The table is sorted by plaintext, thus and only the 2n ciphertexts need
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to be stored in the table. When the attacker gets a ciphertext, he can deduce
the corresponding plaintext from the table, provided that the particular key is
used. Such an attack has a data complexity of 2n plaintext/ciphertext pairs,
a 2n n-bit memory complexity and a negligible time complexity.
• An exhaustive key search (or brute force search) attack involves an attacker
trying every possible key, given a known plaintext/ciphertext pair. The correct
key will yield the correct correspondence between plaintext and ciphertext; if
more than one candidate key is produced, then the incorrect candidates can
be eliminated using one or more additional pairs. Such an attack has a time
complexity of 2k encryptions and negligible data and memory complexities.
An attack is commonly regarded as effective if it is faster (i.e. it has lower time
complexity) than an exhaustive key search. In recent years, a variety of cryptana-
lytic methods have been proposed, of which differential cryptanalysis [12] and linear
cryptanalysis [83] are probably the best known. All of these techniques are trade-
offs between data, time and/or memory complexities [36], compared with the above
three elementary cryptanalytic techniques.
In this chapter, we briefly review a range of cryptanalytic techniques, including
differential cryptanalysis, linear cryptanalysis, differential-linear cryptanalysis, im-
possible differential cryptanalysis, boomerang and rectangle attacks, and related-key
cryptanalysis. These methods all exploit statistical relationships between a block
cipher’s inputs and outputs, in particular between the inputs and outputs of the
nonlinear S-boxes.
2.2.3 Mathematical Background
We first review several types of discrete probability distributions, including Bernoulli
distribution, binomial distribution and Poisson distribution, which are often used
in the statistical cryptanalysis methods to be described below. See [72] for their
detailed introduction.
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2.2.3.1 Fundamental Notions
A sample space represents the individual, distinct outcomes in which a random
experiment can terminate. An event is any set of outcomes in a sample space.
The probability of an event, A say, is the sum of the probabilities assigned to the
outcomes that make up A, denoted by Pr(A). A probability space, denoted by
(Ω,F , P ), involves a sample space Ω, an non-empty collection F of subsets of Ω,
and a probability function P defined on F . A discrete (real-valued) random variable
X on a probability space (Ω,F , P ) is a function X with domain Ω and range a
finite or countably infinite subset (x1, x2, · · · ) of the real numbers R such that {ω ∈
Ω|X(w) = xi} is an event for all i. The expected value (or mathematical expectation)
of a discrete random variable is the sum of the probability of each possible outcome
of the experiment multiplied by the outcome value. A probability mass function,
denoted by fX(x), is a function that gives the probability that a discrete random
variable X is equal to some value x. A probability distribution function, denoted by
FX(x), is a function that describes the probability distribution of a discrete random
variable X, which is defined to equal Pr(X ≤ x).
2.2.3.2 Bernoulli Distribution
Bernoulli distribution is a finite discrete probability distribution where a random
variable can take on only two values. The two values are usually 0 and 1, where 0
and 1 are artificial; for example, we can let 0 and 1 respectively denote failure and
success of a test.
Let Pr(X = 1) = p, then we have Pr(X = 0) = 1 − Pr(X = 1) = 1 − p. The
mathematical expectation of such a Bernoulli distribution is p× 1+ (1− p)× 0 = p.
2.2.3.3 Binomial Distribution
Binomial distribution is a finite discrete probability distribution where a random
variable can be represented to be the sum of the successive results of independent
trials of a Bernoulli experiment. Suppose that X1, X2, · · · , XN are the results of N
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independent trials of a Bernoulli experiment (as described in Section 2.2.3.2). Let a
random variable Y be the sum of X1, X2, · · · , XN , (i.e. Y = X1 +X2 + · · ·+XN ),
then the distribution of Y is defined by the following probability function, where
k = 0, 1, · · · , N .
Pr(Y = k) = Pr(X1 +X2 + · · ·+XN = k)
=
(
N
k
)
pk(1− p)N−k.
This distribution is called the binomial distribution with parameters n and p, written
Y ∼ Bin(N, p). The mathematical expectation of a binomial distribution Y ∼
Bin(N, p) is Np.
2.2.3.4 Poisson Distribution
Poisson distribution is a countably infinite discrete probability distribution. A ran-
dom variable X is said to have a Poisson distribution with parameter λ if and only
if
Pr(X = k) = e−λλk/k!, k = 0, 1, 2, · · · ,
where e(= 2.71828 · · · ) is the base of the natural logarithm.
We write X ∼ Poi(λ) for a random variable X having a Poisson distribution with
parameter λ. The mathematical expectation of a Poisson distribution X ∼ Poi(λ)
is λ.
2.2.3.5 Relationship between Binomial Distribution and Poisson Distribution
A Binomial distribution Y ∼ Bin(N, p) can be approximated with a Poisson distri-
bution Y ∼ Poi(Np) when N is large and p is small. That is,(
N
k
)
pk(1− p)N−k ≈ e−Np(Np)k/k!, k = 0, 1, 2, · · · , N.
A proof of this relationship is given in [72].
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2.2.4 Differential Cryptanalysis
Differential cryptanalysis was introduced in 1990 by Biham and Shamir [12]; it was
the first cryptanalytic method more effective than an exhaustive key search to be
proposed for the full DES [13, 14]. A similar method was used a little earlier by
Murphy [87] to analyse the FEAL block cipher [97].
Differential cryptanalysis takes advantage of how a specific difference in a pair of
inputs of a cipher or function can affect a difference in the pair of outputs of the
cipher or function, where the pair of outputs are obtained by encrypting the pair of
inputs using the same key. The notion of difference can be defined in several ways;
the most widely discussed is with respect to the XOR operation. The difference
between the inputs is called the input difference, the difference between the outputs
of a function is called the output difference, and the difference between internal
values is called an intermediate difference. The combination of the input difference
and the output difference is called a differential. The probability of a differential for
an S-box is defined as follows.
Definition 2.2 Suppose T is an m × n S-box. If γ is an m-bit block and δ is an
n-bit block, then the probability of the differential (γ, δ) for T, written ∆γ → ∆δ, is
defined to be
PrT(∆γ → ∆δ) = Pr
P∈{0,1}m
(T(P )⊕T(P ⊕ γ) = δ).
The following result follows trivially from Definition 2.2:
Proposition 2.1 If T is an m× n S-box, then
PrT(∆γ → ∆δ) = |{x ∈ {0, 1}
m|T(x)⊕T(x⊕ γ) = δ}|
2m
.
The (XOR) difference distribution table for an m× n S-box T is a table storing all
possible pairs of input and output differences (γ, δ) and the numbers of m-bit blocks
x (∈ {0, 1}m) such that T(x)⊕T(x⊕ γ) = δ.
The probability of a differential for a block cipher using a particular key is defined
as follows.
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Definition 2.3 Suppose E is an n-bit block cipher and K ∈ {0, 1}k is a key for E.
If α and β are n-bit blocks, then the probability of the differential (α, β) for EK ,
written ∆α→ ∆β, is defined to be
PrEK (∆α→ ∆β) = Pr
P∈{0,1}n
(EK(P )⊕EK(P ⊕ α) = β).
The following result follows trivially from Definition 2.3:
Proposition 2.2 If E is an n-bit block cipher, and K ∈ {0, 1}k is a key for E, and
α and β are n-bit blocks. Then
PrEK (∆α→ ∆β) =
|{x|EK(x)⊕EK(x⊕ α) = β, x ∈ {0, 1}n}|
2n
.
Sometimes we refer to the differential of a block cipher without specifying the key.
For most currently studied block ciphers the differential probabilities do not depend
on the key used, and so this is reasonable practice.
There may be a number of different intermediate differences that give rise to the
same differential. A sequence of intermediate differences that give rise to a particular
differential is called a differential characteristic. That is, a differential is the set of all
the differential characteristics with the same input difference and output difference.
A differential (characteristic) for r consecutive rounds is often called an r-round
differential (characteristic). An r-round differential (characteristic) that has a prob-
ability of p is often called an r-round differential (characteristic) with probability
p.
Given a set of cPrEK (∆α→∆β)
pairs of plaintexts with difference α, (for some c > 1),
then, if they are all encrypted using the key K, the expected number of pairs of
ciphertexts with a difference of β is equal to cPrEK (∆α→∆β)
· PrEK (∆α → ∆β) =
c. If, on the other hand, these pairs are input to a randomly chosen function,
then the expected number of pairs of outputs with a difference of β is equal to
c
PrEK (∆α→∆β)
·2−n = c2n·PrEK (∆α→∆β) . Therefore, if PrEK (∆α→ ∆β) is larger than
2−n, we can use the differential to distinguish the block cipher from a randomly
chosen function, given a sufficient number of chosen plaintext pairs.
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Definition 2.4 With respect to a particular differential characteristic, an active S-
box is defined to be an S-box that has a non-zero input difference, and an inactive
S-box is defined to be an S-box that has a zero input difference.
Several extensions to differential cryptanalysis have been proposed, including high-
order differential cryptanalysis [56, 65], truncated differential cryptanalysis [56],
impossible differential cryptanalysis [4, 57], and the boomerang and rectangle at-
tacks [6, 48, 103]. In this chapter we restrict our attention to impossible differential
cryptanalysis and the boomerang and rectangle attacks.
2.2.5 Linear Cryptanalysis
Linear cryptanalysis was introduced in 1992 by Matsui and Yamagishi [84], who used
it to analyse the FEAL cipher. In 1993, Matsui [83] presented a linear cryptanalysis
attack on the full DES.
Linear cryptanalysis exploits correlations between a particular linear function of the
input blocks and a second linear function of the output blocks. The most widely used
linear function involves computing the bitwise dot product operation of the block
with a specific binary vector (the specific value combined with the input blocks may
be different from the value applied to the output blocks). The combination of the
two linear functions is called a linear approximation. The probability of a linear
approximation is defined as follows.
Definition 2.5 Suppose E is an n-bit block cipher and K ∈ {0, 1}k is a key for E.
If α and β are n-bit blocks, then the probability of the linear approximation (α, β),
written Γα→ Γβ, is defined to be
PrEK (Γα→ Γβ) = Pr
P∈{0,1}n
(P ¯ α = EK(P )¯ β),
where ¯ represents the dot product of two bit strings regarded as binary vectors.
We refer to the dot product P¯α as the input parity, and the dot product EK(P )¯β
as the output parity.
30
2.2 Cryptanalytic Methods
The following result follows trivially from Definition 2.5:
Proposition 2.3 If E is an n-bit block cipher, and K ∈ {0, 1}k is a key for E, and
α and β are n-bit blocks. Then
PrEK (Γα→ Γβ) =
|{x|x¯ α = EK(x)¯ β, x ∈ {0, 1}n}|
2n
.
For a randomly chosen function, the expected probability of a linear approximation
for any pair (α, β) is 12 .
Definition 2.6 The bias of a linear approximation Γα → Γβ, denoted by ², is
defined to be
² = |PrEK (Γα→ Γβ)−
1
2
|.
Thus, if the bias ² is sufficiently large, we can use the linear approximation to
distinguish a block cipher from a randomly chosen function, given a sufficient number
of matching plaintext/ciphertext pairs.
Several extensions to linear cryptanalysis have been proposed, including bilinear
cryptanalysis [17], linear cryptanalysis using multiple approximations [46], linear
cryptanalysis using nonlinear approximations [59] and linear cryptanalysis using
chosen plaintexts [58].
2.2.6 Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis
Differential-linear cryptanalysis was introduced in 1994 by Langford and Hellman [67];
it is a combination of differential and linear cryptanalysis. In 2002, Biham, Dunkel-
man and Keller [7] presented an enhanced version.
Proposition 2.4 Suppose block cipher E : {0, 1}k×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is represented
as a cascade of two sub-ciphers E = E0 ◦ E1 and K ∈ {0, 1}k is a key for E.
Suppose also that there exists a differential ∆α → ∆β with probability p for E0K
and a linear approximation Γγ → Γδ with bias ² for E1K . If P ′ is chosen uniformly
at random from {0, 1}n, and P ∗ = P ′ ⊕ α, then (under an assumption about the
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random behaviour of E)
Pr(δ ¯EK(P ′)⊕ δ ¯EK(P ∗) = γ ¯ β) = 12 + 2p²
2.
Proof. Given a plaintext pair (P ′, P ∗ = P ′ ⊕ α), where P ′ is chosen uniformly
at random from {0, 1}n, we obtain E0K(P ′) ⊕ E0K(P ∗) = β with probability p, γ ¯
E0K(P
′) = δ ¯EK(P ′) with bias ², and γ ¯E0K(P ∗) = δ ¯EK(P ∗) with bias ². We
therefore obtain δ ¯EK(P ′)⊕ δ ¯EK(P ∗) = γ ¯ β with a probability of
p · [(1
2
+ ²) · (1
2
+ ²) + (
1
2
− ²) · (1
2
− ²)] = p(1
2
+ 2²2).
If E0K(P
′)⊕E0K(P ∗) 6= β, we assume that the value of δ ¯EK(P ′)⊕ δ ¯EK(P ∗) is
distributed uniformly. Hence δ ¯EK(P ′)⊕ δ ¯EK(P ∗) = γ ¯ β with probability
p(
1
2
+ 2²2) + (1− p) · 1
2
=
1
2
+ 2p²2.
Therefore, Proposition 2.4 holds. ¤
If, by contrast, E is a randomly chosen function, then the expected probability that
δ ¯ EK(P ′) ⊕ δ ¯ EK(P ∗) = γ ¯ β is 12 . Therefore, if the bias 2p²2 is sufficiently
large, we can distinguish the block cipher from a randomly chosen function, given a
sufficient number of matching plaintext/ciphertext pairs.
2.2.7 Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis
Impossible differential cryptanalysis was independently introduced by Knudsen [57]
in 1998 and Biham, Biryukov and Shamir [4] in 1999.
An impossible differential is a differential with a probability of zero. Such a differen-
tial is typically constructed in a miss-in-the-middle manner [5]; that is, a differential
with probability 1 is concatenated with another differential with probability 1, where
the intermediate differences of the two differentials contradict one another.
Impossible differential cryptanalysis uses one or more impossible differentials, writ-
ten ∆α 9 ∆β, and it usually treats a block cipher E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n
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as a cascade of three sub-ciphers E = Ea ◦ E0 ◦ Eb, where E0 denotes the rounds
for which α 9 β holds, Ea denotes a number of rounds before E0, and Eb denotes
a number of rounds after E0.
Given a guess for the subkeys used in Ea and Eb, if a plaintext pair produces
a difference of α just after Ea, and its corresponding ciphertext pair produces a
difference of β just before Eb, then this guess for the subkeys must be incorrect.
Thus, given a sufficient number of matching plaintext/ciphertext pairs, an attacker
can find the correct subkey by discarding the wrong guesses.
2.2.8 Boomerang and Rectangle Attacks
The boomerang attack was introduced in 1999 by Wagner [103]. Such an attack uses
two differentials on two different parts of the cipher, instead of a single differential
on the entire cipher.
A boomerang attack uses something called a boomerang distinguisher. To define
a boomerang distinguisher we need to treat a block cipher E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n as a cascade of two sub-ciphers E0 and E1, where E = E0 ◦ E1. Suppose
K ∈ {0, 1}k is a key for E. A boomerang distinguisher is then defined to be a pair of
differentials (∆α → ∆β,∆γ → ∆δ), where ∆α → ∆β is a differential for E0K with
probability p, ∆γ → ∆δ is a differential for E1K with probability q, and p · q > 2−
n
2 .
Suppose we choose N pairs of plaintext blocks (P, P ∗) where P ∗ = P⊕α. We denote
respectively by C and C∗ the ciphertext blocks for the plaintext blocks P and P ∗
encrypted using the block cipher E under key K.
Then, if we apply E0K to each of these pairs, we will obtain approximately Np pairs
(E0K(P ),E
0
K(P
∗)) with the property that E0K(P )⊕E0K(P ∗) = β.
Next, we choose N pairs of ciphertext blocks (C ′ = C⊕δ, C ′∗ = C∗⊕δ). If we apply
(E1K)
−1 to each of the pairs (C,C ′), we get that (E1K)
−1(C) ⊕ (E1K)−1(C ′) = γ
with probability q; if we apply (E1K)
−1 to each of the pairs (C∗, C ′∗), we get
that (E1K)
−1(C∗) ⊕ (E1K)−1(C ′∗) = γ with probability q. Therefore, we will ob-
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Figure 2.1: The boomerang and amplified boomerang distinguishers
tain approximately Npq2 pairs ((E1K)
−1(C ′), (E1K)
−1(C ′∗)) with the property that
(E1K)
−1(C ′)⊕ (E1K)−1(C ′∗) = β. This is because
(E1K)
−1(C ′)⊕ (E1K)−1(C ′∗)
= (E1K)
−1(C)⊕ (E1K)−1(C∗)⊕ (E1K)−1(C)⊕ (E1K)−1(C ′)⊕ (E1K)−1(C∗)⊕
(E1K)
−1(C ′∗)
= β ⊕ γ ⊕ γ
= β.
Therefore, we will get Np2q2 pairs of plaintext blocks ((EK)−1(C ′), (EK)−1(C ′∗))
with the property that (EK)−1(C ′) ⊕ (EK)−1(C ′∗) = α. Figure 2.1(a) depicts the
boomerang distinguisher.
However, for a randomly chosen function, the expected number of plaintext pairs
(P ′, P ′∗) with the property that P ′ ⊕ P ′∗ = α is approximately N · 2−n.
Therefore, if p · q > 2−n2 , the boomerang distinguisher can effectively distinguish
between E and a randomly chosen function, given a sufficient number of adaptive
chosen plaintexts and ciphertexts.
In 2000, Kelsey, Kohno and Schneier [48] presented a variant of the boomerang
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attack, known as the amplified boomerang attack.
An amplified boomerang attack uses something called an amplified boomerang dis-
tinguisher. To define an amplified boomerang distinguisher we also need to treat a
block cipher E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n as a cascade of two sub-ciphers E0 and
E1, where E = E0◦E1. SupposeK ∈ {0, 1}k is a key for E. An amplified boomerang
distinguisher is then defined to be a pair of differentials (∆α → ∆β,∆γ → ∆δ),
where ∆α→ ∆β is a differential for E0K with probability p, ∆γ → ∆δ is a differen-
tial for E1K with probability q, and p · q > 2−
n
2 .
A right quartet consists of two pairs of plaintext blocks (P, P ∗ = P ⊕ α) and
(P ′, P ′∗ = P ′ ⊕ α) satisfying the following three conditions; see Figure 2.1(b).
C1: E0K(P )⊕E0K(P ∗) = E0K(P ′)⊕E0K(P ′∗) = β;
C2: E0K(P )⊕E0K(P ′) = E0K(P ∗)⊕E0K(P ′∗) = γ;
C3: EK(P )⊕EK(P ′) = EK(P ∗)⊕EK(P ′∗) = δ.
Suppose we choose N pairs of plaintext blocks (P, P ∗) where P ∗ = P ⊕ α. These
pairs yield
(
N
2
)
= N(N−1)2 candidate quartets ((P, P
∗), (P ′, P ′∗)), where (P ′, P ′∗) 6=
(P, P ∗) ∈ {(P, P ∗)}.
Then, if we apply E0K to each of these quartets, we will obtain approximately Np
2
quartets ((P, P ∗), (P ′, P ′∗)) with the property that E0K(P ) ⊕ E0K(P ∗) = E0K(P ′) ⊕
E0K(P
′∗) = β.
Assuming that the intermediate values after E0K are distributed uniformly over all
possible values, we get E0K(P )⊕E0K(P ′) = γ with probability 2−n. Once this occurs,
E0K(P
∗)⊕E0K(P ′∗) = γ holds as well, as
E0K(P
∗)⊕E0K(P ′∗)
= E0K(P )⊕E0K(P ∗)⊕E0K(P ′)⊕E0K(P ′∗)⊕E0K(P )⊕E0K(P ′)
= γ.
Therefore, the expected number of candidate quartets ((P, P ∗), (P ′, P ′∗)) with the
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property that EK(P )⊕EK(P ′) = EK(P ∗)⊕E0K(P ′∗) = δ is approximately
N(N − 1)
2
· 2−n · p2 · q2.
However, for a randomly chosen function, the expected number of candidate quartets
((P, P ∗), (P ′, P ′∗)) with the property thatEK(P )⊕EK(P ′) = EK(P ∗)⊕E0K(P ′∗) = δ
is approximately N(N−1)2 · 2−2n.
Therefore, if p · q > 2−n2 , the amplified boomerang distinguisher can effectively
distinguish between E and a randomly chosen function, given a sufficient number of
chosen plaintexts.
In 2001, Biham, Dunkelman and Keller [6] presented an improvement of the ampli-
fied boomerang attack, known as the rectangle attack.
The rectangle attack improves over an amplified boomerang attack by allowing β to
take any possible value β′ in E0K and γ to take any possible value γ
′ in E1K , as long
as β′ 6= γ′. As a result, given the same number of plaintext pairs as described in
the above amplified boomerang attack, the expected number of candidate quartets
((P, P ∗), (P ′, P ′∗)) with the property thatEK(P )⊕EK(P ′) = EK(P ∗)⊕E0K(P ′∗) = δ
is approximately
N(N − 1)
2
· (p̂ · q̂)2 · 2−n,
where p̂ = (
∑
β′ Pr
2
E0K
(∆α→ ∆β′)) 12 and q̂ = (∑γ′ Pr2E1K (∆γ′ → ∆δ)) 12 .
Other extensions to the boomerang attack include the differential-linear boomerang
attack [8] and the differential-bilinear boomerang attack [8].
2.2.9 Related-Key Cryptanalysis
Related-key cryptanalysis was independently introduced by Knudsen [55] in 1992
and Biham [3] in 1993.
Related-key cryptanalysis takes advantage of how a specific difference in a pair of
inputs of a cipher or function can affect a difference in the pair of outputs of the
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cipher or function, where the pair of outputs are obtained by encrypting the pair of
inputs using two different keys with a specific difference. The notion of difference
can be defined in several ways; the most widely discussed is with respect to the
XOR operation. The difference between the inputs is called the input difference,
the difference between the outputs of a function is called the output difference,
the difference between internal values is called an intermediate difference, and the
difference between the user keys is called the user key difference. If we denote by
K,K ′ the two related keys, then the combination of the input difference and the
output difference is called a related-key differential under keys K and K ′.
Related-key cryptanalysis assumes that the attacker knows or can choose the key
difference. This assumption means that it is difficult or even infeasible to conduct
such an attack in many applications. Anyway, as demonstrated in [49, 50], certain
current real-world applications may allow for practical related-key attacks, including
key-exchange protocols and hash functions.
The probability of a related-key differential under keysK andK ′, written ∆α→ ∆β,
is defined as the probability that the input difference propagates to the output
difference under K and K ′; more formally, it is defined as follows.
Definition 2.7 Suppose E is a block cipher and K,K ′ ∈ {0, 1}k are keys for the
cipher. If α and β are n-bit blocks, then the probability of the related-key differential
for the pair (α, β) under the related keys K and K ′, written ∆α → ∆β, is defined
to be
PrEK ,EK′ (∆α→ ∆β) = PrP∈{0,1}n(EK(P )⊕EK′(P ⊕ α) = β).
The following result follows trivially from Definition 2.7:
Proposition 2.5 If E is an n-bit block cipher, K,K ′ ∈ {0, 1}k are keys for the
cipher, and α and β are n-bit blocks, then
PrEK ,EK′ (∆α→ ∆β) =
|{x|EK(x)⊕EK′(x⊕ α) = β, x ∈ {0, 1}n}|
2n
.
Sometimes we refer to the related-key differential of a block cipher without spec-
ifying the related keys. For most currently studied block ciphers the differential
probabilities do not depend on the keys used, and so this is reasonable practice.
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There may be a number of different intermediate related-key differences that give
rise to the same related-key differential. A sequence of intermediate related-key
differences that give rise to a particular related-key differential is called a related-
key differential characteristic. That is, a related-key differential is the set of all the
related-key differential characteristics with the same input difference and output
difference under the same related keys.
A related-key differential (characteristic) for r consecutive rounds is often called an
r-round related-key differential (characteristic). An r-round related-key differential
(characteristic) that has a probability of p is often called an r-round related-key
differential (characteristic) with probability p.
In the following, we briefly describe the related-key rectangle attack, which is a
combination of the related-key arrack and the rectangle attack.
The related-key rectangle attack [9, 40, 53] uses something called a related-key rect-
angle distinguisher. Like a rectangle distinguisher, a related-key rectangle distin-
guisher treats a block cipher E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n as a cascade of two
sub-ciphers E0 and E1, where E = E0 ◦ E1. Typically, such a related-key rect-
angle distinguisher works in a related-key attack scenario involving four related
keys KA,KB,KC ,KD satisfying KA ⊕ KB = KC ⊕ KD = ∆K0 and KA ⊕ KC =
KB ⊕KD = ∆K1, where ∆K0 and ∆K1 are two known differences, and is made up
of four groups of related-key differentials:
• all the possible related-key differentials ∆α → ∆β for E0 under related keys
KA and KB, where β is any possible output difference;
• all the possible related-key differentials ∆α → ∆β for E0 under related keys
KC and KD, where β is any possible output difference;
• all the possible related-key differentials ∆γ → ∆δ for E1 under related keys
KA and KC , where γ is any possible input difference;
• all the possible related-key differentials ∆γ → ∆δ for E1 under related keys
KB and KD, where γ is any possible input difference.
A right quartet consists of two pairs of plaintexts (P, P ∗ = P ⊕ α) and (P ′, P ′∗ =
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Figure 2.2: A related-key rectangle distinguisher
P ′ ⊕ α) satisfying the following three conditions; see Figure 2.2.
C1: E0KA(P )⊕E0KB (P ∗) = E0KC (P ′)⊕E0KD(P ′∗) = β,
C2: E0KA(P )⊕E0KC (P ′) = E0KB (P ∗)⊕E0KD(P ′∗) = γ,
C3: EKA(P )⊕EKC (P ′) = EKB (P ∗)⊕EKD(P ′∗) = δ.
Assuming that the intermediate values after E0 are distributed uniformly over all
possible values, then we can get E0KA(P )⊕E0KC (P ′) = γ with probability 2−n. Once
this occurs, by C1 we know that E0KB (P
∗) ⊕ E0KD(P ′∗) = γ holds with probability
1, for
E0KB(P
∗)⊕E0KD(P ′∗)
= (E0KA(P )⊕E0KB (P ∗))⊕ (E0KC (P ′)⊕E0KD(P ′∗))⊕ (E0KA(P )⊕E0KC (P ′))
= β ⊕ β ⊕ γ
= γ.
As a result, the probability that the quartet satisfies C3 is expected to be approxi-
mately∑
β,γ
(PrE0KA ,E
0
KB
(∆α→ ∆β))2 · 2−n · (PrE1KA ,E1KC (∆γ → ∆δ))
2 = 2−n · (p̂ · q̂)2,
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where p̂ = (
∑
β′ Pr
2
E0KA
,E0KB
(∆α→ ∆β′)) 12 and q̂ = (∑γ′ Pr2E1KA ,E1KC (∆γ′ → ∆δ)) 12 .
For a random function, the probability that the quartet satisfies C3 is approximately
2−n×2 = 2−2n.
Therefore, if p̂ · q̂ > 2−n2 , the related-key rectangle distinguisher can distinguish
between E and a random function given a sufficient number of chosen plaintext
pairs.
Note that there exist three types of related-key rectangle attacks, which correspond
to the following three cases.
• TYPE 1: ∆K0 6= 0,∆K1 6= 0, (four keys);
• TYPE 2: ∆K0 = 0,∆K1 6= 0, (two keys);
• TYPE 3: ∆K0 6= 0,∆K1 = 0, (two keys).
2.3 Summary
In this chapter we have briefly reviewed a number of cryptanalytic methods for block
ciphers. In subsequent chapters we use and extend these techniques to obtain new
cryptanalytic results for a range of block ciphers.
It is very worthy to note that the statistical methods described above generally
treat a basic unit of input (i.e. a chosen-plaintext pair for differential cryptanalysis,
differential-linear cryptanalysis, and impossible differential cryptanalysis; a known-
plaintext for linear cryptanalysis; and a quartet of (adaptive) chosen plaintexts for
boomerang and (related-key) rectangle attacks) as a Bernoulli random variable, and
assume that given a set of inputs of the basic unit, the inputs that satisfy the required
property have (or can be approximated by) a binomial distribution.
The methods we consider here are all statistical in nature; they typically require
assuming that the output of one intermediate round is uniformly distributed, and
is independent from that of previous rounds. As Handschuh and Naccache [31]
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mention, this is “most often not exactly the case, but as often it is a good approxi-
mation”. This means that, in some cases, the success probability of the attack may
be overestimated. However, in the absence of any evidence one way or the other,
it seems reasonable to take the worst case assumption from the point of the user of
the cipher. As a result we make use of assumptions regarding uniform distributions
at various places in this thesis.
Other cryptanalytic methods not considered here include integral cryptanalysis [20,
60, 82] and algebraic cryptanalysis [18]. These techniques are different in nature
from those described above.
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Chapter 3
The Impossible Boomerang Attack
In this chapter we propose a new extension of differential cryptanalysis, named the
impossible boomerang attack. We also describe a variant of this attack which applies
in a related-key attack scenario.
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3.1 Introduction
Most modern block ciphers are designed to be provably secure against differential
cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis [94, 95]. Thus proposing new cryptanalytic
techniques is always desirable in the sense that it provides a better evaluation of the
security of a block cipher and also enables more secure ciphers to be designed.
Impossible differential cryptanalysis and the boomerang-type attacks (including the
boomerang, amplified boomerang and rectangle attacks as well as their related-key
variants) have been used to yield the best currently published cryptanalytic results
for a number of state-of-the-art block ciphers [2, 9, 52, 64, 76, 111]. These techniques
are thus clearly of importance.
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In this chapter, inspired by the ideas that impossible differential cryptanalysis and
the boomerang attack use, we propose a new extension of differential cryptanalysis,
which we call the impossible boomerang attack. Such an attack is based on the use
of a so-called impossible boomerang distinguisher, which, like a boomerang attack,
treats a block cipher E as two sub-ciphers E0◦E1. It uses two (or more) differentials
with probability 1 for E0 and two (or more) differentials with probability 1 for E1,
where the XOR of the intermediate differences of these differentials is not equal to
zero. We then describe a variant of this attack that applies in a related-key scenario,
giving rise to what we call a related-key impossible boomerang attack.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 3.2 we propose the
impossible boomerang attack. In Section 3.3 we briefly describe the variant of the
impossible boomerang attack in a related-key attack scenario. In Section 3.4 we
compare the impossible boomerang attack with impossible differential cryptanalysis
and the boomerang-type attacks. Section 3.5 summarises this chapter.
3.2 The Impossible Boomerang Attack
Typically, when formulating a differential cryptanalysis attack, it is desirable to use
a differential operating on as many rounds of the cipher as possible. Of course, the
more rounds the differential operates on, the smaller its probability is likely to be.
As described in Section 3.2.1, the boomerang attack is based on a somewhat differ-
ent idea, namely of using two short differentials with relatively large probabilities,
instead of using a differential operating on as many rounds as possible with a small
probability. Impossible differential cryptanalysis involves using a differential that
will never happen under any situation. The attack we describe in this chapter, i.e.
what we call the impossible boomerang attack, combines the boomerang attack with
impossible differential cryptanalysis. Possible combinations of cryptanalytic tech-
niques have been proposed in the past, and have proved effective [8, 9, 34, 40, 53, 67];
a good example is provided by differential-linear cryptanalysis [7, 67].
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3.2.1 The Basic Impossible Boomerang Attack
As mentioned earlier, an impossible boomerang attack is constructed on an impos-
sible boomerang distinguisher.
3.2.1.1 Distinguisher Using Two Tuples
An impossible boomerang distinguisher is defined as follows. Like a boomerang
distinguisher, an impossible boomerang distinguisher treats a block cipher E :
{0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n as two sub-ciphers E0 ◦ E1. Such a distinguisher is
made up of four related differentials (or truncated differentials [56]), two for E0
and two for (E1)−1, all of which must have probability 1. That is, an impossible
boomerang distinguisher consists of:
• a differential ∆α→ ∆β with probability 1 for E0;
• a differential ∆α′ → ∆β′ with probability 1 for E0;
• a differential ∆δ → ∆γ with probability 1 for (E1)−1;
• a differential ∆δ′ → ∆γ′ with probability 1 for (E1)−1,
where α, α′, β, β′, γ, γ′, δ and δ′ are all n-bit blocks, and β, β′, γ and γ′ meet the
condition β ⊕ β′ ⊕ γ ⊕ γ′ 6= 0. An impossible boomerang distinguisher is shown
pictorially in Figure 3.1(a).
The following theorem provides the theoretical basis for the impossible boomerang
attack.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose that X and X ′ are n-bit blocks and K is a key for an n-bit
block cipher E, where E = E0 ◦ E1 for some E0 and E1. Suppose that ∆α → ∆β
and ∆α′ → ∆β′ are differentials with probability 1 for E0K , and ∆δ → ∆γ and
∆δ′ → ∆γ′ are differentials with probability 1 for (E1K)−1, where β⊕β′⊕γ⊕γ′ 6= 0.
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Figure 3.1: Impossible boomerang and related-key impossible boomerang distin-
guishers
Then the following pair of equations cannot both hold:
EK(X)⊕EK(X ′) = δ, (3.1)
EK(X ⊕ α)⊕EK(X ′ ⊕ α) = δ′. (3.2)
Proof. Suppose that equations (3.1) and (3.2) both hold for some X, X ′ and K.
Since both the differentials ∆α→ ∆β and ∆α′ → ∆β′ for E0K hold with probability
1, we have
E0K(X)⊕E0K(X ⊕ α) = β,
E0K(X
′)⊕E0K(X ′ ⊕ α′) = β′.
As both the differentials ∆δ′ → ∆γ′ and ∆δ → ∆γ for (E1K)−1 hold with probability
1, we can get the following equation with probability 1:
E0K(X
′)⊕E0K(X ′ ⊕ α)
= (E0K(X
′)⊕E0K(X))⊕ (E0K(X)⊕E0K(X ⊕ α))⊕ (E0K(X ⊕ α)⊕E0K(X ′ ⊕ α))
= ((E1K)
−1(EK(X ′))⊕ (E1K)−1(EK(X)))⊕ (E0K(X)⊕E0K(X ⊕ α))⊕
((E1K)
−1(EK(X ⊕ α))⊕ (E1K)−1(EK(X ′ ⊕ α)))
= γ ⊕ β ⊕ γ′.
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Hence, from the above discussion we get that E0K(X
′)⊕E0K(X ′⊕α) = β′ = γ⊕β⊕γ′
holds. However, this contradicts with the condition that β ⊕ β′ ⊕ γ ⊕ γ′ 6= 0.
Therefore, Theorem 3.1 holds. ¤
From Theorem 3.1 we know that a distinguisher of the form shown in Figure 3.1(a)
can never occur; we call it an impossible boomerang distinguisher, written (∆α,∆α′)
9 (∆δ,∆δ′).
Note that the two differentials for E0 or E1 may be identical, as long as the condition
β ⊕ β′ ⊕ γ ⊕ γ′ 6= 0 holds.
3.2.1.2 A Key Recovery Attack
An impossible boomerang attack involves treating a block cipher E : {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}k → {0, 1}n as a cascade of four sub-ciphers E = Ea◦E0◦E1◦Eb, where E0◦E1
denotes the rounds for which the impossible boomerang distinguisher (∆α,∆α′)9
(∆δ,∆δ′) holds, Ea denotes a number of rounds before E0, and Eb denotes a number
of rounds after E1.
In a chosen plaintext attack scenario, given a guess for the subkeys used in Ea and
Eb, the impossible boomerang attack involves checking whether a candidate quartet
consisting of two pairs of plaintext blocks meets the differential conditions required
by the impossible boomerang distinguisher. Specifically, suppose Ka is the guess
for the subkey used in Ea, and Kb is the guess for the subkey used in Eb, then the
attacker checks whether a candidate quartet of known plaintext/ciphertext pairs
(((P,C), (P ∗, C∗)), ((P ′, C ′), (P ′, C ′∗))) satisfies the following four conditions:
EaKa(P )⊕EaKa(P ∗) = α, (3.3)
EaKa(P
′)⊕EaKa(P ′∗) = α′, (3.4)
(EbKb)
−1(C)⊕ (EbKb)−1(C ′) = δ, (3.5)
(EbKb)
−1(C∗)⊕ (EbKb)−1(C ′∗) = δ′. (3.6)
If there exists a candidate quartet satisfying equations (3.3)–(3.6), then the subkey
guess (Ka,Kb) must be incorrect, and can be discarded. Thus, given a sufficient
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number of chosen plaintext pairs, the attacker can find the correct subkeys used in
Ea and Eb by discarding the wrong guesses.
3.2.2 The Impossible Boomerang Attack Using More Tuples
The impossible boomerang distinguisher described above uses two tuples, i.e. (X,X∗
= X⊕α) and (X ′, X ′∗ = X ′⊕α′). In fact, we can construct an impossible boomerang
distinguisher using more tuples.
For example, suppose we have a third tuple (X ′′, X ′′∗ = X ′′⊕α′′), and we have two
additional differentials ∆α′′ → ∆β′′ and ∆δ′′ → ∆γ′′ for E0 and E1, respectively,
both with probability 1. Suppose also that β ⊕ β′ ⊕ β′′ ⊕ γ ⊕ γ′ ⊕ γ′′ 6= 0. Then
we can construct a 6-fold impossible boomerang distinguisher, which can be used to
construct an attack, given a sufficient number of plaintext pairs.
3.3 The Related-Key Impossible Boomerang Attack
In a related-key attack scenario [3, 49, 55], the attacker is assumed to know the
specific differences between one or more pairs of unknown keys.
A related-key impossible boomerang distinguisher treats a block cipher E : {0, 1}k×
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n as two sub-ciphers E0 ◦E1. Typically, such a distinguisher works
in a related-key attack scenario involving four related keys KA,KB,KC ,KD, and is
made up of four related-key differentials, two for E0 and two for (E1)−1, all of which
must have probability 1. That is, a related-key impossible boomerang distinguisher
consists of:
• a related-key differential ∆α → ∆β with probability 1 for E0 under keys KA
and KB;
• a related-key differential ∆α′ → ∆β′ with probability 1 for E0 under keys KC
and KD;
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• a related-key differential ∆δ → ∆γ with probability 1 for (E1)−1 under keys
KA and KC ;
• a related-key differential ∆δ′ → ∆γ′ with probability 1 for (E1)−1 under keys
KB and KD,
where α, α′, β, β′, γ, γ′, δ and δ′ are all n-bit blocks, and β, β′, γ and γ′ meet the
condition β ⊕ β′ ⊕ γ ⊕ γ′ 6= 0. A related-key impossible boomerang distinguisher is
depicted in Figure 3.1(b).
Similarly we can learn that such a related-key distinguisher is impossible and allows
us to conduct a related-key impossible boomerang attack given a sufficient number
of chosen plaintext pairs.
3.4 A Comparison
From an impossible boomerang distinguisher we can always obtain an impossible
differential for the same number of rounds. Consider an impossible boomerang
distinguisher using two tuples; from the condition β ⊕ β′ ⊕ γ ⊕ γ′ 6= 0 we have
β⊕γ 6= β′⊕γ′, which implies that the values β⊕γ and β′⊕γ′ cannot both be equal
to zero. The above result applies when using two tuples, since the four differentials
required by the impossible boomerang distinguisher have a probability of one. A
similar result holds when using more tuples.
However, this relationship does not hold for their variants in a related-key attack
scenario. When formulating a related-key impossible differential, choosing the sub-
key difference for E0 usually incurs a fixed subkey difference for E1, and vice versa;
but when formulating a related-key impossible boomerang distinguisher we have
more flexibility in choosing the subkey differences for E0 and E1: we can use a sub-
key difference for E0 and use a completely irrelevant subkey difference for E1, and
even more flexibly, we can use two different subkey differences for E0 or E1. These
flexibilities in choosing the key differences may enable us to break more rounds of a
block cipher using a related-key impossible boomerang attack.
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The (related-key) impossible boomerang attack gives us different choices on the
(related-key) differentials used as well as the plaintexts required, and can be treated
as multi-dimensional (related-key) impossible differential cryptanalysis.
The advantages of the (related-key) impossible boomerang attack over the boomerang-
type attacks are analogous to those of (related-key) impossible differential crypt-
analysis over (related-key) differential cryptanalysis. A block cipher resistant to
boomerang-type attacks will not necessarily resist a (related-key) impossible boomerang
attack. In boomerang-type distinguishers, one generally assumes that the output
of one intermediate round of the cipher is uniformly distributed and is independent
from that of previous rounds, while an impossible boomerang distinguisher does not
require this assumption, which is often observed to be not the truth [105]. There-
fore, a (related-key) impossible boomerang distinguisher is more reasonable than
boomerang-type distinguishers.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, inspired by the notions of impossible differential cryptanalysis and
the boomerang attack, we have proposed a new extension of differential cryptanal-
ysis, called the impossible boomerang attack. We have also described a variant of
this attack that applies in a related-key attack scenario.
In Chapter 5 we have applied the impossible boomerang attack to break 6-round
AES-128, 7-round AES-192 and 7-round AES-256 in a single key attack scenario, and
8-round AES-192 and 9-round AES-256 in a related-key attack scenario involving
two keys.
The (related-key) impossible boomerang attack is a general cryptanalytic technique
and can potentially be used to cryptanalyse other block ciphers. It is likely to be
particularly useful in cryptanalysing ciphers with a simple key schedule in a related-
key attack scenario.
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Chapter 4
The Early Abort Technique
In this chapter we give a general description of early abort techniques for (related-
key) impossible differential cryptanalysis and rectangle attacks. In some circum-
stances these techniques can be used to improve the efficiency of such attacks.
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4.1 Introduction
Certain cryptanalytic techniques for block ciphers involve exhaustive searches over
one or more subkeys (some of the bits of which may already be known). The means
used to eliminate possibilities for the subkeys are dependent on the cryptanalysis
method. Nevertheless, we can identify a general approach, which we call the early
abort technique, which applies to more than one type of cryptanalysis.
This technique involves taking advantage of special properties of the block cipher
round function. In some cases the structure of the round function itself, when com-
bined with the particular approach to eliminating subkey possibilities, enables the
subkey search to be partitioned, so that some subkey bits can be tested indepen-
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dently of the values of other subkey bits. This has the potential to significantly
reduce the size of the exhaustive search.
In this chapter we consider in detail two examples of the early abort technique as
applied to specific cryptanalytic techniques — (related-key) impossible differential
cryptanalysis and (related-key) rectangle attacks.
Before proceeding, we observe that a similar technique was previously used in dif-
ferential cryptanalysis of DES [13]. As the permutation function of the DES round
structure is just a reordering of the output bits of the substitution layer, and not
a diffusion function, one can determine the output of an S-box without inverting a
diffusion function. More recently, the term ‘early abort’ has been extensively used
in the cryptanalysis of hash functions, where the technique is also sometimes known
as “early stop”.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 4.2 we describe an early
abort technique for (related-key) impossible differential cryptanalysis. In Section
4.3 we describe an early abort technique for the rectangle attack. In Section 4.4 we
describe an early abort technique for the related-key rectangle attack. Section 4.5
summarises the chapter.
4.2 Early Abort for (Related-Key) Impossible Differential
Cryptanalysis
As discussed in Section 2.2.7, impossible differential cryptanalysis uses one or more
impossible differentials, written ∆α 9 ∆β. Such an attack involves treating a
block cipher E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n as a cascade of three sub-ciphers:
E = Ea ◦ E0 ◦ Eb, where E0 denotes the rounds for which ∆α 9 ∆β holds, Ea
denotes the rounds before E0, and Eb denotes the rounds after E0.
Given a candidate for the subkeys used in Ea and Eb, if a plaintext pair produces
a difference of α immediately after Ea, and the corresponding known ciphertext
pair produces a difference of β immediately before Eb, then this candidate for the
subkey must be incorrect. More specifically, suppose Ka is the guess for the subkeys
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used in Ea, and Kb is the guess for the subkeys used in Eb. Then the candidate
(Ka,Kb) for the subkeys used in Ea and Eb is impossible if there is a pair of known
plaintext/ciphertext pairs ((P, P ′), (C,C ′)) satisfying the following two conditions:
EaKa(P )⊕EaKa(P ′) = α, (4.1)
(EbKb)
−1(C)⊕ (EbKb)−1(C ′) = β. (4.2)
Thus, given a sufficient number of matching plaintext/ciphertext pairs, we can find
the correct subkey by discarding the wrong guesses.
When checking whether a plaintext pair produces a difference of α just after Ea, as
in equation 4.1, (or the corresponding ciphertext pair produces a difference of β just
before Eb, as in equation 4.2), the ‘standard’ approach is to guess all the unknown
bits of the relevant round subkey necessary to partially encrypt (or decrypt) the
pair. Finally, one can check whether the pair produces the expected difference just
after (or before) the round.
As an example, consider a Feistel round function structure similar to that used in
Camellia, as shown in Figure 4.1. We assume that the round function F uses an
nonlinear substitution consisting ofm parallel S-boxes and a linear diffusion function
D. Suppose that (P, P ′) is a pair of plaintexts, (Li, Ri) is the input to the ith round
of the encryption of P , (L′i, R
′
i) is the input to the ith round of the encryption of P
′,
(Li+1, Ri+1) is the output of the ith round of the encryption of P , and (L′i+1, R
′
i+1)
is the output of the ith round of the encryption of P ′. For simplicity, we assume
that the final round of Ea is round i, and the current task for the attacker is to
check whether (F(Li)⊕Ri ⊕ F(L′i)⊕R′i)||(Li ⊕ L′i) = α.
When using the attack procedure described in Section 2.2.7, because of the use of
the function D, the attacker will need to guess all the required unknown bits of the
subkey K (i.e. those corresponding to the active S-boxes). The attacker must then
encrypt Li and L′i through the substitution layer to get the values F(Li ⊕K) and
F(L′i⊕K), and compute the difference F(Li⊕K)⊕F(L′i⊕K). Finally, the attacker
XORs this difference with the difference ∆Ri(= Ri ⊕R′i) to check whether the pair
(P, P ′) has the difference α after round i.
However, if D is linear, the round structure allows us to partially determine whether
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Figure 4.1: A Feistel round structure
the candidate pair (P, P ′) could produce the expected difference α by guessing only
a small fraction of the required round subkey bits at a time, instead of all of them
simultaneously. More specifically, since we know the expected difference α and the
intermediate values (Li||Ri) and (L′i||R′i) of the pair (P, P ′) just before the round,
we can compute the expected difference ∆S = D−1(Ri ⊕ R′i ⊕ αL) just before the
D function, where αL is the left half of α, because given our assumption that D is
linearly invertible. Only if the expected difference ∆S appears after the substitution
layer could the pair (P, P ′) produce the difference α after the round. We next guess
only the part of the required unknown subkey bits corresponding to one (or more)
active S-box, then encrypt the pair through the S-box, and finally check whether it
produces the corresponding partial difference of ∆S. If not, then the pair (P, P ′) is
not a valid candidate, and we can discard it immediately; otherwise, we guess another
part of the required round subkey bits corresponding to another active S-box, and
check again. A pair is a valid candidate only if it produces the corresponding partial
difference of ∆S under each part of the required set of subkey bits. After each guess,
some invalid candidate pairs can be discarded. This observation enables us to reduce
an attack’s computational workload, and, even more significantly, it may be possible
to break more rounds of a cipher.
More delicate applications depend on the specific (related-key) impossible differen-
tials used as well as the round function of the block cipher concerned. Examples
include the cryptanalyses of AES, Camellia and HIGHT described in Chapters 5, 6
and 10.
The early abort technique can be applied in almost the same way to related-key
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impossible differential cryptanalysis.
4.3 Early Abort for the Rectangle Attack
The rectangle attack, (like the amplified boomerang attack), involves treating a block
cipher E : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}k → {0, 1}n as a cascade of four sub-ciphers E = Ea ◦E0 ◦
E1 ◦ Eb, where E0 ◦ E1 denotes the rounds for which the rectangle distinguisher
holds, Ea denotes the rounds before E0, and Eb denotes the rounds after E1.
Given a guess for the subkeys used in Ea and Eb, the rectangle attack involves check-
ing whether a candidate quartet consisting of two pairs of plaintext blocks meets the
differential conditions required by the rectangle distinguisher. Specifically, suppose
Ka is the guess for the subkeys used in Ea, and Kb is the guess for the subkeys
used in Eb. Then the attacker checks whether a candidate quartet of known plain-
text/ciphertext pairs (((P,C), (P ∗, C∗)), ((P ′, C ′), (P ′∗, C ′∗))) satisfies the following
two conditions:
EaKa(P )⊕EaKa(P ∗) = EaKa(P ′)⊕EaKa(P ′∗) = α, (4.3)
(EbKb)
−1(C)⊕ (EbKb)−1(C ′) = (EbKb)−1(C∗)⊕ (EbKb)−1(C ′∗) = δ. (4.4)
This is shown in Figure 4.2(a).
In a chosen plaintext attack scenario, the attack involves choosing the pairs (P, P ∗)
and (P ′, P ′∗) in the following way.
1. Choose a plaintext, P say, and encrypt it with Ea under the guessKa to obtain
EaKa(P ).
2. Set P ∗ = (EaKa)
−1(EaKa(P )⊕ α).
3. Choose the pair (P ′, P ′∗) in the same way as (P, P ∗).
It is straightforward to verify that a quartet ((P, P ∗), (P ′, P ′∗)) selected in the above
way meets the conditions described in equation 4.3. The remaining problem is to
check whether it also meets the conditions described in equation 4.4.
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Figure 4.2: The rectangle and related-key rectangle attacks
The ‘standard’ approach to this is to simultaneously decrypt both the pairs (C,C ′)
and (C∗, C ′∗) through Eb by guessing the subkeys used in Eb. However, it may be
possible to partially determine whether or not a candidate quartet in a rectangle
attack is useful one or more rounds earlier than usual. More specifically, given that
we know the expected output difference δ after E1, we may also know the expected
output differences of one or more rounds after E1. Thus, we only need to guess
part of the subkeys in Eb in order to check whether a candidate quartet produces
one of the expected output differences in one or more of the rounds after E1. If
not, we can discard it immediately; otherwise, we then guess part (or all) of the
rest of the subkeys used in Eb, and check the quartet in a similar way. Since some
candidate quartets are discarded at each stage, this results in a smaller number of
computations overall, and may allow us to break more rounds, depending on how
many candidate quartets remain and how many subkeys it is necessary to guess.
We also observe that the check can be done a little more efficiently by decrypting
the two pairs in a candidate quartet in a staged way. To simplify the explanation,
we assume that there is only one round in Eb. If the first pair, (C,C ′) say, does not
meet the condition
(EbKb)
−1(C)⊕ (EbKb)−1(C ′) = δ,
then this candidate quartet is not useful, and we can discard it without decrypting
the second pair (C∗, C ′∗). If it meets this condition, then we decrypt the other pair
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(C∗, C ′∗) to check whether it meets the condition
(EbKb)
−1(C∗)⊕ (EbKb)−1(C ′∗) = δ.
When decrypting either pair from a quartet, we can also apply the technique intro-
duced in Section 4.2.
Generally, using this staged approach to decrypting quartets we can reduce an at-
tack’s computation workload by a factor of O(12). While this improvement is small
for a rectangle attack, it may be significant for a related-key rectangle attack.
4.4 Early Abort for the Related-Key Rectangle Attack
A related-key rectangle attack, (like the related-key amplified boomerang attack),
treats a block cipher E : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}k → {0, 1}n as a cascade of four sub-ciphers
E = Ea ◦ E0 ◦ E1 ◦ Eb, where E0 ◦ E1 denotes the rounds for which the rectangle
distinguisher holds, Ea denotes the rounds before E0, and Eb denotes the rounds
after E1.
Given a guess for the subkeys used in Ea and Eb, the related-key rectangle attack
involves checking whether a candidate quartet consisting of two pairs of known
plaintext/ciphertext blocks meets the differential conditions required by the related-
key rectangle distinguisher. Specifically, suppose KaA, K
a
B, K
a
C and K
a
D are the
guesses for the subkeys used in Ea, and KbA, K
b
B, K
b
C and K
b
D are the guesses for
the subkeys used in Eb. Then the attacker checks whether a candidate quartet of
known plaintext/ciphertext pairs (((P,C), (P ∗, C∗)), ((P ′, C ′), (P ′∗, C ′∗))) satisfies
the following two conditions:
EaKaA(P )⊕E
a
KaB
(P ∗) = EaKaC (P
′)⊕EaKaD(P
′∗) = α, (4.5)
(Eb
KbA
)−1(C)⊕ (Eb
KbC
)−1(C ′) = (Eb
KbB
)−1(C∗)⊕ (Eb
KbD
)−1(C ′∗) = δ. (4.6)
This is shown in Figure 4.2(b).
In a chosen plaintext attack scenario, the attack involves choosing the pairs (P, P ∗)
and (P ′, P ′∗) in a similar way to that described in Section 4.3, as follows.
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1. Choose a plaintext, P say, and encrypt it with Ea under the guess KaA to
obtain EaKaA(P ).
2. Set P ∗ = (EaKaB )
−1(EaKaA(P )⊕ α).
3. Choose the pair (P ′, P ′∗) in the same way as (P, P ∗).
It is straightforward to verify that a quartet ((P, P ∗), (P ′, P ′∗)) selected in the above
way meets the conditions described in equation 4.5. The remaining problem is to
check whether it also meets the conditions described in equation 4.6.
The key schedules of some block ciphers make it impossible for us to determine the
subkey differences used in Eb from the user key differences; thus it is necessary to
guess the four1 different unknown subkeys KbA, K
b
B, K
b
C and K
b
D used in E
b to check
whether the candidate quartet ((P, P ∗), (P ′, P ′∗)) meets the condition described in
equation 4.6.
The ‘standard’ approach to this is to first guess the four subkeys at once, then
decrypt both (C,C ′) and (C∗, C ′∗) to check whether they meet the conditions de-
scribed in equation 4.6. However, we observe that the check can be performed more
efficiently by decrypting the two pairs from a candidate quartet in a staged way. To
simplify the explanation, we assume that there is only one round in Eb. We first
guess the two subkeys KbA and K
b
C connected with the pair (C,C
′), and then check
whether the pair meets the condition
(Eb
KbA
)−1(C)⊕ (Eb
KbC
)−1(C ′) = δ.
If the pair does not meet this condition, then we can discard the candidate quartet;
if it meets the condition, then we guess the other two subkeysKbB and K
b
D connected
with the other pair (C∗, C ′∗), and check if this pair meets the condition
(Eb
KbB
)−1(C∗)⊕ (Eb
KbD
)−1(C ′∗) = δ.
Using this approach it may be possible to significantly reduce the workload of an
attack. Even more interestingly, it may be possible to break more rounds of a cipher.
1We consider the related-key rectangle attack with four keys here; similar shortcuts apply in the
version of the attack using two keys.
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An example of this latter case is provided by the attack on SHACAL-2 described in
Chapter 8.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter we have given a general description of the early abort technique
for (related-key) impossible differential cryptanalysis and (related-key) rectangle at-
tacks. This technique can, in certain circumstances, be used to improve the efficiency
of an attack. More detailed descriptions of specific examples of the early abort tech-
nique are given in subsequent chapters.
We have only described the application of the early abort technique to two specific
types of block cipher cryptanalysis; however, depending on the design of the round
function, the technique can also be used to improve the efficiency of other cryptan-
alytic approaches, including differential cryptanalysis and its extensions. For exam-
ple, it can be applied to the rounds preceding a differential-linear distinguisher in a
differential-linear cryptanalysis procedure.
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Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round AES
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a 128-bit block cipher with a user key
of 128, 192 or 256 bits, which became a CRYPTREC-recommended e-government
cipher in 2002, a NESSIE selected algorithm in 2003, and was adopted as an ISO
international standard in 2005. In this chapter we present a number of novel at-
tacks on reduced versions of AES; these attacks use the impossible differential and
impossible boomerang techniques.
We first present the best currently published impossible differential cryptanalysis re-
sults on AES; these attacks make use of the early abort technique and a number of
observations regarding the key schedule. We give an attack on 7-round AES-128 that
requires 2112.2 chosen plaintexts and has a time complexity of 2115.6 encryptions. We
also describe two attacks on 7-round AES-192, one that requires 291.2 chosen plain-
texts and has a time complexity of 2145.5 encryptions, and another that requires 2113.8
chosen plaintexts and has a time complexity of 2117.2 encryptions. Finally we de-
scribe two attacks on 8-round AES-256, one that requires 289 chosen plaintexts and
has a time complexity of 2247.7 encryptions, and another that requires 2111.6 chosen
plaintexts and has a time complexity of 2233.1 encryptions.
Secondly, we present impossible boomerang attacks on 6-round AES-128, 7-round
AES-192 and 7-round AES-256. The 6-round AES-128 attack requires 2112.2 chosen
plaintexts and has a time complexity of 2112.3 encryptions; the 7-round AES-192
attack requires 2112.5 chosen plaintexts and has a time complexity of 2186.3 encryp-
tions; and the 7-round AES-256 attack requires 2112.8 chosen plaintexts and has a
time complexity of 2186.9 encryptions.
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Finally, we present related-key impossible boomerang attacks on 8-round AES-192
and 9-round AES-256 using two keys. The 8-round AES-192 attack requires 2122.4
chosen plaintexts and has a time complexity of 2160 encryptions; and the 9-round
AES-256 attack requires 2122.8 chosen plaintexts and has a time complexity of 2242.5
encryptions. This latter attack is the first published attack on 9-round AES-256
using two keys.
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5.1 Introduction
In November 2001, NIST published the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [90]
as the next-generation data encryption standard for use in the USA, designed to
replace the Data Encryption Standard (DES) [91]. Subsequently, AES became a
CRYPTREC-recommended e-government cipher in 2002, a NESSIE selected algo-
rithm in 2003, and was adopted as an ISO international standard in 2005. AES
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is an SPN-based block cipher with a 128-bit block length and a user key length of
128, 192 or 256 bits. It was designed by Daemen and Rijndael [21], and was first
published in 1998.
In this chapter, we first revisit the application of the impossible differential crypt-
analysis technique to AES. Taking advantage of the early abort technique and cer-
tain other observations about the operation of the cipher, including some relating
to the key schedule, we present the best currently published impossible differential
cryptanalysis results on AES. We first give an attack on 7-round AES-128 that
requires 2112.2 chosen plaintexts and has a time complexity of 2115.6 encryptions,
which is also the best currently published cryptanalytic result on AES-128. Second
we describe two attacks on 7-round AES-192, one that requires 291.2 chosen plain-
texts and has a time complexity of 2145.5 encryptions, and another that requires
2113.8 chosen plaintexts and has a time complexity of 2117.2 encryptions. Finally we
describe two attacks on 8-round AES-256, one that requires 289 chosen plaintexts
and has a time complexity of 2247.7 encryptions, and another that requires 2111.6
chosen plaintexts and has a time complexity of 2233.1 encryptions.
We then present impossible boomerang attacks on 6-round AES-128, 7-round AES-
192 and 7-round AES-256. The 6-round AES-128 attack requires 2112.2 chosen plain-
texts and has a time complexity of 2112.3 encryptions; the 7-round AES-192 attack
requires 2112.5 chosen plaintexts and has a time complexity of 2186.3 encryptions;
and the 7-round AES-256 attack requires 2112.8 chosen plaintexts and has a time
complexity of 2186.9 encryptions.
Finally, we present related-key impossible boomerang attacks on 8-round AES-192
and 9-round AES-256 using two keys. The 8-round AES-192 attack requires 2122.4
chosen plaintexts and has a time complexity of 2160 encryptions; and the 9-round
AES-256 attack requires 2122.8 chosen plaintexts and has a time complexity of 2242.5
encryptions. This latter attack is the first published attack on 9-round AES-256
using two keys.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 5.2 we describe
AES. In Section 5.3 we briefly review previous cryptanalytic results relevant to AES.
In Section 5.4 we present our impossible differential cryptanalytic results on AES. In
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Section 5.5 we present our impossible boomerang cryptanalytic results on AES. In
Section 5.6, we present our related-key impossible boomerang cryptanalytic results
on AES. Section 5.7 summarises the main results given in this chapter.
5.2 The AES Block Cipher
In this section we briefly describe the AES block cipher [90].
5.2.1 Notation
In this chapter, the sixteen bytes of a 4 × 4 byte array are numbered from left to
right and then from top to bottom, starting with 1 (i.e. 1, 2, · · · , 16). We use the
following notation.
• ≪: leftward rotation operation on a 32-bit word
• ?: an arbitrary 8-bit value, where two values represented by the ? symbol may
be different
5.2.2 Operations
The four elementary operations BS, SR, MC and KA are used to define the AES
round function.
• BS (Byte Substitution) is a non-linear substitution operation on 4 × 4 byte
arrays, constructed by applying the same 8× 8-bit bijective S-box 16 times in
parallel to a 4× 4 byte array. See [90] for a definition of the S-box.
• SR (Shift Rows) is the linear function on 4 × 4 byte arrays which cyclically
shifts the jth row of a 4× 4 byte array to the left by j bytes, (0 ≤ j ≤ 3).
• MC (Mix Columns) is a permutation of the set of all 4 × 4 byte arrays (it
is a linear function over the finite field of 256 elements). It is equivalent
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to pre-multiplying a 4 × 4 byte array by a fixed 4 × 4 byte array M , where
addition of bytes is simply the XOR operation, and multiplication is equivalent
to multiplication in the finite field of 256 elements (the field representation is
defined in [90]). The matrix M is as follows.
M =

0x02 0x03 0x01 0x01
0x01 0x02 0x03 0x01
0x01 0x01 0x02 0x03
0x03 0x01 0x01 0x02
 .
• KA (Add Round Key) is the bitwise logical XOR operation on 4 × 4 byte
arrays. It is used to combine a 4 × 4 byte array with a 16-byte subkey. If X
and Y are 16-byte blocks, then KA(X,Y ) = X ⊕ Y .
5.2.3 Generation of Subkeys
The AES cipher uses a total of (Nr+1) 128-bit subkeys Ki (0 ≤ i ≤ Nr), all derived
from the cipher key K of Nk 32-bit words long, where Nr is 10 for AES-128, 12 for
AES-192, and 14 for AES-256 (i.e. the 128, 192 and 256-bit key versions of AES),
and Nk is 4 for AES-128, 6 for AES-192, and 8 for AES-256. The key schedule is,
where θi/Nk are public constants.
1. Represent the user key K as Nk 32-bit words (W1,W2, · · · ,WNk).
2. For j = (Nk + 1) to 4(Nr + 1):
• if (j mod Nk = 1), then Wj =Wj−Nk ⊕BS(Wj−1 ≪ 8)⊕ θi/Nk ;
• else if (Nk = 8) and (j mod Nk = 5), then Wj =Wj−Nk ⊕BS(Wj−1);
• else Wj =Wj−Nk ⊕Wj−1.
3. Ki = (W4i+1,W4i+2,W4i+3,W4i+4), (0 ≤ i ≤ Nr).
Each of the subkeys Ki consists of 16 bytes; we write Ki,l for the lth byte of Ki,
where 1 ≤ l ≤ 16.
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5.2.4 Encryption Procedure
AES takes as input a 128-bit plaintext block P , represented as a 4×4 byte array, and
has a total of Nr rounds (where Nr is 10 for AES-128, 12 for AES-192, and 14 for
AES-256). Its encryption procedure is as follows, where A0, Ai, Bi, Ci, Di, ANr , BNr
are 128-bit variables represented as 4× 4 byte arrays.
1. A0 = KA(P,K0).
2. For i = 1 to Nr − 1:
Bi = BS(Ai−1),
Ci = SR(Bi),
Di =MC(Ci),
Ai = KA(Di,Ki).
3. ANr = BS(DNr−1), BNr = SR(ANr).
4. Ciphertext= KA(BNr ,KNr).
An equivalent description of the algorithm can be derived by reversing the order of
the third and fourth operations of step 2 of the above description, i.e. the operations
involving MC and KA. These two steps then become:
D′i = KA(Ci, K˜i),
Ai =MC(D′i),
where K˜i) = MC−1(Ki). (Note that MC−1 is well-defined since MC is a linear
function equivalent to a full rank matrix). We use this alternative representation in
certain of the attacks described later in this chapter.
The ith iteration of Step 2 in the above description is referred to below as Round i,
(1 ≤ i ≤ Nr − 1), and the transformation in Step 3 is referred to below as the final
round, i.e. Round Nr.
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5.3 Previous Cryptanalytic Results
In this section we briefly review previously published cryptanalytic attacks on AES.
• In 1998, using the square attack, the AES proposers Daemen and Rijmen [21]
presented the first published attack on 6-round AES-128.
• In 2000, Gilbert and Minier [26] presented collision attacks on 7-round AES-
128, 7-round AES-192 and 7-round AES-256.
• In 2000, Ferguson, Kelsey, Lucks, Schneier, Stay, Wagner and Whiting [25]
presented partial sums square attacks on 7-round AES-128, 8-round AES-192
and 8-round AES-256, and presented a related-key square attack on 9-round
AES-256 using 256 keys.
• In 2001, Cheon, Kim, Kim, Lee and Kang [16] presented an impossible dif-
ferential attack on 6-round AES-128, building on the impossible differential
attack on 5-round AES-128 of Biham and Keller [11].
• In 2003, Jakimoski and Desmedt [45] presented a related-key impossible dif-
ferential attack on 8-round AES-192 using two keys.
• In 2004, Biryukov [15] presented a boomerang attack on 6-round AES-128.
• In 2004, Phan [96] presented impossible differential attacks on 7-round AES-
192 and 7-round AES-256.
• In 2005, Hong, Kim, Lee and Preneel [40] presented a related-key rectangle
attack on 8-round AES-192 using four keys.
• In 2005, Biham, Dunkelman and Keller [9] presented a related-key rectangle
attack on 9-round AES-192 and 10-round AES-256 using 256 keys.
• In 2006, Zhang, Zhang, Wu and Feng [112] presented a related-key impossible
differential attack on 8-round AES-192 using two keys, building on the related-
key impossible differential attack of Biham et al. [10].
• In 2007, Kim, Hong and Preneel [52] presented related-key rectangle attacks
on 8-round AES-192 using two keys, 9-round AES-192 using 64 keys, 10-round
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AES-192 using 64 (or 256) keys, 9-round AES-256 using 4 keys and 10-round
AES-256 using 64 (or 256) keys.
• In 2007, Bahrak and Aref [2] presented an impossible differential attack on
7-round AES-128.
• In 2007, Zhang, Wu and Feng [111] presented an impossible differential attack
on 7-round AES-128, 7-round AES-192 and 8-round AES-256.
• In 2007, Zhang, Zhang, Wu and Feng [113] presented a related-key differential-
linear attack [34] on 8-round AES-192 using two keys.
• In 2008, Demirci and Selcuk [22] presented a meet-in-the-middle attack on
7-round AES-192 and 8-round AES-256.
In summary, the square attack, the collision attack, the meet-in-the-middle attack,
the impossible differential attack and the boomerang attack are the techniques that
have previously been used to break 6 or more rounds of AES in a single key attack
scenario. The best previously published cryptanalytic results on AES in a single
key attack scenario are the square, collision and impossible differential attacks on
7-round AES-128 [2, 25, 26, 111], the square attack on 8-round AES-192 [25] and the
square, collision and impossible differential attacks on 8-round AES-256 [22, 25, 111].
The best previously published cryptanalytic results on AES in a related-key attack
scenario involving two keys are the related-key impossible differential, rectangle and
differential-linear attacks on 8-round AES-192 [45, 52, 112, 113].
5.4 Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round
AES
In this section, using the early abort technique as well as a number of observations
on the key schedule, we present impossible differential attacks on 7-round AES-128,
7-round AES-192 and 8-round AES-256.
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5.4.1 General Observations
As described in Section 2.2.7, impossible differential cryptanalysis is based on one
or more impossible differentials, written ∆α 9 β. It usually involves treating a
block cipher E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n as a cascade of three sub-ciphers E =
Ea ◦E0 ◦Eb, where E0 denotes the rounds for which ∆α9 ∆β holds, Ea denotes a
number of rounds before E0, and Eb denotes a number of rounds after E0. Given a
guess for the subkeys used in Ea and Eb, if a plaintext pair produces a difference of
α just after Ea and the corresponding ciphertext pair produces a difference of β just
before Eb, then this guess for the subkey must be incorrect. Thus, given a sufficient
number of matching plaintext/ciphertext pairs, we can find the correct subkey by
discarding all the wrong guesses.
5.4.1.1 Observation I
When checking whether a plaintext pair produces a difference of α just after Ea
(or the corresponding ciphertext pair produces a difference of β just before Eb), the
‘standard’ approach is to guess all the unknown bits of the relevant round subkey
necessary to partially encrypt (respectively decrypt) the pair through the substitu-
tion and diffusion layers. The attacker can then check whether the pair produces
the expected difference just after Ea or just before Eb. Consider the example shown
in Figure 5.1. We assume that it is the the first round in Ea, and the attacker needs
to check whether a plaintext pair with a non-zero difference in only the four bytes
numbered (1,6,11,16) can produce the output difference after the MC operation
with only one non-zero byte in the first column.
Because of the diffusion properties of the MC operation, one possible approach, as
followed in [16, 96], is to guess all the unknown required subkey bits (i.e. the four
bytes (1,6,11,16) of the subkeyK0), then encrypt the pair through the BS◦SR◦MC
operation to obtain the corresponding values just after theMC operation, and finally
check whether they have the expected difference. This requires negligible memory,
and has time complexity of one quarter of a round encryption. However, if this
approach is used, then the impossible differential attacks on 7-round AES-128 and
8-round AES-256 presented in [2, 111] would have a time complexity much larger
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than that for an exhaustive key search; that is, they would be infeasible. Instead, a
precomputation table is used, just as in [11], as we now describe.
First note that there are at most 232 × 255× 4 ≈ 242 pairs of 32-bit values of bytes
(1,6,11,16) just after the KA operation which produce an output difference after
the BS ◦ SR ◦MC operation of the expected type (since there are very nearly 240
ordered pairs that produce an output difference which have a single non-zero byte in
a specified position). Let Ω0 be the set of these 242 pairs. Store all the 242 pairs in
Ω0 in a table indexed by the difference between the two 32-bit values in a pair. For
every such difference, there are, on average 2
42
232
= 210 pairs of 32-bit values, made
up of the values of bytes (1,6,11,16) just after the KA operation. In addition to
storing the 242 pairs in Ω0, the attacker needs to store the 232 possible values of
(K0,1,K0,6,K0,11,K0,16) in a list. Finally, given a plaintext pair, the attacker can
compute the 210 values for (K0,1,K0,6,K0,11,K0,16) under which the plaintext pair
produces the expected output difference, by XORing the plaintext pair with the
approximately 210 pairs of 32-bit values in the precomputation table that have the
same difference as that between the two plaintexts from the plaintext pair, and then
discard the 210 values from the list of (K0,1,K0,6,K0,11,K0,16).
To obtain all the values for (K0,1,K0,6,K0,11,K0,16) under which one plaintext pair
produces an expected difference after applyingKA◦BS◦SR◦MC, the first approach
described above requires negligible memory and has a time complexity of 232 × 14 =
230 one-round encryptions. By contrast, the approach using a precomputation table
requires 242 × 8 + 232 × 4 ≈ 245 bytes ≈ 262144 Gbits of memory, and has a time
complexity of 210 memory accesses (the time for precomputation is excluded, which
is approximately 232× 14 = 230 one-round encryptions). That is, we have a trade-off
between time (or computation workload) and memory, which makes Bahrak et al.’s
and Zhang et al.’s attacks [2, 111] feasible in theory.
We now make the observation that the round structure of AES allows us to par-
tially determine whether a candidate pair could produce the expected difference by
guessing only a small fraction of the required round subkey bits at a time. We can
then perform a series of partial checks by guessing other fractions of the unknown
required subkey bits, instead of guessing all the unknown required subkey bits at
once. More specifically, since we know the expected difference just after the MC
68
5.4 Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round AES
SR MCBSKA
Ω
: non-zero byte difference : zero byte difference
Figure 5.1: An example of the early abort technique
operation, we can compute the expected difference just before the SR operation, as
the MC operation is a linear function equivalent to a full rank matrix, and hence
readily invertible. There are 255 possible non-zero differences for a single byte, and
thus there are a total of 4 × 255 possible differences with only one non-zero byte
difference in the first column, since there are four different byte positions in this col-
umn. These differences are transformed by the MC−1 ◦ SR−1 operation to 4× 255
possible all non-zero differences in the four bytes (1,6,11,16); we call the set of all
such differences Ω. All the differences in Ω will be transformed by the SR ◦MC
operation to differences with a non-zero byte difference in only one byte of the first
column.
We can now give the following result.
Property 5.1 The differences in Ω have distinct values in the pair of byte positions
(1, 6).
Proof. Suppose there exist two differences x and y from Ω that have the same value
in bytes (1,6), that is to say, x⊕y is equal to zero in the first two bytes. Since x and
y are transformed by the MC−1 ◦ SR−1 operation from two differences with only
one non-zero byte in the first column, say x˜ and y˜, it follows that at least two out
of the four bytes of x˜ ⊕ y˜ should be zero; however, this is impossible, as the MC
operation has a branch number of 5 [21]. ¤
Thus, we can just guess bytes (1,6) of the subkey K0, and partially encrypt the pair
through the BS operation to check whether it produces a difference equal to the
corresponding partial difference of any difference in Ω. If not, then the pair is not a
valid candidate, and we can discard it immediately. Otherwise, by Property 5.1, we
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know that there is only one difference in Ω that has the same corresponding partial
difference; we label this difference δ1. We next guess another fraction of the required
round subkey bits of K0, i.e. either byte (11) or (16), and check whether the pair
produces a difference equal to the corresponding partial difference in δ1. A pair is
a valid candidate only if it produces the expected partial differences just after the
BS operation, under the guesses for the three parts, i.e. bytes (1,6), (11) and (16),
of the subkey. It is expected that a proportion of about 1− 4×255
216
of plaintext pairs
will be discarded before the next guess for the subkey byte (11) or (16). Therefore,
to obtain all the values for (K0,1,K0,6,K0,11,K0,16) under which one plaintext pair
produces a particular difference after applying KA ◦BS ◦ SR ◦MC, this approach
requires 210 × 4 = 212 bytes ≈ 32 kbits of memory, which is negligible for today’s
computers, and has a time complexity of approximately 216 × 216 + 216 × 4×255216 ×
28 × 116 + 216 × 4×255216 × 28 × 2−8 × 28 × 116 ≈ 215.32 one-round encryptions. Hence,
we can use this observation to reduce an attack’s computational workload without
using the precomputation table described earlier, and, even more significantly, we
may be able to break more rounds of a cipher.
As shown in the attacks described in Sections 5.4.2–5.4.4, there exist other examples
of the successful application of the early abort technique to impossible differential
cryptanalysis of AES.
5.4.1.2 Observation II
From the definition ofMC and the fact thatMC has a branch number of 5, we can
easily get the following result.
Property 5.2 Suppose that a pair of inputs to MC (or MC−1) differ in only two
fixed byte positions of the ith column, and in only three fixed byte positions of the
output of the ith column (1 ≤ i ≤ 4). Then, the following properties hold.
1. The number of possible pairs of input and output differences is 255.
2. If the difference in any of the five fixed byte positions is known, then the dif-
ferences in the other four fixed byte positions can also be determined.
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Figure 5.2: 4-round impossible differentials of AES of Biham et al.
5.4.1.3 Observation III
In 2000, Biham et al. [11] gave the following 4-round impossible differentials for AES:
the input difference has zeros in all the bytes but one, and the output difference
has zeros only in the four bytes of any of (1,8,11,14), (2,5,12,15), (3,6,9,16) and
(4,7,10,13), (where, as described in Section 5.2, we are numbering the 16 bytes of a
128-bit block from 1 to 16). See Figure 5.2 for more details.
In 2007, Bahrak et al. [2] and Zhang et al. [111] gave a further class of 4-round
impossible differentials for AES, namely: the input difference has zeros in all the
bytes but one, and the output difference has zeros in all the bytes except three of a
column.
We find that all the following 4-round differentials of AES are impossible: the input
difference has zeros in all the bytes except one or more bytes of any of (1,6,11,16),
(2,7,12,13), (3,8,9,14) and (4,5,10,15), and the output difference has zeros in the four
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bytes of any of (1,8,11,14), (2,5,12,15), (3,6,9,16) and (4,7,10,13), and has arbitrary
values in the remaining 12 bytes.
These impossible differentials apply to any set of four consecutive rounds of AES.
5.4.2 Attacking 7-Round AES-128
In this subsection, we present an impossible differential attack on 7-round AES-128,
using the early abort technique and an observation on the key schedule of AES-128.
This is the best currently published cryptanalytic result on AES-128. Without loss
of generality, we assume that the attacked 7 rounds are Rounds 1 to 7.
5.4.2.1 Preliminary Results
By the key schedule of AES-128, we have the following equations (5.1)–(5.3).
K7,1 = K6,1 ⊕BS(K6,8)⊕ θ1, (5.1)
K7,13 = K6,13 ⊕BS(K6,4)⊕ θ1, (5.2)
K7,8 = K6,8 ⊕K7,7. (5.3)
Hence, we can give the following property.
Property 5.3 For AES-128, a value for (K7,1,K7,7,K7,8,K7,13) yields a 24-bit fil-
tering condition on the possible values of (K6,1,K6,4,K6,8,K6,13).
5.4.2.2 Attack Description
The above analysis enables us to give the following attack on 7-round AES-128. We
use the 4-round impossible differentials of Bahrak et al. in Rounds 2 to 5, and reverse
the order of the operations MC and KA for Rounds 5 and 6. Figure 5.3 illustrates
the attack.
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1. Choose 280.2 structures Si, (i = 1, 2, · · · , 280.2), where a structure Si is defined
to be a set of 232 plaintexts Pi,j with bytes (1, 6, 11, 16) taking all the possible
values and the other 12 bytes being fixed, (j = 1, 2, · · · , 232). In a chosen-
plaintext attack scenario, obtain all the 2112.2 ciphertexts for the 232 plaintexts
in each of the 280.2 structures; we denote by Ci,j the ciphertext for plaintext
Pi,j . Choose the plaintext pairs (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) such that (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) has a zero
difference in bytes (2,3,5,6,9,12,15,16), where 1 ≤ j1 6= j2 ≤ 232.
2. Guess a value for the two subkey bytes (K0,1,K0,6), and perform Steps (a) and
(b) below.
(a) Partially encrypt every remaining plaintext pair (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) to get the
corresponding values for bytes (1,6) just after the BS operation of Round
1, and check whether they have a difference equal to any of the corre-
sponding two-byte partial differences in Ω, where Ω is defined in Ob-
servation I. Keep only the plaintext pairs that meet this condition. By
Property 5.1, we know that there is only one difference in Ω for every
such plaintext pair (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2), and we denote this difference by δ
1
i,j1,j2
.
(b) Perform the following two sub-steps for l = 11, 16:
• Guess a value for the subkey byte K0,l.
• Partially encrypt every remaining plaintext pair (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) to get
the corresponding values for byte (l) just after the BS operation
of Round 1, and check whether they have a difference equal to the
corresponding one-byte partial difference in δ1i,j1,j2 . Keep only the
plaintext pairs that meet this condition.
3. Perform Steps (a)–(c) below for m = 1, 5, 9, 13:
(a) There are 255 possible 32-bit differences in bytes (1,5,9,13) just after the
KA operation of Round 6 that have a non-zero byte difference only in
byte (m), which are transformed by theMC operation to 255 possible 32-
bit differences in bytes (1,5,9,13) just after the MC operation of Round
6; we denote these differences by set Ωm. Then, guess a value for the two
subkey bytes (K7,1,K7,8), and perform the following two sub-steps.
i. Partially decrypt every ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) corresponding to
a remaining plaintext pair (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) to get the corresponding values
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Figure 5.3: Impossible differential attack on 7-round AES-128
for bytes (1,5) just after the MC operation of Round 6, and check
whether they have a difference equal to any of the corresponding
two-byte partial differences in Ωm. Keep only the ciphertext pairs
that meet this condition. Similarly we know that there is only one
difference in Ωm for a pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) meeting the condition, and
we denote this difference by δmi,j1,j2 .
ii. Perform the following tow sub-steps for l = 11, 14:
• Guess a value for the subkey byte K7,l.
• Partially decrypt every remaining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) to
get the corresponding values for byte (b5l−164 c) just after theMC
operation of Round 6, and check whether they have a difference
equal to the corresponding one-byte partial difference in δmi,j1,j2 .
Keep only the ciphertext pairs that meet this condition.
(b) There are 255 possible 32-bit differences in bytes (4,8,12,16) just after the
KA operation of Round 6 that have a non-zero byte difference only in
byte ((m+ 6) mod 16 + 1), which are transformed by the MC operation
to 255 possible 32-bit differences in bytes (4,8,12,16) just after the MC
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operation of Round 6; we denote these differences by set Ωm+7. Then,
guess a value for the two subkey bytes (K7,4,K7,7), and perform the
following two sub-steps.
i. Partially decrypt every remaining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) to get
the corresponding values for bytes (4,8) just after theMC operation
of Round 6, and check whether they have a difference equal to any
of the corresponding two-byte partial differences in Ωm+7. Keep only
the ciphertext pairs that meet this condition. Similarly we know that
there is only one difference in Ωm+7 for a pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) meeting
the condition, and we denote this difference by δm+7i,j1,j2 .
ii. Perform the following two sub-steps for l = 10, 13:
• Guess a value for the subkey byte K7,l.
• Partially decrypt every remaining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) to
get the corresponding values for byte (b5l4 c) just after the MC
operation of Round 6, and check whether they have a difference
equal to the corresponding one-byte partial difference in δm+7i,j1,j2 .
Keep only the ciphertext pairs that meet this condition.
(c) Guess a value for the two subkey bytes (K˜6,m, K˜6,(m+6) mod 16+1). For
every remaining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2), partially decrypt the corre-
sponding values for bytes (1,4,5,8,9,12,13,16) just after the MC opera-
tion of Round 6 to get the corresponding values for bytes (m+ bm4 c, (m+
bm4 c + 4) mod 16) just after the MC operation of Round 5, and check
whether they produce a difference that has only one zero byte difference
in bytes (m + bm4 c, (m + bm4 c + 4) mod 16, (m + bm4 c + 8) mod 16, (m +
bm4 c+ 12) mod 16) just after the KA operation of Round 5. If there ex-
ists a ciphertext pair meeting this condition, discard the guessed value for
(K0,1,K0,6,K0,11,K0,16,K7,1,K7,4,K7,7,K7,8,K7,10,K7,11,K7,13,K7,14,K˜6,m,
K˜6,(m+6) mod 16+1), and try another guess.
4. For every guessed possible value for (K0,1,K0,6,K0,11,K0,16,K7,1,K7,4,K7,7,
K7,8,K7,10,K7,11,K7,13,K7,14, K˜6,1, K˜6,4, K˜6,5, K˜6,8, K˜6,9, K˜6,12, K˜6,13, K˜6,16) af-
ter Step 3, check whether the value for (K7,1,K7,7,K7,8,K7,13, K˜6,1, K˜6,4, K˜6,5,
K˜6,8, K˜6,9, K˜6,12, K˜6,13, K˜6,16) meets equations (5.1)–(5.3). If not, discard it;
otherwise, determine the correct key by exhaustively searching the remaining
24 key bits.
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5.4.2.3 Complexity Analysis
The attack requires 2112.2 chosen plaintexts, which take a time complexity of 2112.2
7-round AES-128 encryptions.
In Step 1, a structure Si yields
(
232
2
) ≈ 232×22 = 263 plaintext pairs (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) that
have a zero difference in all the bytes except bytes (1,6,11,16), (i = 1, 2, · · · , 280.2,
1 ≤ j1 6= j2 ≤ 232). Thus the 280.2 structures yield a total of 280.2 × 263 = 2143.2
plaintext pairs that have a zero difference in all the bytes except bytes (1,6,11,16).
There is a 64-bit filtering condition over the ciphertext pairs, hence it is expected
that approximately 2143.2 × 2−64 = 279.2 ciphertext pairs (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) are chosen in
Step 1. Choosing these ciphertext pairs requires about 2112.2 memory accesses in a
simple implementation using a hash table.
In Step 2(a), there are only 4 × 255 differences in Ω, thus it is expected that
about 279.2 × 4×255
216
= 273.2 plaintext pairs remain after Step 2(a) for every guess
of (K0,1,K0,6). Step 2(a) has a time complexity of 2 × 279.2 × 216 × 216 × 17 ≈ 294.4
7-round AES-128 encryptions.
In Step 2(b), as the difference δ1i,j1,j2 for every remaining plaintext pair (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) is
already fixed in Step 2(a), it is expected that for every subkey guess a proportion of
about 1−2−8 of the remaining plaintext pairs will be discarded after every iteration.
Step 2(b) has a time complexity of 2×273.2×224× 116× 17+2×265.2×232× 116× 17 ≈ 296.4
7-round AES-128 encryptions.
In Step 3(a)-i, for every iteration of m, there are 255 differences in Ωm, thus the
expected number of remaining pairs for every subkey guess is about 257.2 × 255
216
=
249.2. In Step 3(a)-ii, as the difference δmi,j1,j2 for every remaining ciphertext pair
(Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) is already fixed in Step 3(a)-i, it is expected that a proportion of about
1− 2−8 of the remaining ciphertext pairs will be discarded after every iteration of l.
Step 3(a) has a total time complexity of 4× (2× 257.2 × 248 × 216 × 17 + 2× 249.2 ×
256 × 116 × 17 + 2× 241.2 × 264 × 116 × 17) ≈ 2104.7 7-round AES-128 encryptions.
In Step 3(b)-i, for every iteration of m, there are 255 differences in Ωm+7, thus the
expected number of remaining pairs for every subkey guess is about 233.2 × 255
216
=
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225.2. In Step 3(b)-ii, as the difference δm+7i,j1,j2 for every remaining ciphertext pair
(Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) is already fixed in Step 3(b)-i, it is expected that for every subkey guess
a proportion of about 1 − 2−8 of the remaining pairs will be discarded after every
iteration. Step 3(b) has a time complexity of 4 × (2 × 233.2 × 280 × 216 × 17 + 2 ×
225.2× 288× 116 × 17 +2× 217.2× 296× 116 × 17) ≈ 2112.7 7-round AES-128 encryptions.
In Step 3(c), for every iteration of m, the probability that a remaining ciphertext
pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j1) meets the condition is 4 × 2−8 = 2−6. For every guessed 96-
bit value for (K0,1,K0,6,K0,11,K0,16, K7,1,K7,4,K7,7,K7,8,K7,10,K7,11,K7,13,K7,14),
it is expected that about 216 × (1 − 2−6)29.2 ≈ 22.77 values for the two bytes
(K˜6,m, K˜6,(m+6 mod 16)+1) remain after Step 3(c). After considering the four itera-
tions ofm, we get that, for every guessed value for (K0,1,K0,6,K0,11,K0,16,K7,1,K7,4,
K7,7,K7,8,K7,10,K7,11,K7,13,K7,14), there remain approximately 22.77×4 = 211.08
possible values for (K˜6,1, K˜6,4, K˜6,5, K˜6,8, K˜6,9, K˜6,12, K˜6,13, K˜6,16); however, by Prop-
erty 5.3, we get that there are only 296 × 211.08 × 2−24 = 283.08 possible values for
(K0,1,K0,6,K0,11,K0,16,K7,1,K7,4,K7,7,K7,8,K7,10,K7,11,K7,13,K7,14,K˜6,1,K˜6,4,K˜6,5,
K˜6,8, K˜6,9, K˜6,12, K˜6,13, K˜6,16). By the key schedule of AES-128, we learn that, given
a value for (K7,1,K7,4,K7,7,K7,8,K7,10,K7,11,K7,13,K7,14, K˜6,1, K˜6,4, K˜6,5, K˜6,8, K˜6,9,
K˜6,12, K˜6,13, K˜6,16), only three additional subkey bytes are required to recover the
user key. Hence, Step 3(c) has a time complexity of about 4× {2× 2112 × [1 + (1−
2−6) + · · ·+ (1− 2−6)29.2 ]× 216 × 17} ≈ 2115.2 7-round AES-128 encryptions.
The exhaustive search in Step 4 has a time complexity of 283.08 × 224 = 2107.08
7-round AES-128 encryptions.
Therefore, the attack has a total time complexity of approximately 2115.6 7-round
AES-128 encryptions.
5.4.3 Attacking 7-Round AES-192
In this subsection, we present an impossible differential attack on 7-round AES-192,
using the early abort technique and an observation on the key schedule of AES-192.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the attacked 7 rounds are Rounds 1 to
7.
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5.4.3.1 Preliminary Results
By the key schedule of AES-192, we have the following equations (5.4)–(5.6).
K7,11 = K6,9 ⊕BS(K7,14)⊕ θ1, (5.4)
K7,15 = K6,13 ⊕BS(K7,2)⊕ θ1, (5.5)
K7,12 = K6,10 ⊕BS(K7,11). (5.6)
We can now give the following result.
Property 5.4 For AES-192, the value for (K6,9,K6,10,K6,13) can be known from a
value of (K7,2,K7,11,K7,12,K7,14,K7,15).
5.4.3.2 Attack Description
As a result, we can give the following attack procedure breaking 7-round AES-192
with a time complexity significantly lower than those for the attacks of Phan [96]
and Zhang et al. [111]. We use the 4-round impossible differentials of Biham et al.
in Rounds 2 to 5, and reverse the order of the operations MC and KA for Rounds
5 and 6. Figure 5.4 illustrates the attack.
1. Choose 259.2 structures Si, (i = 1, 2, · · · , 259.2), where a structure Si is defined
to be a set of 232 plaintexts Pi,j with bytes (1, 6, 11, 16) taking all the possible
values and the other 12 bytes fixed, (j = 1, 2, · · · , 232). In a chosen-plaintext
attack scenario, obtain all the ciphertexts for the 232 plaintexts in each of the
259.2 structures; we denote by Ci,j the ciphertext for plaintext Pi,j . Choose
the plaintext pairs (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) such that (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) has a zero difference in
bytes (3,4,6,7,9,10,13,16), where 1 ≤ j1 6= j2 ≤ 232.
2. Guess a value for the 10 subkey bytes (K7,1,K7,2,K7,5,K7,8,K7,11,K7,12,K7,14,
K7,15,K6,1,K6,5). By equations (5.4) and (5.5), we deduce the value for the
two subkey bytes (K6,9,K6,13), and then perform Steps (a)–(d) below.
(a) Partially decrypt every ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) to get the correspond-
ing values for bytes (1,6,11,16) just after the MC operation of Round 5,
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Figure 5.4: Impossible differential attack on 7-round AES-192
and compute the difference; we denote it by δi,j1,j2 . We use all the 4-
round impossible differentials that have a zero difference in only the four
bytes of one of the four sets: bytes (1,8,11,14), bytes (2,5,12,15), bytes
(3,6,9,16) and bytes (4,7,10,13) just after the KA operation of Round
5. Thus, for every ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2), by Property 5.2 we get
from δi,j1,j2 four possible 32-bit differences in bytes (2,7,12,13) just after
the MC operation of Round 5; let Ω5i,j1,j2 be the set of these four 32-bit
differences.
(b) Guess a value for the subkey byte K˜6,2. For every remaining ciphertext
pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2), partially decrypt the corresponding values for byte (2)
just after the MC operation of Round 6 to get the corresponding values
for byte (2) just after the MC operation of Round 5, and check whether
they have a difference equal to any of the corresponding one-byte partial
differences in Ω5i,j1,j2 . Keep only the ciphertext pairs that meet this con-
dition. Let δ5i,j1,j2 be the difference in Ω
5
i,j1,j2
such that a ciphertext pair
(Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) meets the condition.
(c) Perform the following two sub-steps for l = 6, 10:
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• Guess a value for the subkey byte K˜6,l.
• For every remaining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2), partially decrypt
the corresponding values for byte (l) just after the MC operation of
Round 6 to get the corresponding values for byte (b5l4 c) just after the
MC operation of Round 5, and check whether they have a difference
equal to the corresponding one-byte partial difference in δ5i,j1,j2 . Keep
only the ciphertext pairs that meet this condition.
(d) Guess a value for the subkey byte K˜6,14, and then check whether the
above guessed value for (K˜6,2, K˜6,6, K˜6,10, K˜6,14) meets equation (5.6). If
not, discard it, and guess another; otherwise, for every remaining cipher-
text pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2), partially decrypt the corresponding values for byte
(14) just after the MC operation of Round 6 to get the corresponding
values for byte (13) just after the MC operation of Round 5, and check
whether they have a difference equal to the corresponding one-byte par-
tial difference in δ5i,j1,j2 . Keep only the ciphertext pairs that meet this
condition.
3. Guess a value for the subkey bytes (K0,1,K0,6), and perform Steps (a)–(c)
below.
(a) Partially encrypt every plaintext pair (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) corresponding to a re-
maining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) to get the corresponding values for
bytes (1,6) just after the BS operation of Round 1, and check whether
they have a difference equal to any of the corresponding two-byte partial
differences in Ω, where Ω is defined in Observation I. Keep only the plain-
text pairs that meet this condition. By Property 5.1, we know that there
is only one difference in Ω for a pair (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) meeting this condition,
and we denote this difference by δ1i,j1,j2 .
(b) Guess a value for the subkey byte K0,11. Partially encrypt every remain-
ing plaintext pair (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) to get the corresponding values for byte
(11) just after the BS operation of Round 1, and check whether they
have a difference equal to the corresponding one-byte partial difference
in δ1i,j1,j2 . Keep only the plaintext pairs that meet this condition.
(c) Guess a value for the subkey byte K0,16. Partially encrypt every remain-
ing plaintext pair (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) to get the corresponding values for byte
(16) just after the BS operation of Round 1, and check whether they
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have a difference equal to the corresponding one-byte partial difference
in δ1i,j1,j2 . If there exists a plaintext pair meeting this condition, dis-
card the guessed value for (K0,1,K0,6,K0,11,K0,16,K7,1,K7,2,K7,5,K7,8,
K7,11,K7,12,K7,14,K7,15,K6,1,K6,5, K˜6,2, K˜6,6, K˜6,10, K˜6,14), and try an-
other guess.
4. For every guessed value for (K0,1,K0,6,K0,11,K0,16,K7,1,K7,2,K7,5,K7,8,K7,11,
K7,12,K7,14,K7,15,K6,1,K6,5, K˜6,2, K˜6,6, K˜6,10, K˜6,14) after Step 3, determine
the correct key by exhaustively searching the remaining 96 key bits for the
value of (K7,1,K7,2,K7,5,K7,14,K6,1,K6,5,K6,9,K6,13, K˜6,2, K˜6,6, K˜6,10, K˜6,14).
5.4.3.3 Complexity Analysis
The attack requires 291.2 chosen plaintexts, which take a time complexity of 291.2
7-round AES-192 encryptions.
In Step 1, a structure Si yields
(
232
2
) ≈ 232×22 = 263 plaintext pairs (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) that
have zero byte differences in all the bytes except bytes (1,6,11,16), (i = 1, 2, · · · , 259.2,
1 ≤ j1 6= j2 ≤ 232). Thus the 259.2 structures yield a total of 259.2×263 = 2122.2 plain-
text pairs that have a zero byte difference in all the bytes except bytes (1,6,11,16).
There is a 64-bit filtering condition over the ciphertext pairs, hence it is expected
that about 2122.2 × 2−64 = 258.2 plaintext pairs are chosen in Step 1. Choose these
plaintext pairs requires about 291.2 memory accesses in a simple implementation
using a hash table.
Step 2(a) has a time complexity of 2× 258.2× 280× 12 × 27 ≈ 2136.4 7-round AES-192
encryptions.
Step 2(b) has a time complexity of 2×258.2×288× 116 × 17 ≈ 2140.4 7-round AES-192
encryptions. In Step 2(b), there are 4 differences in Ω5i,j1,j2 given a ciphertext pair
(Ci,j1 , Ci,j2), thus the expected number of remaining ciphertext pairs after Step 2(b)
for every subkey guess is about 258.2 × 4
28
= 252.2.
In Step 2(c), it is expected that for every subkey guess a proportion of about 1−2−8
of the remaining pairs will be discarded after every iteration of l. Step 2(c) has a
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time complexity of 2×252.2×296× 116 × 17 +2×244.2×2104× 116 × 17 ≈ 2143.4 7-round
AES-192 encryptions.
In Step 2(d), there is a filtering condition of 2−8 on the possible subkey bytes
(K7,1,K7,2,K7,5,K7,8,K7,11,K7,12,K7,14,K7,15,K6,1,K6,5, K˜6,2, K˜6,6, K˜6,10, K˜6,14), so
Step 2(d) has a time complexity of 2× 236.2 × 2112 × 2−8 × 116 × 17 ≈ 2134.4 7-round
AES-192 encryptions. In Step 2(d), it is expected that for every subkey guess a
proportion of about 1− 2−8 of the remaining pairs will be discarded.
Step 3(a) has a time complexity of 2×228.2×2120× 216× 17 ≈ 2143.4 7-round AES-192
encryptions. In Step 3(a), there are 4 × 255 differences in Ω, thus the expected
number of remaining pairs for every subkey guess is 228.2 × 4×255
216
= 222.2.
Step 3(b) has a time complexity of 2× 222.2 × 2128 × 116 × 17 ≈ 2144.4 7-round AES-
192 encryptions. There is a 8-bit filtering condition in Step 3(b), thus the expected
number of remaining pairs after Step 3(b) for every subkey guess is 222.2×2−8 = 214.2.
In Step 3(c), with a probability of 2−8 we can get a plaintext pair meeting the condi-
tion, thus it is expected that there remain 2104×232×(1−2−8)214.2 ≈ 231 guessed val-
ues for (K0,1,K0,6,K0,11,K0,16,K7,1,K7,2,K7,5,K7,8,K7,11,K7,12,K7,14,K7,15,K6,1,
K6,5, K˜6,2, K˜6,6, K˜6,10, K˜6,14). Step 3(c) has a time complexity of 2× 2136× [1+ (1−
2−8) + · · ·+ (1− 2−8)214.2 ]× 116 × 17 ≈ 2138.2 7-round AES-192 encryptions.
The exhaustive search in Step 4 has a time complexity of 231 × 296 = 2127 7-round
AES-192 encryptions.
Therefore, the attack has a total time complexity of approximately 2145.5 7-round
AES-192 encryptions.
Note: Another impossible differential attack on 7-round AES-192 can be obtained
from the 7-round AES-128 attack presented in Section 5.4.2. After a similar analysis,
we get that the attack requires 2113.8 chosen plaintexts, and has a time complex-
ity of 2117.2 7-round AES-192 encryptions, dramatically faster than any previously
published attack on 7-round AES-192.
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5.4.4 Attacking 8-Round AES-256
In this subsection, we extend the above presented 7-round AES-128/192 attack
to break 8-round AES-256, using a number of specific observations for AES-256.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the attacked 8 rounds are Rounds 1 to
8.
5.4.4.1 Preliminary Results
By the key schedule of AES-256, we have the following property for AES-256.
Property 5.5 For AES-256, the value for (K6,2,K6,3,K6,4,K6,6,K6,7,K6,8,K6,10,
K6,11,K6,12,K6,14,K6,15,K6,16) can be known from a value of K8.
Property 5.6 implies that, to improve an attack’s efficiency, we should use some
4-round impossible differentials such that there is no need to guess any key byte of
Round 6 after K8 is known or guessed.
5.4.4.2 Extending the 7-Round AES-128 Attack to Break 8-Round AES-256
We extend the 7-round AES-128 attack by adding one more round at the end, and
reverse the order of the operationsMC and KA for Rounds 5, 6 and 7. As implied
by Property 5.6 we use 4-round impossible differentials different from those used in
the 7-round AES-128 attack. We briefly describe the attack procedure as follows.
Attack Description
1. Choose 279.6 structures Si, (i = 1, 2, · · · , 279.6), where a structure Si is defined
to be a set of 232 plaintexts Pi,j with bytes (1, 6, 11, 16) taking all the possible
values and the other 12 bytes being fixed, (j = 1, 2, · · · , 232). In a chosen-
plaintext attack scenario, obtain all the ciphertexts for the 232 plaintexts in
each of the 279.6 structures; we denote by Ci,j the ciphertext for plaintext Pi,j .
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2. Perform Steps (a)–(c) below for (m,n) ∈ {(2, 3), (2, 4), (3, 4)}:
(a) Perform the following two sub-steps for l = 1 to 4:
• Guess a value for the subkey bytes (K8,(l−2) mod 4+5,K8,(l−3) mod 4+9,
K8,(l−4) mod 4+13,K8,l).
• Partially decrypt bytes (l, (l − 2) mod 4 + 5, (l − 3) mod 4 + 9, (l −
4) mod 4 + 13) of every (remaining) ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) to
get the corresponding values for bytes (l, l + 4, l + 8, l + 12) just
after the K˜A operation of Round 7, where 1 ≤ j1 6= j2 ≤ 232,
and check whether they have a zero byte difference only in bytes
((4− 3l) mod 16, (4− 3l− 4m− 4n− 1) mod 16 + 1). Keep only the
ciphertext pairs that meet this condition.
Finally, for every remaining ciphertext pair, we know the correspond-
ing values just after the KA operation of Round 7.
(b) Perform Steps (i)–(iii) below for l = 1 to 4:
i. There are 255 possible 32-bit differences in bytes (m,m + 4,m +
8,m+ 12) just after the KA operation of Round 6 that have a non-
zero byte difference only in byte ((m+4l−5) mod 16+1), which are
transformed by the MC operation to 255 possible 32-bit differences
in bytes (m,m + 4,m + 8,m + 12) just after the MC operation of
Round 6; we denote these differences by set Ωm+4l. Then, guess a
value for the two subkey bytes (K˜7,m, K˜7,(m−2) mod 4+5), and perform
Steps (A) and (B) below.
A. For every remaining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2), partially de-
crypt the corresponding values for bytes (m, (m− 2) mod 4 + 5)
just after the KA operation of Round 7 to get the corresponding
values for bytes (m,m+4) just after theMC operation of Round
6, and check whether they have a difference equal to any of the
corresponding two-byte partial differences in Ωm+4l. Keep only
the ciphertext pairs that meet this condition. Similarly we know
that there is only one difference in Ωm+4l for a pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2)
meeting the condition, and we denote this difference by δm+4li,j1,j2 .
B. Perform the following tow sub-steps for s = (m − 3) mod 4 + 9,
(m− 4) mod 4 + 13:
• Guess a value for the subkey byte K˜7,s.
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• For every remaining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2), partially de-
crypt the corresponding values for byte (s) just after the KA
operation of Round 7 to get the corresponding values for byte
(m + 4b s−14 c) just after the MC operation of Round 6, and
check whether they have a difference equal to the corresponding
one-byte partial difference in δm+4li,j1,j2 . Keep only the ciphertext
pairs that meet this condition.
ii. There are 255 possible 32-bit differences in bytes (n, n+4, n+8, n+12)
just after the KA operation of Round 6 that have a non-zero byte
difference only in byte ((4m + 4l − 3n − 5) mod 16 + 1), which are
transformed by the MC operation to 255 possible 32-bit differences
in bytes (n, n+4, n+8, n+12) just after theMC operation of Round
6; we denote these differences by set Ω4m+4l−3n. Then, guess a value
for the two subkey bytes (K˜7,n, K˜7,(n−2) mod 4+5), and perform Steps
(A) and (B) below.
A. For every remaining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2), partially de-
crypt the corresponding values for bytes (n, (n − 2) mod 4 + 5)
just after theMC operation of Round 7 to get the corresponding
values for bytes (n, n+4) just after theMC operation of Round
6, and check whether they have a difference equal to any of the
corresponding two-byte partial differences in Ω4m+4l−3n. Keep
only the ciphertext pairs that meet this condition. Similarly we
know that there is only one difference in Ω4m+4l−3n for a pair
(Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) meeting the condition, and we denote this difference
by δ4m+4l−3ni,j1,j2 .
B. Perform the following two sub-steps for t = (n − 3) mod 4 + 9,
(n− 4) mod 4 + 13:
• Guess a value for the subkey byte K7,t.
• For every remaining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2), partially de-
crypt the corresponding values for byte (t) just after the MC
operation of Round 7 to get the corresponding values for byte
(n+4b t−14 c) just after theMC operation of Round 6, and check
whether they have a difference equal to the corresponding one-
byte partial difference in δ4m+4l−3ni,j1,j2 . Keep only the ciphertext
pairs that meet this condition.
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iii. Compute the value for the two subkey bytes (K˜6,(m+4l−5) mod 16+1,
K˜6,(4m+4l−3n−5) mod 16+1) from the (K8,1,K8,2, · · · ,K8,16) guessed in
Step 2(a). For every remaining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2), partially
decrypt the corresponding values for bytes ((m + 4l − 5) mod 16 +
1, (4m + 4l − 3n − 5) mod 16 + 1) just after the KA operation of
Round 6 to check whether they produce a difference that has only
one zero byte difference in bytes ((m + l − 2) mod 4 + 1, (m + l −
2) mod 4+5, (m+ l−2) mod 4+9, (m+ l−2) mod 4+13) just after
the KA operation of Round 5. Keep only the ciphertext pairs that
meet this condition.
(c) Guess a value for the two subkey bytes (K0,1,K0,6), and perform Steps
(i)–(iii) below.
i. Partially encrypt every plaintext pair (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) corresponding to a
remaining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) to get the corresponding values
for bytes (1,6) just after the BS operation of Round 1, and check
whether they have a difference equal to any of the corresponding
two-byte partial differences in Ω, where Ω is defined in Observation
I. Keep only the plaintext pairs that meet this condition. By Property
5.1, we know that there is only one difference in Ω for a plaintext pair
(Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) meeting the condition, and we denote this difference by
δ1i,j1,j2 .
ii. Guess a value for the subkey byte K0,11. Partially encrypt every
remaining plaintext pair (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) to get the corresponding values
for byte (11) just after the BS operation of Round 1, and check
whether they have a difference equal to the corresponding one-byte
partial difference in δ1i,j1,j2 . Keep only the plaintext pairs that meet
this condition.
iii. Guess a value for the subkey byte K0,16. Partially encrypt every
remaining plaintext pair (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) to get the corresponding val-
ues for byte (16) just after the BS operation of Round 1, and check
whether they have a difference equal to the corresponding one-byte
partial difference in δ1i,j1,j2 . If there exists a plaintext pair meeting
this condition, discard the guessed value for (K˜7,m, K˜7,(m−2) mod 4+5,
K˜7,(m−3) mod 4+9, K˜7,(m−4) mod 4+13, K˜7,n, K˜7,(n−2) mod 4+5,K8,1,K8,2,
· · · ,K8,16, K˜7,(n−3) mod 4+9, K˜7,(n−4) mod 4+13,K0,1,K0,6,K0,11,K0,16),
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and try another.
3. For every guessed possible value for (K8,1,K8,2, · · · ,K8,16, K˜7,2, K˜7,3, K˜7,4, K˜7,5,
K˜7,6, K˜7,7, K˜7,9, K˜7,10, K˜7,12, K˜7,13, K˜7,15, K˜7,16), determine the correct key by
exhaustively searching the remaining 32 key bits.
Complexity Analysis
The attack requires 2111.6 chosen plaintexts, which take a time complexity of 2111.6
8-round AES-256 encryptions.
In Step 1, the 279.6 structures yield a total of 279.6 × 263 = 2142.6 plaintext pairs
(Pi,j1 , Pi,j2), (i = 1, 2, · · · , 279.6, 1 ≤ j1 6= j2 ≤ 232).
In Step 2(a) there is a 16-bit filtering condition in every iteration of l, thus it is
expected that about 2142.6−16×4 = 278.6 ciphertext pairs pass Step 2(a) for every
guessed value of (K8,1,K8,2, · · · ,K8,16). Step 2(a) has a time complexity of 3 ×∑3
i=0(2×2142.6×232×(i+1)×2−16×i× 416 × 18) ≈ 2188.2 8-round AES-256 encryptions.
For every iteration of (m,n) and every iteration of l in Step 2(b)-i-A, there are 255
differences in Ωm+4l, thus it is expected that 278.6 × 255
216
≈ 270.6 ciphertext pairs
pass Step 2(b)-i-A for every guess of (K˜7,m, K˜7,(m−2) mod 4+5,K8,1,K8,2, · · · ,K8,16).
For every iteration of (m,n) and every iteration of l in Step 2(b)-i-B, the difference
δm+4li,j1,j2 for every remaining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) is already fixed in Step 2(b)-i-
A, thus it is expected that for every subkey guess a proportion of 1−2−8 of remaining
ciphertext pairs will be discarded after every iteration of s. It follows that about
270.6−8×2 = 254.6 ciphertext pairs pass Step 2(b)-i for every subkey guess. Step 2(b)-i
has a total time complexity of 12× (2× 278.6× 2144× 216 × 18 +2× 270.6× 2152× 116 ×
1
8 + 2× 262.6 × 2160 × 116 × 18) ≈ 2222.2 8-round AES-256 encryptions.
For every iteration of (m,n) and every iteration of l in Step 2(b)-ii-A, there are 255
differences in Ω4m+4l−3n, thus it is expected that 254.6× 255
216
≈ 246.6 ciphertext pairs
pass Step 2(b)-ii-A for every guess of (K8,1,K8,2, · · · ,K8,16, K˜7,m, K˜7,(m−2) mod 4+5,
K˜7,(m−3) mod 4+9, K˜7,(m−4) mod 4+13, K˜7,n, K˜7,(n−2) mod 4+5). For every iteration of
(m,n) and every iteration of l in Step 2(b)-ii-B, the difference δ4m+4l−3ni,j1,j2 for ev-
ery remaining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) is already fixed in Step 2(b)-ii-A, thus
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it is expected that for every subkey guess a proportion of 1 − 2−8 of remaining
ciphertext pairs will be discarded after every iteration of t. It follows that about
246.6−8×2 = 230.6 ciphertext pairs pass Step 2(b)-i for every subkey guess. Step 2(b)-
ii has a total time complexity of 12× (2× 254.6 × 2176 × 216 × 18 + 2× 246.6 × 2184 ×
1
16 × 18 + 2× 238.6 × 2192 × 116 × 18) ≈ 2230.2 8-round AES-256 encryptions.
For every iteration of (m,n) and every iteration of l in Step 2(b)-iii, we can get a
ciphertext pair meeting the condition with a probability of
(
4
1
) × 2−8 = 2−6. After
considering the four iterations of l in Step 2(b), we expect that about 4×224.6 = 226.6
ciphertext pairs pass Step 2(b)-iii for every guessed value for (K˜7,m, K˜7,(m−2) mod 4+5,
K˜7,(m−3) mod 4+9, K˜7,(m−4) mod 4+13, K˜7,n, K˜7,(n−2) mod 4+5, K˜7,(n−3) mod 4+9, K8,1,K8,2,
· · · ,K8,16, K˜7,(n−4) mod 4+13). Step 2(b)-iii has a time complexity of 12× 2× 230.6 ×
2192 × 216 × 18 ≈ 2221.2 8-round AES-256 encryptions.
In Step 2(c)-i, there are 4 × 255 differences in Ω, thus the expected number of re-
maining pairs for every subkey guess is 226.6× 4×255
216
= 220.6. There is a 8-bit filtering
condition in Step 2(c)-ii, thus the expected number of remaining pairs after Step 2(c)-
ii for every subkey guess is 220.6×2−8 = 212.6. In Step 2(c)-iii, we can get a plaintext
pair meeting the condition with a probability of 2−8. Thus, in Step 2(c)-iii, for every
guessed value for (K˜7,m, K˜7,(m−2) mod 4+5, K˜7,(m−3) mod 4+9, K˜7,(m−4) mod 4+13, K˜7,n,
K˜7,(n−2) mod 4+5, K˜7,(n−3) mod 4+9, K˜7,(n−4) mod 4+13,K8,1,K8,2, · · · ,K8,16), there re-
main about 232×(1−2−8)212.6 ≈ 2−2.92 values for (K0,1,K0,6,K0,11,K0,16); it follows
that, given a value for (K8,1,K8,2, · · · ,K8,16), every value for (K0,1,K0,6,K0,11,K0,16)
is suggested on average by about 2
64×2−2.92
232
= 229.08 values for (K˜7,m, K˜7,(m−2) mod 4+5,
K˜7,(m−3) mod 4+9, K˜7,(m−4) mod 4+13, K˜7,n, K˜7,(n−2) mod 4+5, K˜7,(n−3) mod 4+9, K˜7,(n−4)
mod 4+13). Considering that there are three iterations of (m,n), we get that every
value for (K0,1,K0,6,K0,11,K0,16) is suggested by about 3×229.08× 229.08232 = 227.74 val-
ues for (K˜7,2, K˜7,3, K˜7,4, K˜7,5, K˜7,6, K˜7,7, K˜7,9, K˜7,10, K˜7,12, K˜7,13, K˜7,15, K˜7,16). As a
consequence, given a value for (K8,1,K8,2, · · · ,K8,16), we get 232×227.74 = 259.74 pos-
sible values for (K˜7,2, K˜7,3, K˜7,4, K˜7,5, K˜7,6, K˜7,7, K˜7,9, K˜7,10, K˜7,12, K˜7,13, K˜7,15, K˜7,16)
after summarising all the 232 possible values for (K0,1,K0,6,K0,11,K0,16), which cor-
respond to 259.74 possible values of (K7,2,K7,3,K7,4,K7,5,K7,6,K7,7,K7,9,K7,10,K7,12,
K7,13,K7,15,K7,16). Step 2(c) has a total time complexity of 3×{2×226.6×2208× 216×
1
8+2×220.6×2216× 116× 18+2×2224×[1+(1−2−8)+· · ·+(1−2−8)2
12.6
]× 116× 18} ≈ 2232.8
8-round AES-256 encryptions.
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The exhaustive search in Step 3 has a time complexity of about 2128×259.74×232 =
2219.74 8-round AES-256 encryptions.
Therefore, the attack has a total time complexity of approximately 2230.2 + 2232.8 ≈
2233.1 8-round AES-256 encryptions.
5.4.4.3 Extending the 7-Round AES-192 Attack to Break 8-Round AES-256
We extend the 7-round AES-192 attack presented in Section 5.4.3 to break 8-round
AES-256 by adding an additional round at the end. We reverse the order of the
operations MC and KA for Rounds 5 and 7. The attack procedure is as follows.
Attack Description
1. Choose 257 structures Si, (i = 1, 2, · · · , 257), where a structure Si is defined
to be a set of 232 plaintexts Pi,j with bytes (1, 6, 11, 16) taking all the possible
values and the other 12 bytes being fixed, (j = 1, 2, · · · , 232). In a chosen-
plaintext attack scenario, obtain all the ciphertexts for the 232 plaintexts in
each of the 257 structures; we denote by Ci,j the ciphertext for plaintext Pi,j .
The 257 plaintext structures yield a total of 257 × 263 = 2120 plaintext pairs
(Pi,j1 , Pi,j2), where 1 ≤ j1 6= j2 ≤ 232.
2. Perform Steps (a)–(c) below for (m,n) ∈ {(2, 3), (2, 4), (3, 4)}.
(a) Conduct a step similar to Step 2(a) of the 8-round AES-256 attack pre-
sented in Section 5.4.4.2.
(b) Compute the value for the eight subkey bytes (K6,m,K6,m+4,K6,m+8,K6,n,
K6,m+12,K6,n+4,K6,n+8,K6,n+12) from the (K8,1,K8,2, · · · ,K8,16) guessed
in Step 2(a). Guess a value for the eight subkey bytes (K˜7,(m−2) mod 4+5,
K˜7,(m−3) mod 4+9, K˜7,(m−4) mod 4+13, K˜7,(n−2) mod 4+5, K˜7,(n−3) mod 4+9, K˜7,m,
K˜7,n, K˜7,(n−4) mod 4+13). Partially decrypt every remaining pair of cipher-
texts to check whether they produce a difference just after the KA oper-
ation of Round 5 that has a zero byte difference in only the four bytes of
one of the four set: bytes (1,8,11,14), bytes (2,5,12,15), bytes (3,6,9,16)
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and bytes (4,7,10,13). Keep only the ciphertext pairs that meet this con-
dition.
(c) Conduct a step similar to Step 2(c) of the 8-round AES-256 attack in
Section 5.4.4.2.
3. Conduct a step similar to Step 3 of the 8-round AES-256 attack in Section
5.4.4.2.
Complexity Analysis
The attack requires 289 chosen plaintexts, which take a time complexity of 289 8-
round AES-256 encryptions.
In Step 2(a) there is a 16-bit filtering condition in every iteration of l, thus it
is expected that about 2120−16×4 = 256 ciphertext pairs pass Step 2(a) for every
guessed value for (K8,1,K8,2, · · · ,K8,16). Step 2(a) has a time complexity of 3 ×∑3
i=0(2× 2120× 232×(i+1)× 2−16×i× 416 × 18) ≈ 2165.6 8-round AES-256 encryptions.
In Step 2(b), for every iteration of (m,n), we can get a ciphertext pair meeting the
condition with a probability of
(
4
1
) × 2−32 = 2−30, thus it is expected that about
256×2−30 = 226 ciphertext pairs pass Step 2(b) for every guessed subkey value. Step
2(b) has a time complexity of 3× 2× 256 × 2192 × 816 × 28 = 2247.6 8-round AES-256
encryptions.
In Step 2(c), we similarly know that, for a guessed value for (K˜7,m, K˜7,(m−2) mod 4+5,
K˜7,(m−3) mod 4+9, K˜7,(m−4) mod 4+13, K˜7,n, K˜7,(n−2) mod 4+5, K˜7,(n−3) mod 4+9,K8,1,K8,2,
· · · ,K8,16, K˜7,(n−4) mod 4+13), it is expected that there remain about 232 × (1 −
2−8)212 ≈ 28.96 values for (K0,1,K0,6,K0,11,K0,16); it follows that, given a value for
(K8,1,K8,2, · · · ,K8,16), every value for (K0,1,K0,6,K0,11,K0,16) is suggested on av-
erage by about 2
64×28.96
232
= 240.96 values for (K˜7,m, K˜7,(m−2) mod 4+5, K˜7,(m−3) mod 4+9,
K˜7,(m−4) mod 4+13, K˜7,n, K˜7,(n−2) mod 4+5, K˜7,(n−3) mod 4+9, K˜7,(n−4) mod 4+13). Consid-
ering that there are three different iterations of (m,n), we get that every value for
(K0,1,K0,6,K0,11,K0,16) is suggested by about 3 × 240.96 × 240.96232 = 251.5 values for
(K˜7,2, K˜7,3, K˜7,4, K˜7,5, K˜7,6, K˜7,7, K˜7,9, K˜7,10, K˜7,12, K˜7,13, K˜7,15, K˜7,16). As a conse-
quence, given a value for (K8,1,K8,2, · · · ,K8,16), we get 232 × 251.5 = 283.5 possible
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values for (K˜7,2, K˜7,3, K˜7,4, K˜7,5, K˜7,6, K˜7,7, K˜7,9, K˜7,10, K˜7,12, K˜7,13, K˜7,15, K˜7,16), af-
ter summarising all the 232 possible values for (K0,1,K0,6,K0,11,K0,16), which corre-
spond to 283.5 possible values for (K7,2,K7,3,K7,4,K7,5,K7,6,K7,7,K7,9,K7,10,K7,12,
K7,13,K7,15,K7,16). Step 2(c) has a total time complexity of 3×{2×226×2208× 216×
1
8+2×220×2216× 116× 18+2×2224×[1+(1−2−8)+· · ·+(1−2−8)2
12
]× 116× 18} ≈ 2232.2
8-round AES-256 encryptions.
The exhaustive search in Step 3 has a time complexity of about 2128× 283.5× 232 =
2243.5 8-round AES-256 encryptions.
Therefore, the attack has a total time complexity of approximately 2243.5 + 2247.6 ≈
2247.7 8-round AES-256 encryptions.
5.5 Impossible Boomerang Attack on Reduced-Round AES
In this section we first describe certain 4-round impossible boomerang distinguishers
(using two tuples) of AES. We then use them as the basis of impossible boomerang
attacks on 6-round AES-128, 7-round AES-192 and 7-round AES-256.
5.5.1 4-Round Impossible Boomerang Distinguishers
We now describe certain impossible boomerang distinguishers for Rounds 2 to 5 of
AES. Let E0 denote Rounds 2 and 3 including the KA operation of Round 1, and
E1 denote Rounds 4 and 5 excluding the MC operation for Round 5. Figure 5.5
shows the set of four differentials making up the 4-round impossible boomerang dis-
tinguishers for E0◦E1. In this figure, a (small) square corresponds to a byte, a blank
indicates a zero 8-bit difference, and a square labeled a value a, b, · · · indicates an
(arbitrary1) non-zero 8-bit difference. The symbols given in the figure for individual
byte differences are used to simplify our description below. The four differentials
making up the impossible boomerang distinguisher are as follows.
The first differential ∆α→ ∆β for E0 is ((a, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0))
1By “arbitrary” we mean that these differentials hold with probability 1.
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Figure 5.5: The differentials in the 4-round impossible boomerang distinguisher
→ ((e1, e2, e3, e4), (e5, e6, e7, e8), (e9, e10, e11, e12), (e13, e14, e15, e16)), as shown in Fig-
ure 5.5(a).
The second differential ∆α′ → ∆β′ for E0 has the same format as ∆α → ∆β; we
denote it by ((a′, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0)) → ((e′1, e′2, e′3, e′4), (e′5, e′6,
e′7, e′8), (e′9, e′10, e′11, e′12), (e′13, e′14, e′15, e′16)).
The first differential ∆δ → ∆γ forE1 is ((f1, 0, 0, 0), (f5, 0, 0, 0), (f9, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0))
→ ((i1, i2, i3, 0), (0, i6, i7, i8), (i9, 0, i11, i12), (i13, i14, 0, i16)), as shown in Figure 5.5(b).
The second differential ∆δ′ → ∆γ′ for E1 is ((j1, 0, 0, 0), (j5, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0,
0, 0)) → ((n1, n2, 0, 0), (0, n6, n7, 0), (0, 0, n11, n12), (n13, 0, 0, n16)), as shown in Fig-
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ure 5.5(c).
We can now give the following result.
Property 5.6 The four differentials described above constitute an impossible boome-
rang distinguisher for E0◦E1: ((a, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0)), (a′, 0, 0, 0),
(0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0))) 9 (((f1, 0, 0, 0), (f5, 0, 0, 0), (f9, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0)),
((j1, 0, 0, 0), (j5, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0))), where a, a′, f1, f5, f9, j1 and j5 are ar-
bitrary but non-zero 8-bit values.
Proof. For the differential ∆α→ ∆β, we have (by definition of MC):
e5 = d1, (5.7)
e9 = d1. (5.8)
Similarly, for the differential ∆α′ → ∆β′, we have:
e′5 = d
′
1, (5.9)
e′9 = d
′
1. (5.10)
From [21] we know thatMC has a branch number of 5; hence h11 6= 0. Consequently,
i9 6= 0.
Note that the 5th and 9th bytes of ∆γ are 0 and i9, respectively; and the 5th and
9th bytes of ∆γ′ are both 0. Thus, from equations (5.7) and (5.9), the 5th byte of
β ⊕ β′ ⊕ γ ⊕ γ′ is e5 ⊕ e′5 = d1 ⊕ d′1, and by equations (5.8) and (5.10) the 9th byte
of β ⊕ β′ ⊕ γ ⊕ γ′ is e9 ⊕ e′9 ⊕ i9 = d1 ⊕ d′1 ⊕ i9.
Since i9 6= 0, thus d1 ⊕ d′1 and d1 ⊕ d′1 ⊕ i9 cannot both be zero, and hence β ⊕ β′ ⊕
γ ⊕ γ′ 6= 0 holds for the four differentials. The result follows. ¤
Before proceeding observe that there are many other similar 4-round impossible
boomerang distinguishers for AES. These impossible boomerang distinguishers apply
to any set of four consecutive rounds of AES.
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5.5.2 Attacking 6-Round AES-128
We now describe an impossible boomerang attack on the first 6 rounds of AES-128
based on the above 4-round impossible boomerang distinguisher. We reverse the
order of the operations MC and KA for Round 5.
5.5.2.1 Attack Description
1. Choose 280.2 plaintext structures Si, (i = 1, 2, · · · , 280.2), where a structure Si
is defined to be a set of 232 plaintexts Pi,j with bytes (1, 6, 11, 16) taking all
the possible values and the other 12 bytes are fixed, (j = 1, 2, · · · , 232). In a
chosen-plaintext attack scenario, obtain all the ciphertexts for the 232 plain-
texts in each of the 280.2 structures; let Ci,j be the ciphertext for plaintext
Pi,j . Choose the plaintext quartets ((Pi1,j1 , Pi1,j2), (Pi2,j3 , Pi2,j4)) such that
the corresponding ciphertext quartets ((Ci1,j1 , Ci1,j2), (Ci2,j3 , Ci2,j4)) satisfy
Ci1,j1⊕Ci2,j3 = ((?, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, ?), (0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0)) and Ci1,j2⊕Ci2,j4 =
((?, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, ?), (0, 0, ?, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0)), where 1 ≤ i1, i2 ≤ 280.2, 1 ≤ j1 6=
j2, j3 6= j4 ≤ 232.
2. Guess a value for the two subkey bytes (K6,1,K6,8), and perform Steps (a) and
(b) below for every remaining quartet ((Ci1,j1 , Ci1,j2), (Ci2,j3 , Ci2,j4)).
(a) Partially decrypt bytes (1,8) of Ci1,j1 and Ci2,j3 to get the correspond-
ing values for bytes (1,5) just after the MC operation of Round 5, and
check whether they produce a difference that has a zero in only one of
bytes (1,5,9,13) just after the KA operation of Round 5. Keep only the
ciphertext quartets that meet this condition.
(b) Guess a value for the subkey byte K6,11. Partially decrypt bytes (1,8,11)
of Ci1,j2 and Ci2,j4 to get the corresponding values for bytes (1,5,9) just
after the MC operation of Round 5, and check whether they produce a
difference that has a zero in only two of bytes (1,5,9,13) just after the
KA operation of Round 5 which include the one byte position with a
zero difference in Step 2(a). Keep only the ciphertext quartets that meet
this condition.
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3. Guess a value for the four subkey bytes (K0,1,K0,6,K0,11,K0,16). For ev-
ery plaintext quartet ((Pi1,j1 , Pi1,j2), (Pi2,j3 , Pi2,j4)) corresponding to a remain-
ing ciphertext quartet ((Ci1,j1 , Ci1,j2), (Ci2,j3 , Ci2,j4)), partially encrypt Pi1,j1
and Pi1,j2 to get the corresponding values for bytes (1,5,9,13) just after the
MC operation of Round 1, and check whether they have only one non-zero
byte difference; partially encrypt Pi1,j2 and Pi2,j4 to get the corresponding
values for bytes (1,5,9,13) just after the MC operation of Round 1, and
check whether they have only one non-zero byte difference. If there exists
a plaintext quartet meeting both the conditions, discard the guessed value for
(K6,1,K6,8,K6,11,K0,1,K0,6,K0,11,K0,11), and try another.
4. For every guessed value for (K6,1,K6,8,K6,11,K0,1,K0,6,K0,11,K0,16) after Step
3, determine the correct user key by exhaustively searching the remaining 96
bits for every value of (K0,1,K0,6,K0,11,K0,16).
5.5.2.2 Complexity Analysis
The attack requires 2112.2 chosen plaintexts, which take a time complexity of 2112.2
6-round AES-128 encryptions.
In Step 1, a structure Si yields about
(
232
2
) ≈ 263 plaintext pairs (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2),
where 1 ≤ j1 6= j2 ≤ 232; thus the 280.2 structures yield a total of 280.2 × 263 =
2143.2 plaintext pairs (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) that have a zero difference in all the bytes ex-
cept bytes (1,6,11,16), which propose
(
2143.2
2
) ≈ 2285.4 candidate plaintext quartets
((Pi1,j1 , Pi1,j2), (Pi2,j3 , Pi2,j4)), (1 ≤ i1, i2 ≤ 280.2, 1 ≤ j3 6= j4 ≤ 232). Expected
number of the remaining ciphertext quartets is about 2285.4 × 2−(13+14)×8 = 269.4.
Choosing the useful ciphertext quartets requires 2× 2112.2 = 2113.2 memory accesses
in a simple implementation.
In Step 2(a), the expected number of remaining quartets for every subkey guess is
269.4×(41)×2−8 = 263.4. Step 2(a) has a time complexity of 2×269.4×216× 16× 216 ≈
280.82 6-round AES-128 encryptions.
In Step 2(b), the expected number of remaining quartets for every subkey guess is
263.4×(31)×2−16 ≈ 248.98. Step 2(b) has a time complexity of 2×263.4×224× 16× 316 ≈
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283.4 6-round AES-128 encryptions.
In Step 3, it is expected that we can get a plaintext quartet meeting both the con-
ditions with probability (
(
4
1
)× 2−24)2 = 2−44; thus after analysing 248.98 remaining
plaintext quartets we get that there remain only 256×(1−2−44)248.98 ≈ 210.56 guessed
values for (K6,1,K6,8,K6,11,K0,1,K0,6,K0,11,K0,16). Step 3 has a time complexity
of 4× 256× [1+ (1− 2−44)+ · · ·+(1− 2−44)248.98 ]× 16 × 416 ≈ 297.42 6-round AES-128
encryptions.
The exhaustive search in Step 4 has a time complexity of about 210.56×296 = 2106.56
6-round AES-128 encryptions.
Therefore, the attack has a total time complexity of approximately 2112.2+2106.56 ≈
2112.3 6-round AES-128 encryptions.
5.5.3 Attacking 7-Round AES-192 and 7-Round AES-256
With an additional round appended at the end, the above 6-round AES-128 attack
can be extended to break 7-round AES-192/256, as follows. We reverse the order of
the operations MC and KA for Rounds 5 and 6.
1. Choose 2x plaintext structures Si, (i = 1, 2, · · · , 2x), where a structure Si is
defined to be a set of 232 plaintexts Pi,j with bytes (1, 6, 11, 16) taking all the
possible values and the other 12 bytes being fixed, (j = 1, 2, · · · , 232); and the
value of x will be given below. In a chosen-plaintext attack scenario, obtain all
the ciphertexts for the 232 plaintexts in each of the 2x structures; we denote
by Ci,j the ciphertext for plaintext Pi,j . This step has a time complexity of
2x+32 7-round AES-192/256 encryptions.
2. Guess a value for the subkey bytes (K7,1,K7,4,K7,7,K7,8,K7,10,K7,11,K7,13,
K7,14), and partially decrypt bytes (1, 4, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14) of all the ciphertexts
to get the corresponding values for bytes (1,4,5,8,9,12,13,16) just after theKA
operation of Round 6. A structure Si yields about
(
232
2
) ≈ 263 plaintext pairs
(Pi,j1 , Pi,j2), where 1 ≤ j1 6= j2 ≤ 232; thus the 2x structures yield a total of
2x × 263 = 2x+63 plaintext pairs (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) that have a zero difference in all
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the bytes except bytes (1,6,11,16), which propose
(
2x+63
2
) ≈ 22x+125 candidate
plaintext quartets ((Pi1,j1 , Pi1,j2), (Pi2,j3 , Pi2,j4)), where (1 ≤ i1, i2 ≤ 2x, 1 ≤
j3 6= j4 ≤ 232). Choose the ciphertext quartets ((Ci1,j1 , Ci1,j2), (Ci2,j3 , Ci2,j4))
that satisfy the following three conditions:
(i) Ci1,j1 ⊕ Ci2,j3 = ((?, 0, 0, ?), (0, 0, ?, ?), (0, ?, ?, 0), (?, ?, 0, 0));
(ii) Ci1,j2 ⊕ Ci2,j4 = ((?, 0, ?, ?), (0, ?, ?, ?), (?, ?, ?, 0), (?, ?, 0, ?)).
(iii) Either of the pairs (Ci1,j1 , Ci2,j3) and (Ci1,j2 , Ci2,j4) has a non-zero dif-
ference only in bytes (1,8) of bytes (1,4,5,8,9,12,13,16) just after the KA
operation of Round 6;
This step has a time complexity of 2×2x+32×264 = 2x+97 memory accesses and
2x+32 × 264 × 816 = 2x+95 one-round AES-192/256 encryptions. It is expected
that there remain 22x+125× 2−48×2× 2−64−32 = 22x−67 ciphertext quartets for
every subkey guess.
3. Guess a value for the four subkey bytes (K7,3,K7,6,K7,9,K7,16). For every
remaining ciphertext quartet ((Ci1,j1 , Ci1,j2), (Ci2,j3 , Ci2,j4)), partially decrypt
bytes (3,6,9,16) of Ci1,j2 and Ci2,j4 to get the corresponding values for bytes
(3,7,11,15) just after the KA operation of Round 6, and check whether they
have a non-zero difference only in byte (11). Keep only the ciphertext quartets
that meet this condition.
This step has a time complexity of 2× 22x−67 × 296 × 416 = 22x+28 one-round
AES-192/256 encryptions. It is expected that there remain 22x−67 × 2−24 =
22x−91 ciphertext quartets for every subkey guess.
4. Conduct a step similar to Step 2 of the 6-round AES-128 attack.
This step has a time complexity of 2×22x−91×2112× 216+2×22x−97×2120× 316 ≈
22x+21.8 one-round AES-192/256 encryptions. It is expected that there remain
22x−91×(41)×2−8×(31)×2−16 ≈ 22x−111.42 ciphertext quartets for every subkey
guess.
5. Guess a value for the two subkey bytes (K0,1,K0,6). Perform Steps (a)–(c)
below for every plaintext quartet ((Pi1,j1 , Pi1,j2), (Pi2,j3 , Pi2,j4)) corresponding
to a remaining quartet ((Ci1,j1 , Ci1,j2), (Ci2,j3 , Ci2,j4)).
(a) Partially encrypt Pi1,j1 and Pi1,j2 to get the corresponding values for bytes
(1,6) just after theBS operation of Round 1, and check whether they have
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a difference equal to the corresponding two-byte difference of one of those
in set Ω defined in Section 5.4.1; if yes, we denote by ∆si1,j1,j2 the differ-
ence from Ω for (Pi1,j1 , Pi1,j2). Partially encrypt Pi2,j3 and Pi2,j4 to get the
corresponding values for bytes (1,6) just after the BS operation of Round
1, and check whether they have a difference equal to the corresponding
two-byte difference of one of those in set Ω defined in Section 5.4.1; if yes,
we denote by ∆ti2,j3,j4 the difference from Ω for (Pi2,j3 , Pi2,j4). Keep the
plaintext quartets that meet both the conditions.
This step has a time complexity of 2 × 22x−111.42 × 2136 × 216 = 22x+22.6
one-round AES-192/256 encryptions. It is expected that there remain
22x−111.42× 2−6×2 = 22x−123.42 plaintext quartets for every subkey guess.
(b) Guess a value for the subkey byte K0,11. Partially encrypt Pi1,j1 and
Pi1,j2 to get the corresponding values for byte (11) just after the BS
operation of Round 1, and check whether they have a difference equal to
the corresponding one-byte difference of ∆si1,j1,j2 ; and partially encrypt
Pi2,j3 and Pi2,j4 to get the corresponding values for byte (11) just after the
BS operation of Round 1, and check whether they have a difference equal
to the corresponding one-byte difference of ∆ti2,j3,j4 . Keep the plaintext
quartets that meet both the conditions.
This step has a time complexity of 2 × 22x−123.42 × 2144 × 116 = 22x+17.6
one-round AES-192/256 encryptions. It is expected that there remain
22x−123.42× 2−8×2 = 22x−139.42 plaintext quartets for every subkey guess.
(c) Guess a value for the subkey byte K0,16. Partially encrypt Pi1,j1 and
Pi1,j2 to get the corresponding values for byte (16) just after the BS
operation of Round 1, and check whether they have a difference equal to
the corresponding one-byte difference of ∆si1,j1,j2 ; and partially encrypt
Pi2,j3 and Pi2,j4 to get the corresponding values for byte (16) just after
the BS operation of Round 1, and check whether they have a difference
equal to the corresponding one-byte difference of ∆ti2,j3,j4 . If there exists
a plaintext quartet meeting both the conditions, discard the guessed value
for (K7,1,K7,3,K7,4,K7,6,K7,7,K7,8,K7,9,K7,10,K7,11,K7,13,K7,14,K7,16,
K6,1,K6,8,K6,11,K0,1,K0,6,K0,11,K0,16), and try another.
The probability that there exists a plaintext quartet meeting both the
conditions is 2−8×2 = 2−16; thus the probability that a subkey guess re-
mains after the remaining 22x−139.42 quartets are tested is (1−2−16)22x−139.42
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≈ e−22x−155.42 , here e(= 2.71828 . . .) is the base of the natural logarithm.
This step has a time complexity of 4× 2152 × [1 + (1− 2−16) + · · ·+ (1−
2−16)22x−139.42 ]× 116 ≈ 2166 one-round AES-192/256 encryptions.
6. For every remaining value for (K˜6,8, K˜6,11,K7,1,K7,3,K7,4,K7,6,K7,7,K7,8,K7,9,
K7,10,K7,11,K7,13,K7,14,K7,16) under AES-192 or every remaining value for
(K˜6,1, K˜6,8, K˜6,11,K7,1,K7,3,K7,4,K7,6,K7,7,K7,8,K7,9,K7,10,K7,11,K7,13,K7,14,
K7,16) under AES-256, determine the correct user key by exhaustively search-
ing the remaining bits.
For AES-192, the attack requires x = 280.5 plaintext structures and has a time
complexity of (2189+2182.8+2183.6+2152×e−22×80.5−155.42×280)× 17 ≈ 2186.3 7-round
AES-192 encryptions.
For AES-256, the attack requires x = 280.8 plaintext structures and has a time
complexity of (2189.6 + 2183.4 + 2184.2 + 2152 × e−22×80.8−155.42 × 2136) × 17 ≈ 2186.9
7-round AES-256 encryptions.
5.6 Related-Key Impossible Boomerang Attack on Reduced-
Round AES
In this section we describe 6-round related-key impossible boomerang distinguishers
of AES-192/256, and use them to conduct a related-key impossible boomerang attack
on 8-round AES-192 and 9-round AES-256 using two keys.
Let E0 denote Rounds 2 to 5 (of AES-192/256) including the KA operation of
Round 1, E1 denote Rounds 6 to 7 excluding the MC operation of Round 7. We
use a related-key impossible boomerang distinguisher such that KA = KC and
KB = KD.
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5.6.1 Attacking 8-Round AES-192 Using Two Related Keys
The related-key differentials ∆α→ ∆β and ∆α′ → ∆β′ for E0 are both ((0, 0, a, a),
(0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0))→((?, ?, ?, ?), (?, ?, ?, ?), (?, ?, ?, ?), (?, ?, ?, ?)), where
the use key difference isKA⊕KB(= KC⊕KD) = ((a, 0, a, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)), with a being a specific non-zero 8-bit value. The same dif-
ferentials as those depicted in Figure 5.5(b) and (c) are used for E1.
Table 5.1 gives the subkey differences for the first eight rounds of AES-192 given
the user key difference ((a, 0, a, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)),
where b and c are indeterminate 8-bit values.
Similarly, we can learn that there exist the following 6-round related-key impossible
boomerang distinguishers for E0 ◦ E1: (((0, 0, a, a), (0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0)),
((0, 0, a, a), (0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0))) 9 (((?, 0, 0, 0), (?, 0, 0, 0), (?, 0, 0, 0), (0,
0, 0, 0)), ((?, 0, 0, 0), (?, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0))).
Table 5.1: Subkey differences for the 8-round AES-192 attack
(i) ∆K5i ∆K5i+1 ∆K5i+2 ∆K5i+3 ∆K5i+4
0

a 0 a 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


0 0 a a
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


a 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


0 0 a a
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

1

a a a a
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


a 0 a 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
b b b b


a 0 a a
0 0 0 0
0 0 c c
b b b 0


0 0 a a
0 0 0 0
c c c c
b 0 b 0
 /
As a result, we can conduct a related-key impossible boomerang attack on AES-192
reduced to the first 8 rounds (i.e. Rounds 1 to 8), similarly to the 6-round AES-128
attack given in Section 5.5.2.
From Table 5.1 we know that the differences for the subkey bytes K8,1 and K8,8 are
both zero. After an analysis similar to the 6-round AES-128 attack described in
Section 5.5.2, we get that, the attack requires 290.4 plaintext structures, and has a
time complexity of 2×290.4+32+2×22×90.4−91×216× 18 × 216 +2×22×90.4−97×224×
1
8 × 316 +4×256× [1+(1−2−64)+ · · ·+(1−2−64)2×90.4−111.42]× 18 × 416 +2160 ≈ 2160
8-round AES-192 encryptions, recovering the entire 192-bit user key.
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5.6.2 Attacking 9-Round AES-256 Using Two Related Keys
The related-key differentials ∆α→ ∆β and ∆α′ → ∆β′ for E0 are both ((0, a, a, 0),
(0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0))→((?, ?, ?, ?), (?, ?, ?, ?), (?, ?, ?, ?), (?, ?, ?, ?)), where
the use key difference isKA⊕KB(= KC⊕KD) = ((0, 0, 0, 0, 0, a, a, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0), (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)), with a being a specific non-zero 8-bit value.
The same differentials as those in Figure 5.5(b) and (c) are used for E1.
Table 5.2 gives the subkey differences for the first nine rounds of AES-256 given the
user key difference ((0, 0, 0, 0, 0, a, a, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0)), where b, c, d, e, f, g are indeterminate 8-bit values.
Table 5.2: Subkey differences for the 9-round AES-256 attack
(i) ∆K5i ∆K5i+1 ∆K5i+2 ∆K5i+3 ∆K5i+4
0

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


0 a a 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


0 a 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

1

0 a a a
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
b b b b


0 a 0 a
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
c c c c


0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
d d d d
b⊕ e e b⊕ e e


0 a a 0
0 0 0 0
f f f f
g ⊕ c g g ⊕ c g

We can similarly learn that there exist the following 6-round related-key impossible
boomerang distinguishers for E0 ◦ E1: (((0, a, a, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0)),
((0, a, a, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0))) 9 (((?, 0, 0, 0), (?, 0, 0, 0), (?, 0, 0, 0), (0,
0, 0, 0)), ((?, 0, 0, 0), (?, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0))).
Subsequently, we can conduct a related-key impossible boomerang attack on AES-
256 reduced to the first 9 rounds (i.e. Rounds 1 to 9), similarly to the 7-round
AES-192/256 attack in Section 5.5.3. We reverse the order of the operations MC
and KA for Rounds 7 and 8. From the key difference KA ⊕KB we have:
(i) The differences for K9,1, K9,4, K9,7 and K9,8 are all zero;
(ii) The differences for K9,10 and K9,11 are identical and indeterminate non-zero
values;
(iii) The differences for K9,13 and K9,14 are different and indeterminate non-zero
values, with neither of them equal to the difference for K9,10 (or K9,11);
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(iv) The differences for K˜8,1 and K˜8,8 are indeterminate.
Thus, when conducting a step similar to Step 2 of the 7-round AES-192/256 attack,
we first guess a value for the eight subkey bytes (K9,1,K9,4,K9,7,K9,8,K9,10,K9,11,
K9,13,K9,14) ofKA, and partially decrypt all the ciphertexts to get the corresponding
values for bytes (1,4,5,8,9,12,13,16) just after theKA operation of Round 8; then for
every guessed value for (K9,1,K9,4,K9,7,K9,8, K9,10,K9,11,K9,13,K9,14) of KA, we
guess a value for the differences for K9,10, K9,13 and K9,14, compute the eight subkey
bytes (K9,1,K9,4,K9,7,K9,8,K9,10,K9,11,K9,13,K9,14) of KB, and partially decrypt
all the ciphertexts to get the corresponding values for bytes (1,4,5,8,9,12,13,16)
just after the KA operation of Round 8. Finally, choose the ciphertext quartets
((Ci1,j1 , Ci1,j2), (Ci2,j3 , Ci2,j4)) that meet the following three conditions:
(i) Ci1,j1 ⊕ Ci2,j3 = ((?, 0, 0, ?), (0, 0, ?, ?), (0, ?, ?, 0), (?, ?, 0, 0));
(ii) Ci1,j2 ⊕ Ci2,j4 = ((?, 0, ?, ?), (0, ?, ?, ?), (?, ?, ?, 0), (?, ?, 0, ?));
(iii) For either of the pairs (Ci1,j1 , Ci2,j3) and (Ci1,j2 , Ci2,j4), the difference between
the corresponding values for bytes (1,4,5,8,9,12,13,16) just after the KA op-
eration of Round 8 has a non-zero byte difference only in bytes (1,8).
Subsequently, after an analysis similar to the 7-round AES-192/256 attack described
in Section 5.5.3, we get that, the attack requires 290.8 plaintext structures, and has a
time complexity of 2×290.8+32+290.8+32×264× 19× 816+290.8+32×264+24× 19× 816+2×
22×90.8−67×288+32× 19× 416+2×22×90.8−91×2120+16× 19× 216+2×22×90.8−97×2136+24×
1
9× 316+4×22×90.8−111.42×2160+16× 19× 216+4×22×90.8−143.42×2176+8× 19× 116+4×2192×
[1+(1−2−16)+· · ·+(1−2−16)2×90.8−159.42]×19× 116+2192×e−2
2×90.8−175.42×2136 ≈ 2242.5
9-round AES-256 encryptions, recovering the entire 256-bit user key.
This is the first published attack on 9-round AES-256 using two keys.
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5.7 Summary
In this chapter we have presented impossible differential cryptanalyses of 7-round
AES-128, 7-round AES-192 and 8-round AES-256, extending the results given in [2,
11, 96]. We then present impossible boomerang attacks on 6-round AES-128, 7-
round AES-192 and 7-round AES-256, and finally we present related-key impossible
boomerang attacks on 8-round AES-192 and 9-round AES-256 in a related-key at-
tack scenario using two keys. Table 5.3 summarises the published cryptanalytic
results on AES, where CP, ACPC and RK-CP refer to the required numbers of cho-
sen plaintexts, adaptive chosen plaintexts and ciphertexts and related-key chosen
plaintexts, respectively; and Encryptions refers to the required number of encryp-
tion operations of the relevant reduced-round version of AES-128/192/256.
Note that the early abort technique can be used to improve certain cryptanalytic
results on AES using related keys, such as the related-key truncated and impossible
differential attacks on reduced AES-192 described by Jakimoski and Desmedt in [45].
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Table 5.3: Cryptanalytic results on AES
Key Size Attack Type Rounds Keys Data Time Source
128 Square 6 1 232CP 272Encryptions [21]
7 1 2128 − 2119CP 2120Encryptions [25]
Collision 7 1 232CP 2128Encryptions [26]
Boomerang 6 1 271ACPC 271Encryptions [15]
Impossible boomerang 6 1 2112.2CP 2112.3Encryptions Section 5.5
Impossible differential 5 1 229.5CP 231Encryptions [11]
6 1 291.5CP 2122Encryptions [16]
7 1 2117.5CP 2121Encryptions [2]
7 1 2115.5CP 2119Encryptions [111]
7 1 2112.2CP 2115.6Encryptions Section 5.4
192 Square 7 1 232CP 2184Encryptions [81]
8 1 2128 − 2119CP 2188Encryptions [25]
Collision 7 1 232CP 2140Encryptions [26]
7 1 240CP 280Encryptions [22]
Impossible boomerang 7 1 2112.5CP 2186.3Encryptions Section 5.5
Impossible differential 7 1 292CP 2186Encryptions [96]
7 1 292CP 2162Encryptions [111]
7 1 291.2CP 2145.5Encryptions Section 5.4
7 1 2113.8CP 2117.2Encryptions Section 5.4
RK impossible differential 8 2 288RK-CP 2183Encryptions [45]
8 2 2112RK-CP 2136Encryptions [112]
RK impossible boomerang 8 2 2122.4RK-CP 2160Encryptions Section 5.6
RK rectangle 8 4 286.5RK-CP 286.5Encryptions [40]
8 2 294RK-CP 2120Encryptions [52]
9 64 285RK-CP 2182Encryptions [52]
10 256 2125RK-CP 2182Encryptions [52]
10 64 2124RK-CP 2183Encryptions [52]
256 Square 7 1 232CP 2200Encryptions [81]
8 1 2128 − 2119CP 2204Encryptions [25]
Collision 7 1 232CP 2140Encryptions [26]
8 1 240CP 2208Encryptions [22]
Impossible boomerang 7 1 2112.8CP 2186.9Encryptions Section 5.5
Impossible differential 7 1 292.5CP 2250.5Encryptions [96]
8 1 2116.5CP 2247.5Encryptions [111]
8 1 289CP 2247.7Encryptions Section 5.4
8 1 2111.6CP 2233.1Encryptions Section 5.4
RK square 9 256 285RK-CP 2226.4Encryptions [25]
RK impossible boomerang 9 2 2122.8RK-CP 2242.5Encryptions Section 5.6
RK rectangle 9 4 299RK-CP 2120Encryptions [52]
10 256 2114.9RK-CP 2171.8Encryptions [9]
10 64 2113.9RK-CP 2172.8Encryptions [52]
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Chapter 6
Impossible Differential Cryptanaly-
sis of Reduced Camellia
Camellia is a 128-bit block cipher with a user key of 128, 192 or 256 bits, which be-
came a CRYPTREC-recommended e-government cipher in 2002, a NESSIE selected
algorithm in 2003, and was adopted as an ISO international standard in 2005. In
this chapter we present impossible differential attacks on 11-round Camellia-128
without the FL functions, 12-round Camellia-192 without the FL functions, and
13-round Camellia-256 without the FL functions, all of which use the early abort
technique. The 11-round Camellia-128 attack requires 2118 chosen plaintexts and
has a time complexity of 2118 encryptions and 2126 memory accesses; the 12-round
Camellia-192 attack requires 2119 chosen plaintexts and has a time complexity of
2147.3 encryptions; and the 13-round Camellia-256 attack requires 2120 chosen plain-
texts and has a time complexity of 2211.7 encryptions. These are better than any
previously published cryptanalytic results on Camellia without the FL functions.
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6.1 Introduction
The block cipher Camellia was designed by Aoki, Ichikawa, Kanda, Matsui, Moriai,
Nakajima and Tokita [1], and published in 2000. Camellia has a Feistel structure,
a 128-bit block length, and a user key length of 128, 192 or 256 bits. It became a
CRYPTREC-recommended e-government cipher in 2002, a NESSIE selected algo-
rithm in 2003, and was adopted as an ISO international standard in 2005.
In this chapter we present impossible differential attacks on 11-round Camellia-128
without the FL functions, 12-round Camellia-192 without the FL functions, and
13-round Camellia-256 without the FL functions, all of which use the early abort
technique. The attack on 11-round Camellia-128 requires 2118 chosen plaintexts and
has a time complexity of about 2118 encryptions and 2126 memory accesses; the attack
on 12-round Camellia-192 requires 2119 chosen plaintexts and has a time complexity
of about 2147.3 encryptions; and the attack on 13-round Camellia-256 requires 2120
chosen plaintexts and has a time complexity of about 2211.7 encryptions. These are
better than any previously published cryptanalytic results on Camellia without the
FL functions.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 6.2 we describe
Camellia. In Section 6.3 we briefly review previous cryptanalytic results on Camellia.
In Section 6.4, we describe the 8-round impossible differentials for Camellia of Wu
et al. [108]. In Sections 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7 we present our cryptanalytic results. Section
6.8 summarises the results given in this chapter.
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6.2 The Camellia Block Cipher
In this section we briefly describe the Camellia block cipher [1].
6.2.1 Notation
In this chapter, a 128-bit value is represented as a sequence of sixteen bytes, num-
bered from 1 to 16 from left to right. We use the following notation.
• ?: an arbitrary 8-bit value, where two values represented by the ? symbol may
be different
6.2.2 Functions
Camellia uses the following five functions.
• S : {0, 1}64 → {0, 1}64 is a non-linear substitution constructed by applying
eight 8× 8-bit S-boxes S1,S2,S3,S4,S5,S6,S7 and S8 in parallel to the input,
where S1 and S8 are identical, S2 and S5 are identical, S3 and S6 are identical,
and S4 and S7 are identical. See [1] for specifications of the S-boxes.
• P : GF (28)8 → GF (28)8 is a linear permutation equivalent to multiplication
by the following matrix:
P =

1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0

.
• F : {0, 1}64 × {0, 1}64 → {0, 1}64 is a Feistel function. If X and Y are 64-bit
blocks, F(X,Y ) = P(S(X ⊕ Y )).
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• FL : {0, 1}64×{0, 1}64 → {0, 1}64 and FL−1 : {0, 1}64×{0, 1}64 → {0, 1}64 are
key-dependent linear functions. As we consider the version of Camellia without
the FL or FL−1 functions, we omit the description of these two functions;
see [1] for specifications.
6.2.3 Generation of Subkeys
The Camellia cipher uses a total of four 64-bit whitening subkeys KWj , 2bNr−66 c
64-bit subkeys KIl for the FL and FL−1 functions, and Nr 64-bit round subkeys
Ki, (1 ≤ j ≤ 4, 1 ≤ l ≤ 2bNr−66 c, 1 ≤ i ≤ Nr), all derived from a Nk-bit key K,
where Nr is 18 for Camellia-128, and 24 for Camellia-192/256 (i.e. the 128, 192 and
256-bit key versions of Camellia), Nk is 128 for Camellia-128, 192 for Camellia-192,
and 256 for Camellia-256. How this derivation is performed is not of significance to
our attacks, and so we do not describe it here (for details see [1]).
Each of the round subkeys Ki consists of 8 bytes; we write Ki,l for the lth byte of
Ki, where 1 ≤ l ≤ 8.
6.2.4 Encryption Procedure
Camellia takes as input a 128-bit plaintext block P , and has a total of Nr rounds,
where Nr is 18 for Camellia-128, and 24 for Camellia-192/256. The encryption
procedure is, where L0, R0, Li, Ri, L′i and R′i are 64-bit variables.
1. L0||R0 = P ⊕ (KW1||KW2)
2. For i = 1 to Nr:
if i = 6 or 12 (or 18 for Camellia-192/256),
L′i = F(Li−1,Ki)⊕Ri−1, R′i = Li−1;
Li = FL(L′i,KI i
3
−1), R
i = FL−1(R′i,KI i
3
);
else
Li = F(Li−1,Ki)⊕Ri−1, Ri = Li−1;
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3. Ciphertext = (RNr ⊕KW3)||(LNr ⊕KW4).
The ith iteration of Step 2 in the above description is referred to below as Round i,
(1 ≤ i ≤ Nr).
6.3 Previous Cryptanalytic Results
In this section we briefly review previously published cryptanalytic attacks on Camel-
lia.
• In 2001, He and Qing [35] presented a square attack on 6-round Camellia-128
without the FL functions.
• In 2001, Sugita, Kobara, and Imai [102] described an impossible differential
attack on 7-round Camellia-128 without the FL functions.
• In 2001, Lee, Hong, Lee, Lim, and Yoon [71] presented a truncated differential
attack on 8-round Camellia-128 without the FL functions.
• In 2002, Shirai [99] presented a boomerang attack on 9-round Camellia-192/256
with the FL functions, a rectangle attack on 10-round Camellia-256 with the
FL functions, a differential attack on 11-round Camellia-256 without the FL
functions, and a linear attack on 12-round Camellia-256 without the FL func-
tions.
• In 2002, Yeom, Park, and Kim [109] presented a square attack on 9-round
Camellia-256 with the FL functions.
• In 2002, Hatano, Sekine, and Kaneko [33] presented higher-order differential
attacks on 11-round Camellia-256 both with and without the FL functions.
• In 2003, Yeom, Park, and Kim [110] presented an integral attack on 9-round
Camellia-256 with the FL functions.
• In 2004, Wu, Feng, and Chen [107] presented collision attacks on 9-round
Camellia-192/256 without the FL functions and 10-round Camellia-256 with-
out the FL functions.
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• In 2005, Duo, Li, and Feng [24] presented square attacks on 10-round Camellia-
192/256 without the FL functions and 11-round Camellia-256 without the FL
functions.
• In 2007, Wu, Zhang, and Feng [108] presented an impossible differential attack
on 12-round Camellia-192/256 without the FL functions.
In summary, the best previously published cryptanalytic results on Camellia without
the FL functions are the truncated differential attack on 8-round Camellia-128 [71],
the impossible differential attack on 12-round Camellia-192 [108], and the linear and
impossible differential cryptanalysis of 12-round Camellia-256 [99, 108].
6.4 8-Round Impossible Differentials of Camellia
In 2007, Wu et al. [108] gave the following 8-round impossible differentials for
Camellia: (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, a, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) 9 (h, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0), where a and h are any non-zero bytes.
These impossible differentials apply to any set of eight consecutive rounds of Camel-
lia.
6.5 Attacking 13-Round Camellia-256 without the FL Func-
tions
In this section, we present an impossible differential cryptanalysis of 13-round Camellia-
256. Without loss of generality, we assume that the attacked 13 rounds are Rounds
1 to 13, and use the 8-round impossible differentials of Wu et al. applied to Rounds
4 to 11.
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6.5.1 Preliminary Results
It is easy to verify by a computer program that, for every S-box of Camellia, there
exist 127 possible output differences for any non-zero input difference, of which 1
output difference occurs with probability 2−6, and each of the other 126 output differ-
ences occurs with probability 2−7. Thus an output difference (h, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) of the 8-round impossible differentials will propagate to about 27 pos-
sible output differences (g, g, g, 0, g, 0, 0, g, h, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) after Round 12, where
g is non-zero. Then, every (g, g, g, 0, g, 0, 0, g, h, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) will propagate to
about (27)5 possible output differences after Round 13. Hence, there are at most
(28− 1)× 27× (27)5 ≈ 250 possible output differences after Round 13; let Ω13 be the
set of all possible output differences after Round 13.
We use the early abort technique in the first two rounds and the last round of the
13-round attack. We first give the following result.
Property 6.1 The following properties hold.
1. If (Pi = (L0i , R
0
i ), Pj = (L
0
j , R
0
j )) is a plaintext pair, then P
−1(R0i ⊕ R0j ⊕
(u, u, u, 0, u, 0, 0, u)) has a unique value in the first two bytes for every non-
zero value of u (one byte long).
2. For a pair of ciphertexts (Ci, Cj), if their corresponding values just after Round
13 have a difference (∆L13 = L13i ⊕ L13j ,∆R13 = R13i ⊕ R13j ) belonging to
Ω13, then the difference between their corresponding values just after the S-
box substitution layer of Round 13 must have the form (?, ?, ?, 0, ?, 0, 0, ?), and
there is a unique value of h such that P−1(L13i ⊕L13j ⊕ (h, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)) has
the form (?, ?, ?, 0, ?, 0, 0, ?).
Proof. (1) Suppose that there are two values u1 and u2 such that P−1(R0i ⊕R0j ⊕
(u1, u1, u1, 0, u1, 0, 0, u1))⊕P−1(R0i ⊕R0j⊕(u2, u2, u2, 0, u2, 0, 0, u2)) = (0, 0, ?, ?, ?, ?,
?, ?). Thus P−1(u1⊕u2, u1⊕u2, u1⊕u2, 0, u1⊕u2, 0, 0, u1⊕u2) = (0, 0, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?).
By definition of P−1 it follows that the first byte of P−1(x, x, x, 0, x, 0, 0, x) for any
x is equal to x, and hence u1 ⊕ u2 = 0, i.e. u1 = u2, and (1) follows.
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(2) The left half of a difference from Ω13 has the form (g, g, g, 0, g, 0, 0, g), where
g is a non-zero byte value; thus, for a pair of ciphertexts (Ci, Cj) such that their
corresponding values just after Round 13 have a difference belonging to Ω13, the
difference between their corresponding values just after the S-box substitution layer
of Round 13 must have the form (?, ?, ?, 0, ?, 0, 0, ?). We now prove the latter part
of Property 6.1-2. Because any difference from Ω13 is obtained given the input
difference (g, g, g, 0, g, 0, 0, g, h, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) to Round 13, therefore, for a pair of
ciphertexts (Ci, Cj) such that their corresponding values just after Round 13 have
a difference belonging to Ω13, there must be a value of h such that P−1(L13i ⊕L13j ⊕
(h, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)) has the form (?, ?, ?, 0, ?, 0, 0, ?). Assume there are two different
values h1 and h2 that satisfy the condition, then it follows thatP−1((h1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0)⊕ (h2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)) also has the form (?, ?, ?, 0, ?, 0, 0, ?); note that the fourth
byte is 0; however, by definition ofP−1 it follows that the fourth byte ofP−1((h1, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0)⊕ (h2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)) should be h1 ⊕ h2 6= 0, giving a contradiction. ¤
6.5.2 Attack Description
We now present a procedure for attacking 13-round Cammellia-256; it involves the
following series of steps. The attack is shown diagrammatically in Figure 6.1.
1. Choose 28 structures Si, (1 ≤ i ≤ 28), where a structure Si is defined to be a set
of 2112 plaintexts Pi,j = (L0i,j , R
0
i,j) with L
0
i,j = P(x
i,j
1 , x
i,j
2 , x
i,j
3 , α4, x
i,j
5 , γ
i
6, γ
i
7,
xi,j8 )⊕ (xi,j , β2, β3, β4, β5, β6, β7, β8) and R0i,j = (yi,j1 , yi,j2 , yi,j3 , yi,j4 , yi,j5 , yi,j6 , yi,j7 ,
yi,j8 ), where the bytes α4, β2, β3, · · · , β8 are arbitrary but fixed values (for the 28
structures), the bytes xi,j , xi,j1 , x
i,j
2 , x
i,j
3 , x
i,j
5 , x
i,j
8 , y
i,j
1 , y
i,j
2 , · · · , yi,j8 take all the
possible values in {0, 1}8, and the bytes γi6, γi7 are fixed, (j = 1, 2, · · · , 2112).
In a chosen-plaintext attack scenario, obtain all the 2120 ciphertexts for all the
2112 plaintexts in each of the 28 structures; we denote the ciphertext for plain-
text Pi,j by Ci,j = (L13i,j , R
13
i,j). Choose the pairs (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) with a difference
belonging to Ω13, where 1 ≤ j1 6= j2 ≤ 2112.
2. For every remaining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2), by Property 6.1-2 there is
only one value of h such that P−1(L13i,j1 ⊕ L13i,j2 ⊕ (h, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)) has the
form (?, ?, ?, 0, ?, 0, 0, ?); we denote by δ13i,j1,j2 the value P
−1(L13i,j1 ⊕ L13i,j2 ⊕
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P ⊕
K ◦ S P ⊕
K ◦ S P ⊕
K ◦ S P ⊕
K ◦ S P ⊕
8-round impossbile differentials
∆L11 = (h, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) ∆R11 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
∆L12 = (g, g, g, 0, g, 0, 0, g)
δ13
i,j
∆L0 = P(?, ?, ?, 0, ?, 0, 0, ?)⊕ (?, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
∆L1 = (u, u, u, 0, u, 0, 0, u)
∆L2 = (a, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
∆L3 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
∆R0 = (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
δ1
i,j
δ2
i,j
K ◦ S
∆13
Figure 6.1: Impossible differential attack on 13-round Camellia-256
(h, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)) with the form (?, ?, ?, 0, ?, 0, 0, ?). Then, perform Steps
(a) and (b) below.
(a) Perform the following two sub-steps for l = 1, 2, 3, 5, 8.
• Guess a value for the subkey byte K13,l;
• For every remaining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2), partially decrypt
R13i,j1 and R
13
i,j2
to get the corresponding values for byte (l) just after
the S function of Round 13, and check whether they have a difference
equal to the corresponding one-byte difference in δ13i,j1,j2 . Keep only
the pairs that meet this condition.
(b) Guess a value for the subkey bytes (K13,4,K13,6,K13,7), such that for
every remaining ciphertext pair we can get the corresponding values for
byte (1) just before Round 12.
3. Guess a value for the subkey byte K12,1. For every remaining ciphertext pair
(Ci,j1 , Ci,j2), partially decrypt R
12
i,j1
and R12i,j2 to get the corresponding values
for byte (1) just after the S function of Round 12, and check whether they
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have a difference equal to byte (1) of L12i,j1 ⊕ L12i,j2 . Keep only the pairs that
meet this condition.
4. For every plaintext pair (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) corresponding to a remaining ciphertext
pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2), compute P
−1(R0i,j1 ⊕ R0i,j2 ⊕ (u, u, u, 0, u, 0, 0, u)) for all the
255 possible non-zero values of u; label the resulting set of 255 values ∆1i,j1,j2 .
Then, perform Steps (a) and (b) below.
(a) Guess a value for the two subkey bytes (K1,1,K1,2). For every remaining
plaintext pair (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2), partially encrypt L
0
i,j1
and L0i,j2 to get the cor-
responding values for bytes (1,2) just after the S function of Round 1, and
check whether they have a difference equal to any of the corresponding
two-byte partial differences in ∆1i,j1,j2 . Keep only the pairs that meet this
condition. By Property 6.1-1 there is only one difference in ∆1i,j1,j2 for a
pair meeting the condition, and we denote this difference from ∆1i,j1,j2 by
δ1i,j1,j2 .
(b) Perform the following two sub-steps for l = 3 to 8:
• Guess a value for the subkey byte K1,l;
• For every remaining plaintext pair (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2), partially encrypt L0i,j1
and L0i,j2 to get the corresponding values for byte (l) just after the S
function of Round 1, and check whether they have a difference equal
to the corresponding one-byte partial difference in δ1i,j1,j2 . Keep only
the pairs that meet this condition.
5. For every remaining plaintext pair (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2), from Property 6.1-2 we sim-
ilarly know that there is only one value of a such that P−1(L0i,j1 ⊕ L0i,j1 ⊕
(a, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)) has the form (?, ?, ?, 0, ?, 0, 0, ?); we denote by δ2i,j1,j2 the
value P−1(L0i,j1 ⊕L0i,j1 ⊕ (a, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)) with the form (?, ?, ?, 0, ?, 0, 0, ?).
Then, perform Steps (a) and (b) below.
(a) Perform the following two sub-steps for l = 1, 2, 3, 5, 8.
• Guess a value for the subkey byte K2,l;
• For every remaining pair (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2), partially encrypt L1i,j1 and L1i,j2
to get the corresponding values for byte (l) just after the S function
of Round 2, and check whether they have a difference equal to the
corresponding one-byte partial difference in δ2i,j1,j2 . Keep only the
pairs that meet this condition.
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(b) Guess a value for the subkey bytes (K2,4,K2,6,K2,7), such that for every
remaining plaintext pair we can get the corresponding values for byte (1)
just after Round 2.
6. Guess a value for the subkey byte K3,1. For every plaintext pair (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2),
partially encrypt L2i,j1 and L
2
i,j2
to get the corresponding values for byte (1)
just after the S function of Round 3, and check whether they have a difference
equal to byte (1) of L1i,j1 ⊕ L1i,j2 . If there exists a ciphertext pair that meets
this condition, then discard this subkey guess, and try another; otherwise, for
every subkey guessed value for (K1,K2), exhaustively search for the remaining
128 key bits.
6.5.3 Complexity Analysis
The attack requires 2120 chosen plaintexts, which take a time complexity of 2120
13-round Camellia-256 encryptions.
In Step 1, after an analysis we learn that, for different values of (xi,j , xi,j1 , x
i,j
2 , x
i,j
3 , x
i,j
5 ,
xi,j8 , y
i,j
1 , · · · , yi,j8 ) in a structure Si, the resultant 128-bit blocks are different. Thus
a structure Si yields
(
2112
2
) ≈ 2112×22 = 2223 plaintext pairs (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2), (j =
1, 2, · · · , 2112), and hence the 28 structures yield a total of 2231 ciphertext pairs.
Choosing the pairs (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) with a difference belonging to Ω13 requires about
2120 × 250 = 2176 memory accesses in a simple implementation. There are 250 pos-
sible differences in Ω13, thus approximately 2231 × 2502128 = 2153 are chosen in Step
1.
In Step 2(a), a proportion of about 1 − 2−7 of the remaining ciphertext pairs will
be discarded after every iteration. Step 2(b) does not put any filtering condition
on the remaining ciphertext pairs. Step 2 has a total time complexity of about∑4
i=0(2× 2153−7×i × 28×(i+1) × 113 × 18) + 2× 2118 × 264 × 113 × 38 ≈ 2177.9 13-round
Camellia-256 decryptions.
In Step 3, a proportion of about 1 − 2−7 of the remaining ciphertext pairs will be
discarded. Step 3 has a time complexity of about 2 × 2118 × 272 × 113 × 18 ≈ 2184.3
13-round Camellia-256 decryptions.
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In Step 4(a), there are 255 possible values in ∆1i,j1,j2 for every pair (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2), thus
it is expected that about 2111 × 255
216
≈ 2103 pairs (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) remain after Step 4(a)
for every guess of (K13,1,K13,2,K13,3,K13,5,K13,8,K12,1,K1,1,K1,2). In Step 4(b),
the difference δ1i,j1,j2 is already fixed in Step 4(a), so it is expected that a proportion
of about 1 − 2−8 of the remaining pairs (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) will be discarded after every
iteration. Step 4 has a total time complexity of about 2 × 2111 × 288 × 113 × 28 +∑5
i=0(2×2103−8×i×288+8×(i+1)× 113× 18) ≈ 2196.3 13-round Camellia-256 encryptions.
In Step 5(a), similarly it is expected that a proportion of about 1 − 2−8 of the
remaining plaintext pairs (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) will be discarded after every iteration. Step
5(b) does not put any filtering condition on the remaining plaintext pairs. Step 5
has a total time complexity of about
∑4
i=0(2 × 255−8×i × 2136+8×(i+1) × 113 × 18) +
2× 215 × 2200 × 113 × 38 ≈ 2210.9 13-round Camellia-256 encryptions.
In Step 6, with a probability of 2−8 we can get a pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) that meets the
condition, thus the expected number of remaining subkey guesses is about 2208 ×
(1− 2−8)215 ≈ 223.68, meaning that 2151.68 trial encryptions are required to find the
correct 256 key bits. Step 6 has a time complexity of about 2×2208× [1+(1−2−8)+
· · ·+ (1− 2−8)215 ]× 113 × 18 + 2151.68 ≈ 2210.3 13-round Camellia-256 encryptions.
Therefore, the attack has a total time complexity of approximately 2211.7 13-round
Camellia-256 encryptions.
6.6 Attacking 12-Round Camellia-192 without the FL Func-
tions
As mentioned earlier, Wu et al. [108] presented an impossible differential crypt-
analysis on 12-round Camellia-192 without the FL functions. The attack requires
2120 chosen plaintexts, and has a time complexity of 2181 Camellia-192 encryptions.
However, it can be improved; the improved attack is basically the version of the
above 13-round Camellia-256 attack when the last round is removed. The main
difference is that in the last step we exhaustively search for the remaining 64 key
bits for every guessed value for (K1,K2). After a similar analysis, we get that the
improved attack on 12-round Camellia-192 requires 2119 chosen plaintexts, and has
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a time complexity of approximately 2147.3 12-round Camellia-192 encryptions;
6.7 Attacking 11-Round Camellia-128 without the FL Func-
tions
Without loss of generality, we assume that the attacked 11 rounds are Rounds 1 to
11. We use the 8-round impossible differentials of Wu et al. in Rounds 3 to 10, and
use the early abort technique in the first round.
6.7.1 Attack Description
The attack procedure is as follows.
1. Choose 230 structures Si, (i = 1, 2, · · · , 230), where a structure is defined to be a
set of 288 plaintexts Pi = (L0i,j , R
0
i,j) with R
0
i,j = P(x
i,j
1 , x
i,j
2 , x
i,j
3 , α4, x
i,j
5 , σ
i
6, σ
i
7,
xi,j8 )⊕(xi,j , βi2, βi3, βi4, βi5, βi6, βi7, βi8) and L0i,j = (yi,j1 , yi,j2 , yi,j3 , γi4, yi,j5 , γi6, γi7, yi,j8 ),
where the bytes α4, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6, β7, β8 are arbitrary but fixed values (for
the 230 structures), the bytes xi,j , xi,j1 , x
i,j
2 , x
i,j
3 , x
i,j
5 , x
i,j
8 , y
i,j
1 , y
i,j
2 , y
i,j
3 , y
i,j
5 , y
i,j
8
take all the possible values in {0, 1}8, and the bytes σi6, σi7, γi4, γi6, γi7 are fixed,
(j = 1, 2, · · · , 288). In a chosen-plaintext attack scenario, obtain all the
2118 ciphertexts for the 288 plaintexts in each of the 230 structures; we de-
note the ciphertext for plaintext Pi,j by Ci,j = (L11i,j , R
11
i,j). Choose the ci-
phertext pairs (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) such that L
0
i,j1
⊕ L0i,j2 = (u, u, u, 0, u, 0, 0, u) and
(L11i,j1 ⊕ L11i,j2 , R11i,j1 ⊕ R11i,j2) belonging to the 215 possible output differences
after Round 11.
2. Conduct a step similar to Step 3 of the 13-round Camellia-256 attack presented
in Section 6.5.
3. Conduct a step similar to Step 5 of the 13-round Camellia-256 attack.
4. Conduct a step similar to Step 6 of the 13-round Camellia-256 attack; here,
for every remaining guess for (K1,K2,1), exhaustively search for the remaining
56 key bits.
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6.7.2 Complexity Analysis
In Step 1, a structure yields about 2
88×2
2 × 255240 ≈ 2143 ciphertext pairs (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2)
with L0i,j1 ⊕ L0i,j2 = (u, u, u, 0, u, 0, 0, u), so the 230 structures yield a total of 2173
ciphertext pairs with ∆L0 = (u, u, u, 0, u, 0, 0, u), which generate 2173 × 215
2128
= 260
useful pairs. To get the useful ciphertext pairs, we first store the ciphertexts in a
structure Si into a hash table indexed by bytes (4,6,7) of L11i,j , bytes (2, 3, · · · , 8)
of R11i,j , the XOR of the 1st and 2-nd bytes of L
11
i,j , the XOR of the 1st and 3-rd
bytes of L11i,j , the XOR of the 1st and 5th bytes of L
11
i,j and the XOR of the 1st and
8th bytes of L11i,j ; and then we choose the qualified pairs. Thus, it requires about
2118×28 = 2126 memory accesses in a simple implementation. The expected number
of remaining ciphertext pairs is about 260.
Step 2 has a time complexity of about 2 × 260 × 28 × 111 × 18 ≈ 262.6 11-round
Camellia-128 encryptions.
Step 3 has a time complexity of about
∑4
i=0(2 × 253−8×i × 28+8×(i+1) × 111 × 18) +
2× 213 × 272 × 111 × 38 ≈ 281.2 11-round Camellia-128 encryptions.
In Step 4, it is expected that there remain about 280 × (1− 2−8)213 ≈ 233.92 guesses
for (K1,K2,1,K11,1); thus 289.92 trial encryptions are required to find the 128 key
bits. This step has a time complexity of about 2× 280 × [1 + (1− 2−8) + · · ·+ (1−
2−8)213 ]× 111 × 18 + 289.92 ≈ 290 11-round Camellia-128 encryptions.
Therefore, the attack has a total time complexity of approximately 2118 11-round
Camellia-128 encryptions and 2126 memory accesses.
6.8 Summary
In this chapter we have presented impossible differential attacks on 11-round Camellia-
128 without the FL functions, 12-round Camellia-192 without the FL functions,
and 13-round Camellia-256 without the FL functions. Table 6.1 summarises the
published cryptanalytic results on Camellia, where CP, KP and ACPC refer to
the required numbers of chosen plaintexts, known plaintexts and adaptive chosen
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plaintexts and ciphertexts, respectively; MA and Encryptions refer to the required
numbers of memory accesses and encryption operations of the relevant reduced ver-
sion of Camellia-128/192/256, respectively; “none” means “no FL function”; and
“all” means “all the FL functions”.
Table 6.1: Cryptanalytic results on Camellia
Key Size Attack Type Rounds FL/FL−1 Data Time Source
128 Square 6 none 211.7CP 2112Encryptions [35]
Truncated differential 8 none 283.6CP 255.6Encryptions [71]
Impossible differential 7 none not specified not specified [102]
11 none 2118CP 2126MA&2118Encryptions Section 6.7
192 Boomerang 9 all 2124ACPC 2170Encryptions [99]
Collision 9 none 213CP 2175.6Encryptions [107]
Square 10 none not specified 2186Encryptions [24]
Impossible differential 12 none 2120CP 2181Encryptions [108]
12 none 2119CP 2147.3Encryptions Section 6.6
256 Boomerang 9 all 2124ACPC 2170Encryptions [99]
Square 9 all 260CP 2202Encryptions [109]
10 none not specified 2186Encryptions [24]
Integral 9 all 260.5CP 2202.2Encryptions [110]
Rectangle 10 all 2127CP 2241Encryptions [99]
Collision 10 none 214CP 2239.9Encryptions [107]
Differential 11 none 2104CP 2232Encryptions [99]
High-order differential 11 none 221CP 2255Encryptions [33]
11 all 293CP 2256Encryptions [33]
Square 11 none not specified 2250Encryptions [24]
Linear 12 none 2119KP 2247Encryptions [99]
Impossible differential 12 none 2120CP 2181Encryptions [108]
13 none 2120CP 2211.7Encryptions Section 6.5
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Chapter 7
Related-Key Cryptanalysis of the Full
Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b
Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b, designed for firmware-oriented applications, are 64-bit
Data-dependent Permutation based block ciphers with 128 key bits, which involve 16
and 20 rounds, respectively. In this chapter, we present a related-key rectangle attack
on the full Cobra-F64a and a related-key differential attack on the full Cobra-F64b.
The attack on Cobra-F64a requires 264.81 related-key chosen plaintexts, and has a
time complexity of approximately 2123.81 encryptions; the attack on Cobra-F64b re-
quires 261 related-key chosen plaintexts, and has a time complexity of approximately
2110.67 encryptions.
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7.1 Introduction
Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b was designed by Goots, Moldovyan, Moldovyan and
Summerville [28], and published in 2003. They have a Feistel structure, a 64-bit
block length, and a 128-bit user key, which involve 16 and 20 rounds, respectively.
Recently, a number of block ciphers, including SPECTR-H64 [29], the CIKS fam-
ily — CIKS-1 [85], CIKS-128 [28] and CIKS-128H [100], and the Cobra family —
Cobra-128, Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b [30], Cobra-H64 and Cobra-H128 [101],
have been proposed for use in applications that require a small amount of data to be
encrypted with frequently changed user keys. One example of such an application
is provided by IPsec (Internet Protocol security) [44]. However, many of them have
been shown to be vulnerable to related-key cryptanalytic attacks [62, 63, 68, 69],
although Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b [30] have, until now, been exceptions.
In this chapter, we describe a 15-round related-key rectangle distinguisher with
probability 2−123.62 for Cobra-F64a, and use it to mount a related-key rectangle at-
tack on the full 16-round Cobra-F64a. The attack requires 264.81 related-key chosen
plaintexts and has a time complexity of approximately 2123.81 encryptions. We also
describe a 19.5-round related-key differential with probability 2−57 for Cobra-F64b,
and use it as the basis of a related-key differential attack on the full 20-round
Cobra-F64b. The second attack requires 261 related-key chosen plaintexts and has
a time complexity of approximately 2110.67 encryptions.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 7.2 we describe
Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b. In Section 7.3 we briefly review previous cryptan-
alytic results on Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b. In Section 7.4 we give a number
of properties of Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b. In Sections 7.5 and 7.6 we present
our cryptanalytic results on Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b, respectively. Section 7.7
summarises the results given in this chapter.
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7.2 Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b
In this section we briefly describe the Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b block ciphers [30].
7.2.1 Notation
In this chapter, the bits of an n-bit value are numbered from 1 to n from left to right,
where the least significant bit is referred as the nth bit, and the most significant bit
is referred as the 1st bit. We use the following notation.
• ¢: addition modulo 232
• ¯: subtraction modulo 232
• 〈x〉2: x is in binary (base 2) notation
7.2.2 Functions and DDP-Boxes
Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b use the function T and a number of so-called DDP-
boxes Pn,m (for specific values of n andm) to construct the round function F. These
functions are defined as follows.
• T : {0, 1}32 → {0, 1}96 is a linear function. If L = (l1, · · · , l32) is 32-bit block,
then T(L) is defined to equal (L1||L1 ≫ 6||L1 ≫ 12||L2||L2 ≫ 6||L2 ≫ 12),
where L1 = (l1, · · · , l16) and L2 = (l17, · · · , l32).
• For certain specific values of n and m (see below), the non-linear function
Pn,m : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n with the property that, for any fixed m-bit
value V , Pn,m(·, V ) : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is a bijective mapping. Such a function
is called a Data-Dependent Permutation box (DDP-box), and V is called the
controlling vector. We write P−1n,m(·, V ) as (P−1n,m(·, V ))−1 for any fixed V , or
simply write P−1n,m. Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b use the following DDP-boxes.
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Pn,m
n
X = (x1, x2, · · · , xn)
n
Pn∗m(X, V ) = (y1, y2, · · · , yn)
m
V = (v1, v2, · · · , vn)
P2,1 P2,1
P2,1 P2,1
x1 x2 x3 x4
y1 y2 y3 y4
v1 v2
v3 v4
P2,1
x1 x2
y1 y2
(a) (b) (c)
P2,1 P2,1
P2,1 P2,1
x1 x2 x3 x4
y1 y2 y3 y4
v3 v4
v1 v2
(d)
P2,1 P2,1
x1 x2 x3 x4
y1 y2 y3 y4
P2,1 P2,1
P4,4
x5 x6 x7 x8
y5 y6 y7 y8
V3
(e)
V1
V2P4,4 P2,1 P2,1
x1 x2 x3 x4
y1 y2 y3 y4
P2,1 P2,1
P4,4
x5 x6 x7 x8
y5 y6 y7 y8
V1
(f)
V3
V2
P4,4
P8,12 P8,12 P8,12 P8,12
P
−1
8,12
P
−1
8,12
P
−1
8,12
P
−1
8,12
(g)
V1
V2
V3
V4
V5
V6
V6
V5
V4
V3
V2
V1
Figure 7.1: (a) Pn,m; (b) P2,1; (c) P4,4; (d) P−14,4; (e) P8,12; (f) P
−1
8,12; (g) P32,96 and
P−132,96
– P2,1: If x = (x1, x2) ∈ {0, 1}2 and v ∈ {0, 1}, P2,1(x, v) = (x1+v, x2−v).
That is, P2,1(·, v) swaps the two input bits if v = 1; otherwise, it is the
identity function.
– P4,4, P8,12, P32,96, and their inverses P−14,4, P
−1
8,12 and P
−1
32,96 are all defined
using the 2 × 1 DDP-box P2,1. Figure 7.1 depicts these DDP-boxes.
Detailed specifications of these functions are given in Goots et al. [30].
– The function P(ω)96,1: is defined in a series of P2,1 that use the same 1-
bit ‘control’ input ω, as shown in Figure 7.2(a). ω = 0 is used for the
encryption function of Cobra-F64a or Cobra-F64b, and ω = 1 is used for
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decryption.
– The function P(ω)32,32 is defined as the functional composition ofT, followed
by P(ω)96,1 and then P32,96, as shown in Figure 7.2(b).
• F : {0, 1}64 × {0, 1}64 → {0, 1}64 is an non-linear Feistel structure. Figure 7.3
depicts F for Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b. Detailed specifications of these
two functions are given in [30].
16 × P2,1ω
V1
V
′
1
ω
V3
V
′
3
ω
V5
V
′
5
V4
V
′
4
V2
V
′
2
V6
V
′
6
(a)
T
ω
Y
P
(ω)
96,1
P32,96
(b)
V
X
32
V V
′
32
16 × P2,1 16 × P2,1
Figure 7.2: (a) P(ω)96,1; (b) P
(ω)
32,32
P
(0)
32,32
⊕
P
(0)
32,32
Aj−1 Bj−1
P
(0)
32,32
Aj−1 Bj−1
⊕ ⊕
>>> 8
>>> 8
K2
j
K1
j
K2
j
K1
j
(a) (b)
Aj Bj Aj Bj
Figure 7.3: (a) F of Cobra-F64a; (b) F of Cobra-F64b
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7.2.3 Generation of Subkeys
Cobra-F64a uses a total of 34 32-bit subkeys Kji (1 ≤ i ≤ 17), j ∈ {1, 2}, all derived
from a 128-bit user key K. Similarly, Cobra-F64b uses a total of 42 32-bit subkeys
Kji (1 ≤ i ≤ 21), j ∈ {1, 2}, all derived from a 128-bit user key K. Let K be
represented as a sequence of as four 32-bit words K = (W1,W2,W3,W4), then the
subkeys of Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b are generated as shown in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1: The key schedules of Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b
i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
K1i W1 W2 W3 W4 W2 W1 W4 W3 W1 W2 W4 W3 W1 W4 W2 W3 W2 W4 W3 W1 W2
K2i W4 W3 W1 W2 W3 W2 W1 W4 W2 W3 W1 W2 W3 W1 W3 W4 W3 W1 W4 W2 W3
7.2.4 Encryption Procedure
Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b both take as input a 64-bit plaintext block P and
have a total of N rounds, where N is 16 for Cobra-F64a, and 20 for Cobra-F64b.
The encryption procedures of Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b are as follows, where
A0, B0, Ai, Bi are 32-bit variables.
1. P = (A0, B0).
2. For i = 1 to N :
if i ≤ N − 1,
(Ai, Bi) = F(Ai−1, Bi−1,K1i ,K
2
i ),
(Ai, Bi) = (Bi, Ai).
else
(Ai, Bi) = F(Ai−1, Bi−1,K1i ,K
2
i ).
3. • For Cobra-F64a: Ciphertext = (AN ¯K1N+1, BN ¢K2N+1).
• For Cobra-F64b: Ciphertext = (AN ⊕K1N+1, BN ⊕K2N+1).
The ith iteration of Step 2 in the above description is referred to below as Round
i, (1 ≤ i ≤ N), and the transformation in Step 3 is referred to below as the final
transformation.
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7.3 Previous Cryptanalytic Results
In 2005, Lee, Kim, Hong, Sung and Lee [68] presented a related-key differential
attack on the first 11 rounds of Cobra-F64a, and a related-key differential attack
on the first 18 rounds of Cobra-F64b. These are the only previously published
cryptanalytic results on Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b.
7.4 Properties of Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b
In 2004, Ko et al. [62, 63] gave the following three properties of the Cobra DDP-
boxes.
Property 7.1 Let ∆x be the difference between two inputs x and x′ of P2,1, ∆v
be the difference between two controlling vectors v and v′ of P2,1, and ∆y be the
difference between the two outputs P2,1(x, v) and P2,1(x′, v′). Then:
(a) P2,1(x, 0) = P2,1(x, 1) holds if and only if the two bits of the input x are equal,
i.e. it holds with probability 12 .
(b) Pr(∆y = 〈10〉2|∆x ∈ {〈10〉2, 〈01〉2},∆v = 0) = Pr(∆y = 〈01〉2|∆x ∈ {〈10〉2, 〈01〉2},
∆v = 0) = 2−1.
(c) Pr(∆y = 〈10〉2|∆x ∈ {〈10〉2, 〈01〉2},∆v = 1) = Pr(∆y = 〈01〉2|∆x ∈ {〈10〉2, 〈01〉2},
∆v = 1) = 2−1.
(d) Pr(∆y = 〈11〉2|∆x = 〈00〉2,∆v = 1) = Pr(∆y = 〈00〉2|∆x = 〈00〉2,∆v = 1) =
2−1.
Property 7.2 Suppose X,X ′ ∈ {0, 1}8 and V ∈ {0, 1}12. If X ⊕X ′ = ei for some
i (1 ≤ i ≤ 8), then P8,12(X,V ) ⊕ P8,12(X ′, V ) = ej, for some j, (1 ≤ j ≤ 8). If i
and j are fixed, then the path for the differential ∆ei → ∆ej is fixed.
Property 7.3 Suppose X ∈ {0, 1}n and V ∈ {0, 1}m. Then the following properties
hold for all the various values of n and m.
(a) Pr(Pn,m(X,V ) = Pn,m(X,V ⊕ ei)) = 2−1, for every i (1 ≤ i ≤ m).
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(b) If X ′ ∈ {0, 1}n then W (X ⊕X ′) =W (Pn,m(X,V )⊕Pn,m(X ′, V )), where W is
the Hamming Weight function.
In 2005, Lee et al. [68] gave two further properties of the DDP-boxesP32,96 andP
(ω)
32,32
used in Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b; we now give these two properties, correcting
certain errors in the versions given in [68].
Property 7.4 Let ∆x be the difference between two inputs x and x′ of P32,96, ∆v
be the difference between two controlling vectors v and v′ of P32,96, and ∆y be the
difference between the two outputs P32,96(x, v) and P32,96(x′, v′). Then:
(a) Pr(∆y = e1|∆x = e1,∆v = 0) = 2−5.
(b) Pr(∆y = e1|∆x = e1,∆v = e1) = 2−5.
Proof. (a) As shown in Figure 7.1, there are six layers of DDP-boxes P2,1 in a
P32,96. Given the difference e1 between two inputs and a zero difference between
two controlling vectors to P32,96, there are two possibilities to get ∆y = e1: one
is that the controlling bits in the first P2,1 DDP-boxes of the six layers are all
zero, which happens with a probability of 2−6; the other is that the controlling
bit in the first P2,1 DDP-box of the first layer is 1 and the controlling bits in
the third P2,1 of the middle four layers and the first P2,1 of the last layer are
all zero, which happens also with a probability of 2−6. Therefore, we get that
Pr(∆y = e1|∆x = e1,∆v = 0) = 2−6 + 2−6 = 2−5.
(b) Given the difference e1 between two inputs and the difference e1 between two
controlling vectors to P2,1, we can get either of the differences 〈01〉2 and 〈01〉2
between the two outputs P2,1 with a probability of 2−1. For the case of 〈01〉2, if the
controlling bits in the third P2,1 of the middle four layers and the first P2,1 of the
last layer are all zero, we can get ∆y = e1, which happens with a probability of 2−5.
For the case of 〈10〉2, if the controlling bits in the third P2,1 of the last five layers are
all zero, we can get ∆y = e1, which happens also with a probability of 2−5. Hence,
we get that Pr(∆y = e1|∆x = e1,∆v = e1) = 2−1 × 2−5 + 2−1 × 2−5 = 2−5. ¤
Property 7.5 Let ∆x be the difference between two inputs x and x′ of P(0)32,32, ∆v
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be the difference between two controlling vectors v and v′ of P(0)32,32, and ∆y be the
difference between the two outputs P(0)32,32(x, v) and P
(0)
32,32(x
′, v′). Then:
(a) Pr(∆y = 0|∆x = 0,∆v = e1) = 2−3.
(b) Pr(∆y = e1|∆x = e1,∆v = 0) = 2−5.
(c) Pr(∆y = e1|∆x = e1,∆v = e1) = 2−7.
(d) Pr(∆y = e1|∆x = e1,∆v = e9) = 2−8.
(e) Pr(∆y = e1|∆x = e1,∆v = e1,9) = 2−10.
Proof. (a) As introduced in Section 7.2.2, P(0)32,32 is the functional composition of
T, followed by P(0)96,1 and then P32,96. A DDP-Box P32,96 consists of six layers of
DDP-boxes P2,1. After the application of T and P
(0)
96,1, the difference e1 between
two controlling vectors of P(0)32,32 will produce a one difference in the following three
controlling bits of the P32,96 in P
(0)
32,32: the first P2,1 of the first layer, the 7th P2,1
of the second layer and the 13th P2,1 of the third layer, and a zero difference in
the other controlling bits of P32,96. Thus, this property proves correct following
Property 7.1(a).
(b) Similar to the proof of Property 7.4(a).
(c) As mentioned above, after the application of T and P(0)96,1, the difference e1
between two controlling vectors ofP(0)32,32 will produce a one difference in the following
three controlling bits of the P32,96 in P
(0)
32,32: the first P2,1 of the first layer, the 7th
P2,1 of the second layer and the 13th P2,1 of the third layer, and a zero difference
in the other controlling bits of P32,96. Thus, to get ∆y = e1 we require that the
following requirements hold simultaneously.
• The two inputs to the 7th P2,1 of the second layer produce a zero output
difference;
• The two inputs to the 13th P2,1 of the second layer produce a zero output
difference;
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• When the two inputs to the first P2,1 of the first layer produce the output
differences 〈01〉2, the controlling bits in the third P2,1 of the middle four layers
and the first P2,1 of the last layer are all zero, which happens with a probability
of 2−5; or when the two inputs to the first P2,1 of the first layer produce the
output differences 〈10〉2, the controlling bits in the third P2,1 of the last five
layers are all zero, which happens also with a probability of 2−5.
By Property 7.1(a), we know that each of the first two requirements holds with a
probability of 2−1; similarly to Property 7.4(b) we know that the last requirement
holds with a probability of 2−1 × 2−5 + 2−1 × 2−5 = 2−5. Therefore, we learn that
Pr(∆y = e1|∆x = e1,∆v = e1) = 2−1 × 2−1 × 2−5 = 2−7.
(d) After the application of T and P(0)96,1, the difference e9 between two controlling
vectors of P(0)32,32 will produce a one difference in the following three controlling bits
of the P32,96 in P
(0)
32,32: the 9th P2,1 of the first layer, the 15th P2,1 of the second
layer and the 5th P2,1 of the third layer, and a zero difference in the other controlling
bits of P32,96. Thus, to get ∆y = e1 we require that the following requirements hold
simultaneously.
• The two inputs to the 9th P2,1 of the first layer produce a zero output differ-
ence;
• The two inputs to the 15th P2,1 of the second layer produce a zero output
difference;
• The two inputs to the 5th P2,1 of the third layer produce a zero output differ-
ence;
• When the two inputs to the first P2,1 of the first layer produce the output
differences 〈01〉2, the controlling bits in the third P2,1 of the middle four layers
and the first P2,1 of the last layer are all zero; or when the two inputs to the
first P2,1 of the first layer produce the output differences 〈10〉2, the controlling
bits in the third P2,1 of the last five layers are all zero.
By Property 7.1(a), we know that each of the first three requirements holds with a
probability of 2−1; similarly to Property 7.4(a) we know that the last requirement
129
7.4 Properties of Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b
holds with a probability of 2−1 × 2−5 + 2−1 × 2−5 = 2−5. Therefore, we learn that
Pr(∆y = e1|∆x = e1,∆v = e9) = 2−1 × 2−1 × 2−1 × 2−5 = 2−8.
(e) After the application of T and P(0)96,1, the difference e1,9 between two controlling
vectors of P(0)32,32 will produce a one difference in the following six controlling bits of
the P32,96 in P
(0)
32,32: the 1st and 9th P2,1 of the first layer, the 7th and 15th P2,1 of
the second layer and the 5th and 13th P2,1 of the third layer, and a zero difference
in the other controlling bits of P32,96. Thus, to get ∆y = e1 we require that the
following requirements hold simultaneously.
• The two inputs to the 9th P2,1 of the first layer produce a zero output differ-
ence;
• The two inputs to the 7th P2,1 of the second layer produce a zero output
difference;
• The two inputs to the 15th P2,1 of the second layer produce a zero output
difference;
• The two inputs to the 5th P2,1 of the third layer produce a zero output differ-
ence;
• The two inputs to the 13th P2,1 of the third layer produce a zero output
difference;
• When the two inputs to the first P2,1 of the first layer produce the output
differences 〈01〉2, the controlling bits in the third P2,1 of the middle four layers
and the first P2,1 of the last layer are all zero; or when the two inputs to the
first P2,1 of the first layer produce the output differences 〈10〉2, the controlling
bits in the third P2,1 of the last five layers are all zero.
By Property 7.1(a), we know that each of the first five requirements holds with a
probability of 2−1; similarly to Property 7.4(b) we know that the last requirement
holds with a probability of 2−1 × 2−5 + 2−1 × 2−5 = 2−5. Therefore, we learn that
Pr(∆y = e1|∆x = e1,∆v = e1,9) = 2−1 × 2−1 × 2−1 × 2−1 × 2−1 × 2−5 = 2−10. ¤
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7.5 Related-Key Rectangle Attack on Cobra-F64a
In this section, we first describe a 15-round related-key rectangle distinguisher with
probability 2−123.62 for Cobra-F64a. This then allows us to construct a related-key
rectangle attack on the full Cobra-F64a. Note that in this section we are concerned
exclusively with Cobra-F64a, and all statements made refer specifically to that ci-
pher.
7.5.1 A 15-Round Related-Key Rectangle Distinguisher with Probability
2−123.62
Let E0 denote Rounds 2 to 9, and E1 denote Rounds 10 to 16 including the final
transformation. The 15-round related-key rectangle distinguisher involves four ci-
pher keys (TYPE 1 as described in Section 2.2.9), which we assume are KA,KB,KC
andKD. The first part of this 15-round distinguisher is an 8-round related-key differ-
ential ∆α→ ∆β with probability 2−18 for E0. This has the form: (e1, 0)→ (0, e1),
where the key difference is KA ⊕KB = KC ⊕KD = (e1, 0, 0, 0). The second part of
the 15-round related-key distinguisher differential is made up of a 7-round related-
key differential ∆γ → ∆δ with probability 2−12 for E1 (Rounds 10 to 16, and the
final transformation). This has the form: (e1, 0) → (0, 0), where the key difference
is KA ⊕ KC = KB ⊕ KD = (e1, 0, 0, 0). Table 7.2 shows more details of the two
related-key differentials, where the difference in a round is the input difference to
this round.
In the following, we need to sum the square of the probabilities of all the differentials
∆α→ ∆β∗ with the same input difference α through E0, which is computationally
infeasible. Instead, we just count those 8-round related-key differentials ∆α→ ∆β∗
in each of which only the difference propagation of the second P(0)32,32 in Round 9
is different from the 8-round related-key differential ∆α → ∆β in Table 7.2, that
is, the input difference and the controlling vector difference of the second P(0)32,32 in
Round 9 is 0 and e1, respectively, and its 32-bit output difference t has a hamming
weight of 2 with one bit difference in the first byte and the other bit in the second
byte (Case A) or one bit difference in the first two bytes and the other bit in the
last two bytes (Case B). The contributions of the remaining 8-round related-key
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Table 7.2: The related-key differentials in the 15-round related-key rectangle distin-
guisher
Round(i) (∆Ai−1,∆Bi−1) (∆K1i ,∆K
2
i ) Prob.
2 (e1, 0) (0, 0) 2−6
3 (0, e1) (0, e1) 1
4 (0, 0) (0, 0) 1
5 (0, 0) (0, 0) 1
6 (0, 0) (e1, 0) 2−6
7 (0, e1) (0, e1) 1
8 (0, 0) (0, 0) 1
9 (0, 0) (e1, 0) 2−6
output (0, e1) / /
10 (e1, 0) (0, 0) 2−6
11 (0, e1) (0, e1) 1
12 (0, 0) (0, 0) 1
13 (0, 0) (e1, 0) 2−6
14 (0, e1) (0, e1) 1
15 (0, 0) (0, 0) 1
16 (0, 0) (0, 0) 1
FT (0, 0) (0, 0) 1
output (0, 0) / /
differentials are negligible. We now analyse the probabilities corresponding to these
two cases. Consider the second P(0)32,32 in Round 9, where the controlling vector
difference is e1 and the input difference is 0. As shown in Figure 7.4, the controlling
vector difference e1 is propagated to V ′11 , V
′
27
and V ′313 after the extension T and the
transposition P(0)96,1 in this P
(0)
32,32.
• For Case A, there exist only the following two possible sources:
1. The DDP-box P2,1 corresponding to V ′313 produces a difference 〈11〉2, and
the other two DDP-boxes P2,1 corresponding to V ′11 and V
′
27
produce a
difference 〈00〉2. From Property 7.1(d), this holds with a probability of
2−1 × 2−1 × 2−1 = 2−3. Then, to get any specific difference in Case A,
we have a probability of 2−3 × 2−3 = 2−6, as there are three layers of
DDP-boxes to reach each one-bit difference. As a result, the probability
of getting any specific difference in Case A from this source is 2−3×2−6 =
2−9.
2. The DDP-box P2,1 corresponding to V ′11 produces a difference 〈11〉2, and
the other two DDP-boxes P2,1 corresponding to V ′27 and V
′
313
produce a
difference 〈00〉2. Again, we can learn from Property 7.1(d) that this holds
with a probability of 2−3. Then, since there are two traces to reach any
specific difference in Case A and there are five layers of DDP-boxes to
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Figure 7.4: The P32,96 in P
(0)
32,32(∆X = 0,∆V = e1)
reach each one-bit difference, we have a probability of 2×2−5×2−5 = 2−9.
As a result, the probability of getting any specific difference in Case A
from this source is 2−3 × 2−9 = 2−12.
Finally, we can conclude from the above analysis that the probability of getting
any specific difference in Case A is 2−9 + 2−12.
• For Case B, there also exist only the following two possible sources:
1. The DDP-box P2,1 corresponding to V ′27 produces a difference 〈11〉2, and
the other two DDP-boxes P2,1 corresponding to V ′11 and V
′
313
produce a
difference 〈00〉2, which holds with a probability of 2−1 × 2−1 × 2−1 =
2−3. Then, as there are four layers of DDP-boxes to reach each one-bit
difference of any specific difference in Case B, we have a probability of
2−4 × 2−4 = 2−8. As a result, the probability of getting any specific
difference in Case B from this source is 2−3 × 2−8 = 2−11.
2. The DDP-box P2,1 corresponding to V ′11 produces a difference 〈11〉2, and
the other two DDP-boxes P2,1 corresponding to V ′27 and V
′
313
produce
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a difference 〈00〉2, which holds with a probability of 2−3. Then, since
there are two traces to reach any specific difference in Case B and there
are five layers of DDP-boxes to reach each one-bit difference, we have a
probability of 2×2−5×2−5 = 2−9. As a result, the probability of getting
any specific difference in Case B from this source is 2−3 × 2−9 = 2−12.
Finally, we can conclude from the above analysis that the probability of getting
any specific difference in Case B is 2−11 + 2−12.
Therefore, after considering the probability 2−3 incurred in the first P(0)32,32 in Round
9, we can compute a square sum of at least 1 × (2−18)2 + (81) · (81) · [2−12 × 2−3 ×
(2−9 +2−12)]2+
(
16
1
) · (161 ) · [2−12 × 2−3(2−11 +2−12)]2 ≈ 2−35.96 for the 321 possible
8-round related-key differentials (e1, 0)→ (t, e1), where t ∈ {0, Case A, Case B}.
We also need to sum the square of the probabilities of all the differentials ∆γ∗ →
∆δ with the same output difference δ through E1, which is also computationally
infeasible. Alternatively, we just count those 7-round related-key differentials ∆γ∗ →
∆δ in each of which only the difference propagation of the first P(0)32,32 in Round 10 is
different from the 7-round related-key differential ∆γ → ∆δ in Table 7.2, that is, the
output difference and the controlling vector difference of the first P(0)32,32 in Round
10 (through the encryption direction) is 0 and e1, respectively, and its 32-bit input
difference s has a hamming weight of 2. After noting that the two one-bit differences
of such a differential can only distribute in the input to one of the three DDP-boxes
P2,1 corresponding to V ′11 , V
′
27
and V ′313 , we can similarly compute a square sum of
at least 1 × (2−12)2 + 1 × (2−13)2 + (21) · (21) · (2−16)2 + (41) · (41) · (2−18)2 ≈ 2−23.66
for the 22 possible 7-round related-key differentials ∆γ∗ → ∆δ. As a result, the
distinguisher has a probability of 2−64 × 2−35.96 × 2−23.66 = 2−123.62 for the correct
key, while it has a probability of (2−64)2 = 2−128 for a wrong key.
7.5.2 Attack Description
We can use the 15-round distinguisher to mount a related-key rectangle attack on
the full Cobra-F64a. The attack procedure is as follows.
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1. Choose 263.81 ciphertext pairs (Ci, C∗i ) with Ci = C
∗
i , (i = 1, · · · , 263.81). In
a chosen-ciphertext attack scenario, obtain all the plaintexts for the 263.81
ciphertexts Ci decrypted withKA; we denote by Pi the plaintext for ciphertext
Ci. In a chosen-ciphertext attack scenario, obtain all the plaintexts for the
263.81 ciphertexts C∗i decrypted with KB; we denote by P
∗
i the plaintext for
ciphertext C∗i , where KA ⊕KB = (e1, 0, 0, 0).
2. Guess a value for the 64-bit user key (W1,W4), and perform Steps (a) and (b)
below.
(a) Partially encrypt all the plaintexts Pi with (the guessed value for) (W1,W4)
to get the corresponding values just after Round 1; we denote these
values by Ti, respectively. Partially encrypt all the plaintexts P ∗i with
(W1 ⊕ e1,W4) to get the corresponding values just after Round 1; we
denote them by T ∗i , respectively. Then, store all the values Ti and T
∗
i
into a hash table. Finally, choose only the quartets (Ti1 , T
∗
i1
, Ti2 , T
∗
i2
) such
that Ti1 ⊕ T ∗i2 = T ∗i1 ⊕ Ti2 = (e1, 0), where 1 ≤ i1 < i2 ≤ 263.81. If six
or more quartets (Ti1 , T
∗
i1
, Ti2 , T
∗
i2
) pass this condition, execute Step 2(b)
with the quartets meeting this condition; otherwise, repeat Step 2 with
another guess.
(b) Guess a value for the 64-bit user key (W2,W3). Partially encrypt all re-
maining quartets (Ti1 , T
∗
i1
, Ti2 , T
∗
i2
) with (the guessed value for) (W2,W3)
to get the corresponding values just after Round 2; we denote them
by (T i1 , T
∗
i1 , T i2 , T
∗
i2), respectively. Finally, check whether T i1 ⊕ T
∗
i2 =
T
∗
i1 ⊕ T i2 = (0, e1). If six or more quartets (Ti1 , T ∗i1 , Ti2 , T ∗i2) pass this
condition, record the guessed value for (W1,W2,W3,W4), and execute
Step 3; otherwise, repeat this step with another guess, (if all the 264 pos-
sible values for (W2,W3) are tested, repeat Step 2 with another guess for
(W1,W4)).
3. For every recorded value for (W1,W2,W3,W4), do a trial encryption with one
known plaintext/ciphertext pair. If one is suggested, output it as the user key
of Cobra-F64a; otherwise, go to Step 2.
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7.5.3 Complexity Analysis
The attack requires 264.81 related-key chosen ciphertexts, which have a time com-
plexity of 264.81 encryptions. The required memory for this attack is dominated by
the encrypted plaintext pairs, which is approximately 264.81 × 8 = 267.81 memory
bytes.
Step 2(a) has a time complexity of about 264 × 264.81 × 12 × 116 ≈ 2123.81 16-round
Cobra-F64a encryptions, where 12 means the average fraction of 64-bit key pairs that
are tested in Step 2(a). In Step 2(a), a total of about
(
263.81
2
) ≈ 2126.62 candidate
quartets are yielded, and the probability that the number of the quartets for a
wrong key is no less than six is approximately
∑126.62
i=6 [
(
126.62
i
) · (2−64×2)i · (1 −
2−64×2)126.62−i] ≈ 2−17.77. Thus, about 264×2−17.77× 12 ≈ 245.23 keys pass Step 2(a)
for every guess of (W1,W4).
Step 2(b) has a time complexity of 245.23 × 264 × 6 × 4 × 116 ≈ 2108.65 16-round
Cobra-F64a encryptions. In Step 2(b), probability 2−6 is required to satisfy the
one-round differential characteristic for Round 2, and the number of the quartets to
be tested in this step is at least 6, so the probability that a wrong guess for (W2,W3)
passes Step 2(b) is about (2−6)6×2 = 2−96. As a result, the expected number of the
recorded values for (W1,W2,W3,W4) in Step 2(b) is 245.23 × 264 × 2−96 = 213.23.
As a consequence, Step 3 has a time complexity of 213.23 16-round Cobra-F64a
encryptions.
Therefore, this attack requires a total time complexity of 2123.81 full-round Cobra-F64a
encryptions.
The probability that a wrong 128-bit key is suggested in Step 3 is approximately
2−64, thus the expected number of suggested wrong 128-bit keys is about 2−64 ×
213.23 ≈ 2−50.77, which is quite low. The expected number of quartets passing Step
2(b) for the right key pair is 2126.62 × 2−123.62 = 8, and the probability that the
number of the quartets for the right subkey is no less than six is approximately∑2126.62
i=6 [
(
2126.62
i
) · (2−123.62)i × (1 − 2−123.62)2126.62−i] ≈ 0.8. Therefore, the related-
key rectangle attack can break the full Cobra-F64a, with a success probability of
80%.
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7.6 Related-Key Differential Attack on Cobra-F64b
In this section, we first describe a 19.5-round related-key differential characteristic
with probability 2−57 of Cobra-F64b. This then enables us to construct a related-
key differential attack on the full Cobra-F64b. Note that in his section we are
concerned exclusively with Cobra-F64b, and all statements made refer specifically
to that cipher.
7.6.1 A 19.5-Round Related-Key Differential Characteristic with Prob-
ability 2−57
We describe a 19.5-round related-key differential characteristic (0, e1)→ (e1, 0) with
probability 2−57, where the key difference is (e1, e1, e1, e1). See Table 7.3 for more
details of the 19.5-round related-key differential characteristic. It is derived from
the full-round related-key differential characteristic presented in [68].
Table 7.3: The 19.5-round related-key differential characteristic
Round(i) (∆Ai−1,∆Bi−1) (∆K1i ,∆K
2
i ) Prob.
1 (0, e1) (e1, e1) 2−3
2 (0, e1) (e1, e1) 2−3
3 (0, e1) (e1, e1) 2−3
.
..
.
..
.
..
.
..
18 (0, e1) (e1, e1) 2−3
19 (0, e1) (e1, e1) 2−3
20(half) (0, e1) (e1, e1) 1†
output (e1, 0) / /
†: This probability is just for the difference between the
intermediate values XORed with the 20th round subkey
7.6.2 Attack Description
In order to reduce the time complexity of our attack, we use the following filter-
ing property: some possible differences between a pair of ciphertexts can be par-
tially determined from the output difference (e1, 0) of the 19.5-round related-key
differential, for those ciphertext pairs that do not meet these differences can be dis-
carded immediately. More specifically, as the input difference and the controlling
vector difference of the DDP-box P(0)32,32 in Round 20 are 0 and e1, respectively,
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the output difference of this P(0)32,32 should have a hamming weight of 0, 2, 4 or
6, which is caused by the three inherent DDP-boxes P2,1 corresponding to V ′11 ,
V ′27 and V
′
313
. After an analysis on the P(0)32,32, we conclude that there are at most(
32
2
)·(161 )·(161 )·(81)·(81) = 31×218 possible values for those that have a hamming weight
of 6, at most
(
32
2
)·(161 )·(161 )+(322 )·(81)·(81)+(161 )·(161 )·(81)·(81) = 31×212+31×210+214
possible values for those that have a hamming weight of 4, at most
(
32
2
)
= 31 × 24
possible values for those that have a hamming weight of 2, and only 1 with a ham-
ming weight of 0. Therefore, the number of possible output differences of the P(0)32,32
is totally 31× 218+31× 212+31× 210+214+31× 24+1 = 8302065. After XORed
with the subkey difference ∆W3 = e1 in the final transformation, these 8302065
possible output differences of the P(0)32,32 incur 8302065 possible output differences
between the right halve of the pair of ciphertexts. We denote the resultant 8302065
possible output differences by the set Ω. We will not count the possible number for
the left halve, for it seems infeasible due to the right rotation and addition modulo
232 operations in Round 20.
Consequently, we can conduct the following related-key differential attack to break
the full Cobra-F64b.
1. Choose 260 pairs of plaintexts (Pi, P ∗i ) with Pi ⊕ P ∗i = (0, e1), i = 1, · · · , 260.
In a chosen-plaintext attack scenario, obtain all the ciphertexts for the 260
plaintexts Pi encrypted with KA; we denote by Ci the ciphertext for plaintext
Pi. In a chosen-plaintext attack scenario, obtain all the ciphertexts for the 260
plaintexts P ∗i encrypted with KB; we denote by C
∗
i the ciphertext for plaintext
P ∗i , where KA ⊕KB = (e1, e1, e1, e1). Keep only the pairs (Ci, C∗i ) such that
the right half of the difference Ci ⊕ C∗i belongs to the set Ω.
2. Guess a value for the 64-bit key (W2,W3), and perform Steps (a) and (b)
below.
(a) Partially decrypt all the remaining ciphertexts Ci with (the guessed value
for) (W2,W3) to get the corresponding values just after the data (A19, B19)
XORed with the 20th round subkey (K120,K
2
20) in Round 20 (i.e. just after
the last 0.5 round in Round 20 through the backward direction); we de-
note them by Ti, respectively. Partially decrypt all the remaining cipher-
texts C∗i with (W2⊕e1,W3⊕e1) to get the respective corresponding values
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just after the last 0.5 round in Round 20 through the backward direction;
we denote them by T ∗i , respectively. Check whether Ti ⊕ T ∗i = (e1, 0). If
six or more pairs (Ti, T ∗i ) pass this condition, execute Step 2(b) with the
pairs meeting this condition; otherwise, repeat Step 2 with other guess.
(b) Guess a value for the 32-bit key W1. For each remaining pair (Ti, T ∗i ),
partially decrypt Ti with (W1,W2) to get its corresponding value just
after the data (A18, B18) XORed with the 19th round subkey (K119,K
2
19)
in Round 19 (i.e. just after the last 1.5 round in Rounds 20 and 19 through
the backward direction); we denote them by T i, respectively. Partially
decrypt T ∗i with (W1⊕e1,W2⊕e1) to get its corresponding value just after
the last 1.5 round in Rounds 20 and 19 through the backward direction;
we denote them by T ∗i , respectively. Check whether T i ⊕ T ∗i = (e1, 0).
If six or more pairs (Ti, T ∗i ) pass this condition, record the guessed value
for (W1,W2,W3), and execute Step 3; otherwise, repeat this step with
another guess, (if all the 232 possible values for W1 are tested, repeat
Step 2 with another guess for (W2,W3).
3. For every recorded value for (W1,W2,W3), do an exhaustive search for the
remaining 32-bit subkey W4 using trial encryption. Two known pairs of plain-
texts and ciphertexts are enough for this trial process. If a 128-bit key is
suggested, output it as the user key of the full Cobra-F64b; otherwise, go to
Step 2.
7.6.3 Complexity Analysis
This attack requires 261 related-key chosen plaintexts, which have a time complexity
of 261 full-round Cobra-F64b encryptions. The required memory for this attack is
dominated by the ciphertext pairs, which is approximately 261 × 8 = 264 memory
bytes.
Due to the filtering condition in Step 1, about 260 × 8302065
232
≈ 250.99 pairs remain
after Step 1.
Step 2(a) has a time complexity of about 264 × 251.99 × 12 × 120 ≈ 2110.67 full-round
Cobra-F64b encryptions, where 12 means the average fraction of 64-bit key pairs that
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are tested in Step 2(a). In Step 2(a), the expected number of pairs recorded for each
guessed key is about 2−41.01× 250.99 = 29.98, for the probability that each decrypted
pair passes the condition of Step 2(a) is about 2−64 × 8302065 = 2−41.01, which is
due to the fact that the filtering step holds 8302065 = 222.99 ciphertext differences.
Step 2(b) has a time complexity of about 29.98 × 2× 296 12 × 120 ≈ 2101.66 full-round
Cobra-F64b encryptions. In Step 2(b), probability 2−3 is required to satisfy the one-
round differential characteristic for Round 19 (refer to Table 7.3), and the probability
that a wrong guess for (W1,W2,W3) passes Step 2(b) is about
∑29.98
i=6 [
(
29.98
i
) ·(2−3)i×
(1− 2−3)29.98−i] ≈ 2−53. Step 3 has a time complexity of 232 × 296 × 2−53 × 12 = 274
full-round Cobra-F64b encryptions.
Therefore, the attack requires a total time complexity of 2110.67 full-round Cobra-F64b
encryptions.
Since the probability that a wrong 128-bit key is suggested in Step 3 is approximately
2−128, the expected number of suggested wrong 128-bit keys is about 2−128 × 274 ≈
2−54, which is extremely low. One the other hand, the expected number of text pairs
for the right key pair is 260 × 2−57 = 8, and the probability that the number of the
pairs for the right key guess is no less than six is approximately
∑260
i=6[
(
260
i
) · (2−57)i ·
(1 − 2−57)260−i] ≈ 0.8. Therefore, the related-key differential attack can break the
full Cobra-F64b, with a success probability of 0.8.
7.7 Summary
In this chapter we have presented a related-key rectangle attack on the full Cobra-F64a
and a related-key differential attack on the full Cobra-F64b. Table 7.4 summarises
the published cryptanalytic results on Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b, where RK-CP
refers to the required numbers of related-key chosen plaintexts, and Encryptions
refers to the required number of encryption operations of Cobra-F64a or Cobra-F64b.
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Table 7.4: Cryptanalytic results on Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b
Cipher Attack Type Rounds Data Time Source
Cobra-F64a Related-key differential 11 259RK-CP 2107Encryptions [68]
Related-key rectangle full(16) 264.81RK-CP 2123.81Encryptions Sect. 7.5
Cobra-F64b Related-key differential 18 258RK-CP 2122Encryptions [68]
full(20) 261RK-CP 2110.67Encryptions Sect. 7.6
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Chapter 8
Related-Key Rectangle Attack on
44-Round SHACAL-2
SHACAL-2 is a 64-round block cipher with a 256-bit block length and a variable
length key of up to 512 bits, which was selected as one of the NESSIE-recommended
algorithms in 2003. In this chapter, we present a related-key rectangle attack on
44 rounds of SHACAL-2. The attack requires 2233 related-key chosen plaintexts,
and has a time complexity of 2497.2 encryptions. This is better than any previously
published cryptanalytic results on SHACAL-2 in terms of the number of attacked
rounds.
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8.1 Introduction
In 2000, Handschuh and Naccache [31] proposed a 160-bit block cipher SHACAL,
standardised hash function SHA-1 [92]. In 2001, they then elaborated their original
proposal to give two schemes, SHACAL-1 and SHACAL-2 [32], where SHACAL-1 is
the same as the original SHACAL, and SHACAL-2 is a 256-bit block cipher based
on the compression function of the hash function SHA-256 [93]. In both cases, the
block cipher encryption operation is simply the compression function of the hash
function, with the chaining value input set equal to the plaintext block, and the
message block input set equal to the key. Both SHACAL-1 and SHACAL-2 were
submitted to the NESSIE project [89], and were both selected for the second phase
of the evaluation. However, although SHACAL-2 became a member of the final set
of NESSIE recommended algorithms, SHACAL-1 was rejected because of concerns
regarding its key schedule.
In this chapter, we first describe a novel a 35-round related-key rectangle distin-
guisher with probability 2−460 for SHACAL-2. We then use this distinguisher to
specify a related-key rectangle attack on 44 rounds of SHACAL-2, using the early
abort technique described in Section 4.3. The attack requires 2233 related-key chosen
plaintexts, and has a time complexity of 2497.2 encryptions. This is better than any
previously published cryptanalytic results on SHACAL-2 in terms of the number of
attacked rounds.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 8.2 we describe
SHACAL-2. In Section 8.3 we briefly review previous cryptanalytic results on
SHACAL-2. In Section 8.4 we describe certain properties of SHACAL-2. In Section
8.5 we give a 35-round related-key rectangle distinguisher with probability 2−460,
which forms the basis for the related-key rectangle attack on 44-round SHACAL-2
described in Section 8.6. Section 8.7 summarises the results of this chapter.
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8.2 The SHACAL-2 Block Cipher
In this section we briefly describe the SHACAL-2 block cipher [32].
8.2.1 Notation
In this chapter, the bits of a 32-bit value are numbered from 1 to 32 from left to
right, where the least significant bit is referred as the 1st bit, and the most significant
bit is referred as the 32nd bit. We use the following notation.
• ¢: addition modulo 232
• ¯: subtraction modulo 232
• ej : a 32-bit word with zeros in all positions but bit j, (1 ≤ j ≤ 32)
• ei1,··· ,ij : the 32-bit word equal to ei1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ eij , (1 ≤ i1, · · · , ij ≤ 32)
• ej,∼: a 32-bit word that has zeros in bits 1 to j − 1, a one in bit j and
indeterminate values in bits (j + 1) to 32, (1 ≤ j ≤ 31)
8.2.2 Functions
SHACAL-2 uses a number of functions, namely Ψ0, Ψ1, Φ0, Φ1, Ch and Maj.
These functions are as follows.
• Ψ0 : {0, 1}32 → {0, 1}32. If X is a 32-bit block, then Ψ0(X) = (X ≫
7)⊕ (X ≫ 18)⊕ (X À 3).
• Ψ1 : {0, 1}32 → {0, 1}32. If X is a 32-bit block, then Ψ1(X) = (X ≫
17)⊕ (X ≫ 19)⊕ (X À 10).
• Φ0 : {0, 1}32 → {0, 1}32. If X is a 32-bit block, then Φ0(X) = (X ≫
2)⊕ (X ≫ 13)⊕ (X ≫ 22).
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• Φ1 : {0, 1}32 → {0, 1}32. If X is a 32-bit block, then Φ1(X) = (X ≫
6)⊕ (X ≫ 11)⊕ (X ≫ 25).
• Ch : {0, 1}32 × {0, 1}32 × {0, 1}32 → {0, 1}32. If X,Y and Z are 32-bit blocks,
then Ch(X,Y, Z) = (X&Y )⊕ (¬X&Z).
• Maj : {0, 1}32×{0, 1}32×{0, 1}32 → {0, 1}32. If X,Y and Z are 32-bit blocks,
then Maj(X,Y, Z) = (X&Y )⊕ (X&Z)⊕ (Y&Z).
8.2.3 Generation of Subkeys
SHACAL-2 uses a total of 64 32-bit subkeys Ki, (1 ≤ i ≤ 64), all derived from a
variable length key of up to 512 bits. Shorter keys can be used by padding them
with zeros to produce a 512-bit key string; however, the proposers recommend that
the key should not be shorter than 128 bits. Let a 512-bit user key K be represented
as a sequence of sixteen 32-bit words K1,K2, · · · ,K16, then these words form the
round keys for the first 16 rounds. The remaining round keys Ki (17 ≤ i ≤ 64) are
defined as follows.
Ki = Ψ1(Ki−2)¢Ki−7 ¢Ψ0(Ki−15)¢Ki−16.
8.2.4 Encryption Procedure
SHACAL-2 takes as input a 256-bit plaintext block P , and has a total of 64 rounds.
Its encryption procedure is as follows, where Ai, Bi, Ci, Di, Ei, F i, Gi,H i, T i1, T
i
2 are
32-bit variables, and θi are public constants.
1. Represent P as eight 32-bit words P = (A0, B0, C0, D0, E0, F 0, G0,H0).
2. For i = 1 to 64:
T i1 = Ki ¢Φ1(Ei−1)¢Ch(Ei−1, F i−1, Gi−1)¢H i−1 ¢ θi,
T i2 = Φ0(A
i−1)¢Maj(Ai−1, Bi−1, Ci−1),
H i = Gi−1,
Gi = F i−1,
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F i = Ei−1,
Ei = Di−1 ¢ T i1,
Di = Ci−1,
Ci = Bi−1,
Bi = Ai−1,
Ai = T i1 ¢ T i2.
3. The ciphertext = (A64, B64, C64, D64, E64, F 64, G64, H64).
The ith iteration of Step 2 in the above description is referred to below as Round i,
(1 ≤ i ≤ 64).
8.3 Previous Cryptanalytic Results
In this section we briefly review previous cryptanalytic attacks on SHACAL-2.
• In 2003, Hong, Kim, Kim, Sung, Lee and Lee [39] presented an impossible
differential attack on 30-round SHACAL-2.
• In 2004, Shin, Kim, Kim, Hong and Lee [98] presented a square-nonlinear
attack on 28-round SHACAL-2 and a differential-nonlinear attack on 32-round
SHACAL-2.
• In 2004, Kim, Kim, Lee, Lim and Song [53] presented a related-key differential-
nonlinear attack on 35-round SHACAL-2, and a related-key rectangle attack
on 37-round SHACAL-2, where the latter is based on a 33-round related-key
rectangle distinguisher.
• In 2006, Lu, Kim, Keller and Dunkelman [78] presented a related-key rectangle
attack on 42-round SHACAL-2, exploiting a 34-round related-key rectangle
distinguisher with probability 2−456.76 and then using an early abort technique.
• In 2007, Wang [104] presented a related-key rectangle attack on 43-round
SHACAL-2, based on an extension of Lu et al.’s 34-round related-key rect-
angle distinguisher to a 35-round distinguisher with probability 2−474.76.
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Table 8.1: Differential distribution of the functions Ch and Maj
x 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
y 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
z 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1
Ch 0 0/1 0/1 0/1 1 0/1 0/1 0/1
Maj 0 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 1
This latter result is the best previously published cryptanalytic result on SHACAL-2
in terms of the number of attacked rounds.
8.4 Properties of SHACAL-2
We first give the following general result, which can be used to compute differential
probabilities of the addition modulo 232 in SHACAL-2.
Theorem 8.1 ([73]) Let x, y and z be 32-bit words. If PrX,Y ∈{0,1}32((X ¢ Y ) ⊕
((X ⊕∆x)¢ (Y ⊕∆y)) = ∆z) > 0, then PrX,Y ∈{0,1}32((X ¢Y )⊕ ((X ⊕∆x)¢ (Y ⊕
∆y)) = ∆z) = 2−s, where s is the number of the least significant 31 bit positions that
do not satisfy xi = yi = zi, where xi denotes the ith bit of x, and so on, (1 ≤ i ≤ 31).
We next give two further differential properties of SHACAL-2.
The following observations are due to Shin at al. [98]. The functions Ch and Maj
operate in a bit-by-bit manner, and hence they can be regarded as functions having
a 3-bit input and a 1-bit output. It is thus simple to calculate the differential
properties of these functions, and these properties are summarised in Table 8.1. In
this table, for each possible 3-bit difference, the possible differences in the outputs
of the two functions are indicated, where 0, 1, and 0/1 respectively indicate that the
output is always, 0, always 1, or either 0 or 1 with probability 12 .
Property 8.1 ([78, 104]) Suppose that K and K˜ are cipher keys, P and P˜ are
plaintext blocks, and let Ki and K˜i (1 ≤ i ≤ 64) denote the subkeys derived from K
and K˜, respectively. Also let (Ai, Bi, · · · ,H i) denote the values obtained at the end
of Round i when encrypting P using the key K, and let (A˜i, B˜i, · · · , H˜ i) denote the
corresponding values when encrypting P˜ using K˜.
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Then, if (Ai, Bi, · · · ,H i), (A˜i, B˜i, · · · , H˜ i) and Ki ¯ K˜i are known (5 ≤ i ≤ 64),
then the following values can readily be computed:
(i) (Ai−1, Bi−1, · · · , Gi−1) and (A˜i−1, B˜i−1, · · · , G˜i−1);
(ii) H i−1 ¯ H˜ i−1;
(iii) (Ai−5, Bi−5, Ci−5) and (A˜i−5, B˜i−5, C˜i−5);
(iv) Di−5 ¯ D˜i−5.
8.5 A 35-Round Related-Key Rectangle Distinguisher with
Probability 2−460
In this section, we describe a 35-round related-key rectangle distinguisher with prob-
ability 2−460 for Rounds 0 to 34 of SHACAL-2. This distinguisher is an extension of
those described in [78, 104]. These related-key rectangle distinguishers involve two
cipher keys (TYPE 3 as described in Section 2.2.9), which we assume are K and K˜.
We also describe a flaw in Wang’s attack on 43-round SHACAL-2.
8.5.1 A 34-Round Related-Key Rectangle Distinguisher with Probability
2−456.76
In 2006, Lu et al. [78] described a 24-round related-key differential characteristic for
Rounds 2 to 25 of SHACAL-2. This is of the form (0, 0, e7,10,19,21,26,30, e32, 0, e10,14,20,
e19,30, e32) → (e14,25,29, 0, 0, 0, e14,25,29, 0, 0, 0) and has probability 2−38.1 They also
give a 10-round differential characteristic for Rounds 25 to 34 of SHACAL-2, which
has the form (e32, e32, e7,10,19,21,26,30,32, 0, 0, e10,14,20, e19,30,32, 0)→ (e7,10,19,21,26,30, e32,
0, 0, e7,21,26, e32, 0, 0) and has probability 2−65.
Then, they computed a square sum of at least 2−74(= 2−37×2) for the probabilities of
all the 24-round related-key differentials for Rounds 2 to 25 with the input difference
(0, 0, e7,10,19,21,26,30, e32, 0, e10,14,20, e19,30, e32), and a square sum of at least 2−126.76(=
1Certain input bits are fixed.
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2−63.38×2) for the probabilities of all the 10-round differentials for Rounds 26 to 35
with the output difference (e7,10,19,21,26,30, e32, 0, 0, e7,21,26, e32, 0, 0).
These two related-key differential characteristics were used to construct a 34-round
related-key rectangle distinguisher with probability 2−456.76(= 2−74 × 2−126.76 ×
2−256) for Rounds 2 to 35 of SHACAL-2. This was finally used in conjunction
with an early abort technique to break the first 42 rounds of SHACAL-2.
8.5.2 A 35-Round Related-Key Rectangle Distinguisher with Probability
2−474.76
In 2007, Wang [104] described a way of extending the 34-round related-key rectangle
distinguisher given in Section 8.5 to a 35-round distinguisher by appending a one-
round related-key differential with probability 1 at the beginning. The differential
requires the pair of plaintext blocks to satisfy certain properties; specifically, sup-
pose P = (A0, B0, C0, D0, E0, F 0, G0,H0) and P˜ = (Â0, B̂0, Ĉ0, D̂0, Ê0, F̂ 0, Ĝ0, Ĥ0)
satisfy:
a032 = b
0
32, a
0
i = c
0
i , for i = 7, 10, 19, 21, 26, 30;
b010 = ¬e010, a0i = ¬f0i , for i = 20, 31;
e0i = 0, for i = 19, 30, 31;
f0i = g
0
i , for i = 10, 14, 20,
(8.1)
where a0i denotes the ith bit of A
0, and so on.
The 35-round distinguisher is made up of the following two related-key differentials.
The following 25-round related-key differential with probability 2−47 is used for
Rounds 1 to 25: (0, e7,10,19,21,26,30, e32, 0, e10,14,20, e19,30, e32,∆′) → (e14,25,29, 0, 0, 0,
e14,25,29, 0, 0, 0), where ∆′ = Φ1(E0) ¯ Φ1(E0 ⊕ e10,14,20) and the key difference
K ⊕ K˜ = (e32, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, e32, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0). See Table 8.2 for more details.
The second differential making up the 35-round distinguisher is the 10-round differ-
ential with probability 2−65 described in Section 8.5.1.
Wang used this 35-round related-key rectangle distinguisher with probability (2−46)2×
2−126.76 × 2−256 = 2−474.76, to break the first 43 rounds of SHACAL-2. However,
as described below, there is a flaw in the complexity analysis for Wang’s attack
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Table 8.2: The 25-round related-key differential characteristic for Rounds 1 to 25
Round(i) ∆Ai−1 ∆Bi−1 ∆Ci−1 ∆Di−1 ∆Ei−1 ∆F i−1 ∆Gi−1 ∆Hi−1 ∆KiProb.
1 0 e7,10,19,21,26,30 e32 0 e10,14,20 e19,30 e32 ∆′ e32 1
2 0 0 e7,10,19,21,26,30 e32 0 e10,14,20 e19,30 e32 0 2−11
3 e32 0 0 e7,10,19,21,26,30 0 0 e10,14,20 e19,30 0 2−10
4 0 e32 0 0 e7,21,26 0 0 e10,14,20 0 2−7
5 0 0 e32 0 0 e7,21,26 0 0 0 2−4
6 0 0 0 e32 0 0 e7,21,26 0 0 2−3
7 0 0 0 0 e32 0 0 e7,21,26 0 2−4
8 0 0 0 0 0 e32 0 0 0 2−1
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 e32 0 0 2−1
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 e32 e32 1
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
.
..
.
..
.
..
.
..
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 · 2−6
output e14,25,29 0 0 0 e14,25,29 0 0 0 / /
algorithm, which makes the attack infeasible.
8.5.2.1 A Flaw in Wang’s Attack
Wang [104] claimed that the probability that six or more quartets pass the fil-
tering condition in Step 6 of the attack is about
∑231.76
i=6 [
(
231.76
i
) · (2−32×2)i · (1 −
2−32×2)231.76−i] ≈ 2−202.93. It is thus expected that about 2448 × 2−202.93 = 2245.07
guesses for ((K37, · · · ,K43), (K∗37, · · · ,K∗43)) will be output by Step 6. As a result,
Step 7 (which involves finding the 512-bit cipher key by exhaustively searching for
the remaining 288 bits using the guesses output by Step 6) will have a complexity
of around 2533.07, i.e. significantly larger than 2512. Therefore, the attack is less
efficient than an exhaustive key search.
8.5.3 A 35-Round Related-Key Rectangle Distinguisher with Probability
2−460
We next describe a novel 35-round related-key rectangle distinguisher for Rounds
1-35 of SHACAL-2. This distinguisher incorporates a novel 10-round differential
characteristic for Rounds 26 to 35: (0, 0, e7,10,19,21,26,30, e32, 0, e10,14,20, e19,20, e32) →
(e7,10,19,21,26,30, e32, 0, 0, e7,21,26, e32, 0, 0), which has a probability of 2−56. See Ta-
ble 8.3 for more details.
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Table 8.3: The 10-round differential characteristic for Rounds 26 to 35
Round(i) ∆Ai ∆Bi ∆Ci ∆Di ∆Ei ∆F i ∆Gi ∆Hi Prob.
26 0 0 e7,10,19,21,26,30 e32 0 e10,14,20 e14,19,30 e14,32 2−11
27 e32 0 0 e7,10,19,21,26,30 0 0 e10,14,20 e14,19,30 2−14
28 0 e32 0 0 e7,21,26 0 0 e10,14,20 2−7
29 0 0 e32 0 0 e7,21,26 0 0 2−4
30 0 0 0 e32 0 0 e7,21,26 0 2−3
31 0 0 0 0 e32 0 0 e7,21,26 2−4
32 0 0 0 0 0 e32 0 0 2−1
33 0 0 0 0 0 0 e32 0 2−1
34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 e32 1
35 e32 0 0 0 e32 0 0 0 2−11
output e7,10,19,21,26,30 e32 0 0 e7,21,26 e32 0 0 /
It also uses Wang’s 25-round related-key differential characteristic with probability
2−47. This means that the new 35-round related-key rectangle distinguisher has a
probability of at least (2−46 × 2−56)2 × 2−256 = 2−460 for the correct key, while it
has a probability of (2−256)2 = 2−512 for a wrong key.
8.6 Attacking the First 44 Rounds of SHACAL-2
In this section we describe an attack on the first 44 rounds of SHACAL-2. This attack
exploits the novel related-key rectangle distinguisher described in Section 8.5.3. As
mentioned before, we assume that the two related user keys are K and K˜ with the
relationship K ⊕ K˜ = (e32, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, e32, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0).
8.6.1 Preliminary Remarks
Property 8.1 allows us to break more rounds of the cipher than would otherwise
be the case by using the early abort technique described in Section 4.3. Because
of the properties of the key schedule of SHACAL-2, it is impossible to determine
the subkey differences of the last few rounds (to be attacked) from the difference
between the two related cipher keys; thus it is necessary to guess the two different
unknown subkeys in every round in order to conduct an early abort. In previously
described related-key rectangle attacks on reduced-round SHACAL-2, such as those
given in [78, 104], this is achieved by first guessing both the round subkeys, then
partially decrypting every remaining candidate quartet to get the corresponding
151
8.6 Attacking the First 44 Rounds of SHACAL-2
quartet just before this round, and finally checking whether it meets the difference
requirements. However, we observe that an early abort can be conducted by checking
the two pairs out of a candidate quartet in a staged way, as described in Section 4.4.
This observation enables us to use the 35-round distinguisher in Section 8.5 to con-
duct a related-key rectangle attack on the first 44 rounds of SHACAL-2. The early
abort technique described in Section 4.4 plays a crucial role in the efficiency of
our attack; otherwise, we would only be able to break only the first 43 rounds of
SHACAL-2.
8.6.2 Attack Description
The attack procedure is as follows.
1. Choose a structure S, which is defined to be a set of 2232 plaintexts Pi =
(A0i , B
0
i , C
0
i , D
0
i , E
0
i , F
0
i , G
0
i ,H
0
i ) under the condition given in equation (8.1),
(i = 1, 2, · · · , 2232). In a chosen-plaintext attack scenario, obtain all the ci-
phertexts for the 2232 plaintexts encrypted with K; let Ci be the ciphertext
corresponding to plaintext Pi.
2. Compute another structure S˜, which contains 2232 plaintexts P˜i = (Â0, B̂0, Ĉ0,
D̂0, Ê0, F̂ 0, Ĝ0, Ĥ0) = (A0i , B
0
i ⊕e7,10,19,21,26,30, C0i ⊕e32, D0i , E0i ⊕e10,14,20, F 0i ⊕
e19,30, G
0
i ⊕e32,H0i ¢Φ1(E0i )¯Φ1(E0i ⊕e10,14,20)). In a chosen-plaintext attack
scenario, obtain all the ciphertexts for the 2232 plaintexts in S˜ encrypted with
K˜ = K ⊕ (e32, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, e32, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); let C˜i be the ciphertext
corresponding to plaintext P˜i (encrypted with K˜).
3. Guess a 128-bit subkey pair for ((K41,K42,K43,K44), (K˜41, K˜42, K˜43, K˜44)).
Then, partially decrypt all the ciphertexts Ci through Rounds 44 to 41 us-
ing the subkeys (K44,K43,K42,K41) to get the corresponding values just be-
fore Round 41; let C40i be the partially decrypted version of Ci. Partially
decrypt all the ciphertexts C˜i through Rounds 44 to 41 using the subkeys
(K˜44, K˜43, K˜42, K˜41) to get the corresponding values just before Round 41; let
C˜40i be the partially decrypted version of C˜i. Keep (C
40
i , C˜
40
i ) in a hash table.
This process produces about 2
232×2
2 = 2
463 candidate quartets (C40i0 , C˜
40
i0
, C40i1 ,
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C˜40i1 ), where 1 ≤ i0 ≤ i1 ≤ 2232. By Property 8.1, we can deduce (A35i0 , B35i0 , C35i0 ),
(A35i1 , B
35
i1
, C35i1 ), (Â
35
i0
, B̂35i0 , Ĉ
35
i0
), (Â35i1 , B̂
35
i1
, Ĉ35i1 ), D
35
i0
¯D35i1 , and D̂
35
i0
¯D̂35i1 . Fi-
nally, choose only the quartets (C40i0 , C˜
40
i0
, C40i1 , C˜
40
i1
) such that (A35i0 , B
35
i0
, C35i0 )⊕
(A35i1 , B
35
i1
, C35i1 ) = (e7,10,19,21,26,30, e32, 0), (Â
35
i0
, B̂35i0 , Ĉ
35
i0
) ⊕ (Â35i1 , B̂35i1 , Ĉ35i1 ) =
(e7,10,19,21,26,30, e32, 0), and D35i0 ¯D
35
i1
= D̂35i0 ¯D̂
35
i1
= 0. If six or more quartets
(C40i0 , C˜
40
i0
, C40i1 , C˜
40
i1
) pass this condition, store the quartet and the associated
information; otherwise, repeat this step with another guess.
4. Perform Steps (a) and (b) below for every remaining quartet (C40i0 , C
40
i1
, C˜40i0 , C˜
40
i1
).
(a) Guess a value for the subkey K40. Partially decrypt C40i0 and C
40
i1
through
Round 40 with K40 to get the corresponding values just before Round
40; we denote them by C39i0 and C
39
i1
, respectively. Thus, we can compute
H38i0 ¯ H
38
i1
by Property 8.1; since H38i = E
35
i , we choose the quartets
(C40i0 , C
40
i1
, C˜40i0 , C˜
40
i1
) such that H38i0 ¯ H
38
i1
∈ {±26 ± 220 ± 225 mod 232}.
If six or more quartets (C40i0 , C
40
i1
, C˜40i0 , C˜
40
i1
) pass this condition, execute
Step 4(b) with the quartets meeting this condition; otherwise, repeat this
step with another guess for K40.
(b) Guess a value for the subkey K˜40. Partially decrypt C˜40i0 and C˜
40
i1
through
Round 40 with K˜40 to get the corresponding values just before Round
40; we denote them by C˜39i0 and C˜
39
i1
, respectively. Similarly, we choose
only the quartets (C40i0 , C
40
i1
, C˜40i0 , C˜
40
i1
) such that Ĥ38i0 ¯ Ĥ
38
i1
∈ {±26 ±
220 ± 225 mod 232}. If six or more quartets (C40i0 , C40i1 , C˜40i0 , C˜40i1 ) pass this
condition, execute Step 5 with the quartets (C39i0 , C
39
i1
, C˜39i0 , C˜
39
i1
) that meet
this condition; otherwise, repeat this step with another guess for K˜40.
5. Perform Steps (a) and (b) below for every remaining quartet (C39i0 , C
39
i1
, C˜39i0 , C˜
39
i1
).
(a) Guess a value for the subkey K39. Partially decrypt C39i0 and C
39
i1
through
Round 39 with K39 to get the corresponding values just before Round 39;
we denote them by C38i0 and C
38
i1
, respectively. Thus, we can compute E35i0 ,
E35i1 , and H
37
i0
¯ H37i1 . We choose only the quartets (C
39
i0
, C39i1 , C˜
39
i0
, C˜39i1 )
such that E35i0 ⊕E35i1 = e7,21,26 and H37i0 ¯H37i1 ∈ {±231 mod 232}. If six or
more quartets (C39i0 , C
39
i1
, C˜39i0 , C˜
39
i1
) pass this condition, execute Step 5(b)
with the quartets meeting this condition; otherwise, repeat this step with
another guess for K39.
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(b) Guess a value for the subkey K˜39. Partially decrypt C˜39i0 and C˜
39
i1
through
Round 39 with K˜39 to get the corresponding values just before Round 39;
we denote them by C˜38i0 and C˜
38
i1
, respectively. Thus, we can compute Ê35i0 ,
Ê35i1 , and Ĥ
37
i0
¯ Ĥ37i1 . We choose only the quartets (C
40
i0
, C40i1 , C˜
40
i0
, C˜40i1 )
such that Ê35i0 ⊕ Ê35i1 = e7,21,26 and Ĥ37i0 ¯ Ĥ37i1 ∈ {±231 mod 232}. If six or
more quartets (C39i0 , C
39
i1
, C˜39i0 , C˜
39
i1
) pass this test, execute Step 6 with the
quartets (C38i0 , C
38
i1
, C˜38i0 , C˜
38
i1
) that meet this condition; otherwise, repeat
this step with another guess for K˜39.
6. Perform Steps (a) and (b) below for every remaining quartet (C38i0 , C
38
i1
, C˜38i0 , C˜
38
i1
).
(a) Guess a value for the subkey K38. Partially decrypt C38i0 and C
38
i1
through
Round 38 with K38 to get the corresponding values just before Round 38;
we denote them by C37i0 and C
37
i1
, respectively. Thus, we can compute F 35i0 ,
F 35i1 , and H
36
i0
¯ H36i1 . We choose only the quartets (C
38
i0
, C38i1 , C˜
38
i0
, C˜38i1 )
such that F 35i0 ⊕ F 35i1 = e32 and H36i0 ¯ H36i1 = 0. If six or more quar-
tets (C38i0 , C
38
i1
, C˜38i0 , C˜
38
i1
) pass this condition, execute Step 6(b) with the
quartets meeting this condition; otherwise, repeat this step with another
guess for K38.
(b) Guess a value for the subkey K˜38. Partially decrypt C˜38i0 and C˜
38
i1
through
Round 38 with K˜38 to get the corresponding values just before Round 38;
we denote them by C˜37i0 and C˜
37
i1
, respectively. Thus, we can compute F̂ 35i0 ,
F̂ 35i1 , and Ĥ
36
i0
¯ Ĥ36i1 . We choose only the quartets (C
38
i0
, C38i1 , C˜
38
i0
, C˜38i1 )
such that F̂ 35i0 ⊕ F̂ 35i1 = e32 and Ĥ36i0 ¯ Ĥ36i1 = 0. If six or more quar-
tets (C38i0 , C
38
i1
, C˜38i0 , C˜
38
i1
) pass this test, execute Step 7 with the quartets
(C37i0 , C
37
i1
, C˜37i0 , C˜
37
i1
) that meet this condition; otherwise, repeat this step
with another guess for K˜38.
7. Perform Steps (a) and (b) below for every remaining quartet (C37i0 , C
37
i1
, C˜37i0 , C˜
37
i1
).
(a) Guess a value for the subkey K37. Partially decrypt C37i0 and C
37
i1
through
Round 37 with K37 to get the corresponding values just before Round
37; we denote them by C36i0 and C
36
i1
, respectively. Thus, we can compute
H35i0 ¯ H
35
i1
. We choose only the quartets (C37i0 , C
37
i1
, C˜37i0 , C˜
37
i1
) such that
H35i0 ¯ H
35
i1
= 0. If six or more quartets (C37i0 , C
37
i1
, C˜37i0 , C˜
37
i1
) pass this
condition, execute Step 7(b) with the quartets meeting this condition;
otherwise, repeat this step with another guess for K37.
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(b) Guess a value for the subkey K˜37. Partially decrypt C˜37i0 and C˜
37
i1
through
Round 37 with K˜37 to get the corresponding values just before Round
37; we denote them by C˜36i0 and C˜
36
i1
, respectively. Thus, we can compute
Ĥ35i0 ¯ Ĥ
35
i1
. We choose only the quartets (C37i0 , C
37
i1
, C˜37i0 , C˜
37
i1
) such that
Ĥ35i0 ¯Ĥ
35
i1
= 0. If six or more quartets (C37i0 , C
37
i1
, C˜37i0 , C˜
37
i1
) pass this test,
then record (K37,K38, · · · ,K44), and execute Step 8; otherwise, repeat
this step with another guess for K˜37.
8. For a recorded value for (K37,K38, · · · ,K44), exhaustively search for the re-
maining 256 bits using one known pair of plaintext and ciphertext. If a 512-bit
key is suggested, output it as the user key of the 44-round SHACAL-2; other-
wise, repeat Step 3 with another guess.
8.6.3 Complexity Analysis
This attack requires 2233 related-key chosen plaintexts. The required memory for
this attack is dominated by the ciphertexts, which is approximately 2233×32 ≈ 2238
memory bytes.
Step 3 has a time complexity of about 2 × 2232 × 232×8 × 844 ≈ 2486.54 44-round
SHACAL-2 encryptions, and it also requires about 232×8 × 2232 = 2488 memory
accesses, which is negligible compared with the 2486.54 encryptions. Due to the 128-
bit filtering condition in Step 3, it is expected that only about 2463× (2−128)2 = 2207
candidate quartets remain after Step 3 for every key guess.
Step 4(a) has a time complexity about 2× 2207 × 232×9 × 144 ≈ 2490.54 encryptions.
There is a filtering condition of 2
3
232
= 2−29 in either of Steps 4(a) and (b). In
Step 4(a), the probability that 6 or more quartets pass the test for a wrong guess
is about 1, thus it follows that all the 2288 key guesses pass this step; and about
2207 × 2−29 = 2178 candidate quartets remain after this step for every key guess.
Step 4(b) has a time complexity about 2× 2178 × 232×10 × 144 ≈ 2493.54 encryptions.
In Step 4(b), the probability that 6 or more quartets pass the test for a wrong guess
is also about 1, thus it follows that all the 2320 key guesses pass this step; and about
2178 × 2−29 = 2149 candidate quartets remain after this step for every key guess.
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Step 5(a) has a time complexity about 2× 2149 × 232×11 × 144 ≈ 2496.54 encryptions.
There is a filtering condition of 2
232
× 1
23
= 2−34 in either of Steps 5(a) and (b). In
Step 5(a), the probability that 6 or more quartets pass the test for a wrong guess
is about 1, so it follows that all the 2352 key guesses pass this step; and about
2149 × 2−34 = 2115 candidate quartets remain after this step for every key guess.
Step 5(b) has a time complexity about 2× 2115 × 232×12 × 144 ≈ 2494.54 encryptions.
In Step 5(b), since the probability that 6 or more quartets pass the test for a wrong
guess is also about 1, it follows that all the 2384 key guesses pass this step; and about
2115 × 2−34 = 281 candidate quartets remain after this step for every key guess.
Step 6(a) has a time complexity about 2× 281 × 232×13 × 144 ≈ 2492.54 encryptions.
There is a filtering condition of 1
232
× 12 = 2−33 in either of Steps 6(a) and (b). In
Step 6(a), the probability that 6 or more quartets pass the test for a wrong guess
is about 1 as well, thus it follows that all the 2416 key guesses pass this step; and
about 281×2−33 = 248 candidate quartets remain after this step for every key guess.
Step 6(b) has a time complexity about 2× 248 × 232×14 × 144 ≈ 2491.54 encryptions.
In Step 6(b), the probability that 6 or more quartets pass the test for a wrong guess
is about 1, thus it follows that all the 2448 key guesses pass this step; and about
248 × 2−33 = 215 candidate quartets remain after this step for every key guess.
Step 7(a) has a time complexity about 2× 215 × 232×15 × 144 ≈ 2490.54 encryptions.
There is a filtering condition of 2−32 in either of Steps 7(a) and (b). In Step 7(a),
the probability that six or more quartets pass the test for a wrong guess is about∑215
i=6[
(
215
i
) · (2−32)i · (1− 2−32)215−i] ≈ 2−111.49, thus it follows that about the 2480×
2−111.49 = 2368.51 key guesses pass this step. Step 7(b) has a time complexity about
2 × 2368.51 × 6 × 144 ≈ 2366.63 encryptions. In Step 7(b), the probability that six
or more quartets pass the test for a wrong guess is about (2−32)6 = 2−192, so it is
expected that only about 2368.51+32× 2−192 = 2208.51 guesses of (K37,K38, · · · ,K44)
pass Step 7(b), which result in 2464.51 trials in Step 8.
Therefore, the attack has a total time complexity of about 2497.2 44-round SHACAL-2
encryptions.
As about 2463 quartets are tested in this attack and the 35-round related-key rect-
angle distinguisher has a probability of 2−460, we can learn that the expected
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number of the qualified quartets for the correct key guess in Step 7(b) is about
2463 × 2−460 = 8. The probability that six or more quartets pass Step 7(b) is∑2463
i=6 [
(
2463
i
) · (2−460)i · (1 − 2−460)2463−i] ≈ 0.8, therefore the related-key rectangle
attack works with a success probability of 80%.
8.7 Summary
In this chapter we have presented a related-key rectangle attack on 44 rounds of
SHACAL-2. This is better than any previously published cryptanalytic result on
SHACAL-2 in terms of the number of attacked rounds. Table 8.4 summarises the
published cryptanalytic results on the 512-bit key version of SHACAL-2, where
CP and RK-CP refer to the required numbers of chosen plaintexts and related-key
chosen plaintexts, respectively; and Encryptions refers to the required number of
encryption operations of the relevant reduced-round version of SHACAL-2.
Table 8.4: Cryptanalytic results on the 512-bit key version of SHACAL-2
Attack Type Rounds Data Time Source
Impossible differential 30 744CP 2495.1Encryptions [39]
Square-nonlinear 28 240.9CP 2494.1Encryptions [98]
Differential-nonlinear 32 243.4CP 2504.2Encryptions [98]
Related-key differential-nonlinear 35 242.4RK-CP 2452.1Encryptions [54]
Related-key rectangle 37 2235.2RK-CP 2487Encryptions [54]
42 2243.4RK-CP 2488.4Encryptions [78]
43† 2240.4RK-CP 2480.4Encryptions [104]
44 2233RK-CP 2497.2Encryptions Section 8.6
†: there is a flaw, as shown in Section 8.5.2.
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Chapter 9
Related-Key Rectangle Attack on
36-Round XTEA
XTEA is a 64-bit block cipher with a 128-bit user key. In this chapter, we present a
related-key rectangle attack on 36 rounds of XTEA; the attack requires 264.98 related-
key chosen plaintexts, and has a time complexity of 2126.3 encryptions. This is better
than any previously published cryptanalytic results on XTEA in terms of the number
of attacked rounds.
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9.1 Introduction
The block cipher TEA (Tiny Encryption Algorithm) was designed by Wheeler and
Needham [106] in 1994 as a short C language program that would run safely on
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most machines. It has no preset tables or long set up times, and achieves a high
performance by performing all its operations on 32-bit words, using only exclusive-or,
addition modulo 232, multiplication modulo 232 and shifts. TEA has a simple Feistel
structure, but uses a large number (i.e. 64) of rounds to achieve the desired level of
security. Although it was originally written in C, TEA can readily be implemented
in a range of languages, including assembler. However, taking advantage of its
simple key schedule, in 1997 Kelsey, Schneier and Wagner [50] described a related-
key attack. To secure TEA against related-key attacks, Needham and Wheeler [88]
presented an extended version of TEA in 1997, known as XTEA, which retains the
original objectives of simplicity and efficiency.
In this chapter, we describe a 24-round related-key rectangle distinguisher with prob-
ability 2−124.92 for XTEA. We then apply it to mount a related-key rectangle attack
on 36 rounds of XTEA, using the early abort technique described in Section 4.3.
The attack requires 264.98 related-key chosen plaintexts and has a time complexity
of 2126.3 36-round XTEA computations.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 9.2 we describe
XTEA. In Section 9.3 we briefly review previous cryptanalytic results on XTEA.
In Section 9.4 we give the 24-round related-key rectangle distinguisher for XTEA.
In 9.5 we present our cryptanalytic results on XTEA. Section 9.6 summarises the
results of this chapter.
9.2 The XTEA Block Cipher
In this section we briefly describe the XTEA block cipher [88].
9.2.1 Notation
In this chapter, the bits of a 32-bit value are numbered from 1 to 32 from left to
right, where the least significant bit is referred as the 1st bit, and the most significant
bit is referred as the 32nd bit. We use the following notation.
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• ¢: addition modulo 232
• £: multiplication modulo 232
• ej : a 32-bit word with zeros everywhere except for bit position j, (1 ≤ j ≤ 32)
• ei1,··· ,ij : the 32-bit word equal to ei1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ eij , (1 ≤ i1, · · · , ij ≤ 32)
• ej,∼: a 32-bit word that has zeros in bit positions 1 to j − 1, a one in bit
position j and indeterminate values in bit positions (j+1) to 32, (1 ≤ j ≤ 31)
• ? : an arbitrary 32-bit value, where two values represented by the ? symbol
may be different
• ρlj : an l-bit value with zeros everywhere except for bit position j, (1 ≤ j ≤ l)
• ρlj,∼: an l-bit value that has zeros in bit positions 1 to j, a one in bit position
j and indeterminate values in the remaining positions, (1 ≤ j ≤ l)
9.2.2 Generation of Subkeys
XTEA uses a total of 64 32-bit subkeys Ki, (1 ≤ i ≤ 64), all derived from a
128-bit key K. Let K be represented as a sequence of four 32-bit words K =
(W1,W2,W3,W4), then Ki = W(b i
2
c£ θ >>11)&3, where θ = 0x9e3779b9. Table 9.1
lists the set of subkey values.
Table 9.1: The key schedule of XTEA
Round(i) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Ki W1 W4 W2 W3 W3 W2 W4 W1 W1 W1 W2 W4 W3 W3 W4 W2
Round(i) 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Ki W1 W1 W2 W1 W3 W4 W4 W3 W1 W2 W2 W2 W3 W1 W4 W4
Round(i) 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48
Ki W1 W3 W2 W2 W3 W2 W4 W1 W1 W4 W2 W3 W3 W2 W4 W2
Round(i) 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64
Ki W1 W1 W2 W4 W3 W3 W4 W3 W1 W2 W2 W1 W3 W4 W4 W3
9.2.3 Encryption Procedure
XTEA takes as input a 64-bit plaintext block P , and has a total of 64 rounds. Its
encryption procedure is as follows, where Li and Ri are 32-bit variables.
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1. Represent P as two 32-bit words P = (L0, R0).
2. For i = 1 to 64:
Ri = Li−1 ¢ (((Ri−1 << 4⊕Ri−1 >> 5)¢Ri−1)⊕ (b i2c£ θ ¢Ki)),
Li = Ri−1;
3. Ciphertext = (L64, R64).
<< 4
>> 5
⊕
⊕
Kib
i
2
c
Li+1 Ri+1
Li Ri
θ
Figure 9.1: The ith encryption round of XTEA
The ith iteration of Step 2 in the above description is referred to below as Round i,
(1 ≤ i ≤ 64). Figure 9.1 depicts such a round.
Let K˜i = (b i2c × θ)¢Ki, (1 ≤ i ≤ 64). We write K˜i,[l1,l2] for bits (l1, · · · , l2) of K˜i,
where 1 ≤ l1 ≤ l2 ≤ 32.
9.3 Previous Cryptanalytic Results
In this section we briefly review previously published cryptanalytic attacks on XTEA.
• In 2002, Moon, Hwang, Lee, Lee and Lim [86] presented an impossible differ-
ential attack on 14 rounds of XTEA.
• In 2003, Hong, Hong, Ko, Chang, Lee and Lee [38] presented a differential
attack on 15 rounds of XTEA and a truncated differential attack on 23 rounds
of XTEA, where the former attack uses a 13-round differential with probability
2−54.795, and the latter attack uses an 8-round truncated differential.
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• In 2004, Ko, Hong, Lee, Lee and Kang [61] presented a related-key truncated
differential attack on 27 rounds of XTEA, based on the 8-round truncated
differential of Hong et al.
• In 2006, Lee, Hong, Chang, Hong and Lim [70] presented a related-key rect-
angle attack on 34 rounds of XTEA that works under the assumption that the
key used is a member of a special class of weak keys.
In summary, the related-key truncated differential attack on 27-round XTEA of Ko
et al. [61] is the best previously published cryptanalytic result on XTEA without
making a weak key assumption.
9.4 A 24-Round Related-Key Rectangle Distinguisher with
Probability 2−124.92
In this section, we describe a novel 24-round related-key rectangle distinguisher for
XTEA.
The definition of a related-key rectangle distinguisher requires the part of the cipher
E concerned to be decomposed into two sub-ciphers E0 and E1. Let E0 denote
Rounds 21 to 36 of XTEA, and E1 denote Rounds 37 to 44 of XTEA. To define
the distinguisher we need to specify related-key differentials for E0 and E1. The
24-round related-key rectangle distinguisher involves four cipher keys (TYPE 1 as
described in Section 2.2.9), which we assume are KA,KB,KC ,KD.
The first related-key differential making up the 24-round distinguisher is the follow-
ing related-key differential ∆α→ ∆β with probability 2−32.49 forE0: (e22,27,31, e27)→
(e12,17,21, e7,25,27), where the relationship between the four cipher keys is KA⊕KB =
KC⊕KD = (0, 0, 0, e32). See Table 9.2 for further details of this differential. During
the calculations of the probability of this related-key differential, we use the general
result described in Theorem 8.1.
The second related-key differential making up the 24-round distinguisher is the
following related-key differential ∆γ → ∆δ with probability 1 for E1: (e32, 0) →
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Table 9.2: The first related-key differential in the 24-round related-key rectangle
distinguisher
Round(i) (∆Li−1,∆Ri−1) ∆Ki Prob. Round(i) (∆Li−1,∆Ri−1) ∆Ki Prob.
21 (e22,27,31, e27) 0 2−4.16 31 (0, 0) e32 1
22 (e27, e32) e32 2−1.52 32 (0, e32) e32 2−1.52
23 (e32, 0) e32 1 33 (e32, e27) 0 2−4.16
24 (0, 0) 0 1 34 (e27, e22,27,31,32) 0 2−5.15
...
...
...
... 35 (e22,27,31,32, e17,27) 0 2−8.31
29 (0, 0) 0 1 36 (e17,27, e12,17,21) 0 2−7.67
30 (0, 0) 0 1 output (e12,17,21, e7,25,27) / /
(0, e32), where the relationship between the four cipher keys is KA ⊕KC = KB ⊕
KD = (0, 0, e32, 0).
In the following, we need to sum the squares of the probabilities of all the possible
16-round differentials ∆α → ∆β∗ with the same input difference α to E0, which is
computationally infeasible. To address this problem, we just count some of those
in which only the last one-round (Case A), two-round (Case B) or five-round (Case
C) related-key differential characteristic is different from the 16-round related-key
differential ∆α→ ∆β in Table 9.2:
Case A: The last one-round (i.e. Round 36) related-key differential characteristic
has the form (e17,27, e12,17,21) → (e12,17,21,∆R37). From an analysis of this
one-round differential, we know that there exists at least 1 possible ∆R37 (i.e.
e7,25,27) with a lower bound probability of 2−7.67, at least 4 possible ∆R37 (i.e.
e7,8,25,27, e7,18,25,27, e7,25,26,27, e7,25,26) with a lower bound probability of 2−8.67+
2−9.72 ≈ 2−8.10, at least 7 possible ∆R37 (i.e. e7,8,9,25,27, e7,8,18,25,27, e7,8,25,26,27,
e7,8,25,26, e7,18,19,25,27, e7,18,25,26,27, e7,18,25,26) with a lower bound probability of
2−9.67 + 2−11.86 ≈ 2−9.38, at least 2 possible ∆R37 (i.e. e7,25,26,28, e7,25,26,27,28)
with a lower bound probability of 2−9.67+2−12.85 ≈ 2−9.52, at least 10 possible
∆R37 with a lower bound probability of 2−10.67, at least 15 possible ∆R37
with a lower bound probability of 2−11.67, at least 21 possible ∆R37 with a
lower bound probability of 2−12.67 and at least 28 possible ∆R37 with a lower
bound probability of 2−13.67. Thus, we can compute a square sum of at least
2−7.67×2 + 4 × 2−8.1×2 + 7 × 2−9.38×2 + 2 × 2−9.52×2 + 10 × 2−10.67×2 + 15 ×
2−11.67×2+21×2−12.67×2+28×2−13.67×2 ≈ 2−13.25 for the probabilities of the
one-round differentials (e17,27, e12,17,21)→ (e12,17,21,∆R37).
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2−124.92
Case B: The last two-round (i.e. Rounds 35 and 36) related-key differential char-
acteristic has the form (e22,27,31,32, e17,27) → (e17,27,∆R36) → (∆R36,∆R37).
Here, we only consider ∆R36 ∈ {e12,17,21, e12,17,21,22, e12,17,21,32, e12,17,21,22,32};
after an analysis we can learn that these four possibilities of ∆R36 have the
same probability 2−8.31 for the one-round differential (e22,27,31,32, e17,27) →
(e17,27,∆R36). Similar to that described in Case A, we can compute a square
sum of at least 2−14.04 for the case ∆R36 = e12,17,21,32, a square sum of at least
2−15.55 for the case ∆R36 = e12,17,21,22 and a square sum of at least 2−16.26 for
the case ∆R36 = e12,17,21,22,32.
Case C: The last five-round (i.e. Rounds 32 to 36) related-key differential character-
istic has the form (0, e32)→ (e32,∆R33)→ (∆R33,∆R34)→ (∆R34,∆R35)→
(∆R35,∆R36) → (∆R36,∆R37). Here, we only consider (∆R34,∆R35) ∈
{(e22,27,31,32, e17,27), (e22,27,31,32, e17,27,32), (e22,27,31, e17,32), (e22,27,31, e17)}; we can
know that the four possibilities of (∆R34,∆R35) have the same probability
of at least 2−10.83 + 2−13.55 + 2−17.56 ≈ 2−10.62 for the three-round differen-
tial (0, e32) → (∆R34,∆R35). Subsequently, a detailed analysis reveals that
the one-round differential (∆R34,∆R35) → (∆R35,∆R36) has a probability
of at least 2−8.31 for the eight cases ∆R34 = e22,27,31,32 and (∆R35,∆R36) ∈
{(e17,27, e12,17,21), (e17,27, e12,17,21,22), (e17,27, e12,17,21,32), (e17,27, e12,17,21,22,32),
(e17,27,32, e12,17,21,27), (e17,27,32, e12,17,21,22,27), (e17,27,32, e12,17,21,27,32), (e17,27,32,
e12,17,21,22,27,32)}, and has a probability of at least 2−7.46 for the eight cases
∆R34 = e22,27,31 and (∆R35,∆R36) ∈ {(e17, e12,17,21,27,31), (e17, e12,17,21,22,27,31),
(e17, e12,17,21,27,31,32), (e17, e12,17,21,22,27,31,32), (e17,32, e12,17,21,31), (e17,32, e12,17,21,
22,31), (e17,32, e12,17,21,31,32), (e17,32, e12,17,21,22,31,32)}. Then, similar to that de-
scribed in Case A, for the one-round differentials (∆R35,∆R36)→(∆R36,∆R37),
we can compute a square sum of at least 2−17.11 for the probabilities of the dif-
ferentials from either of the two cases (∆R34,∆R35,∆R36) ∈ {(e22,27,31,32, e17,27,
32, e12,17,21,27),(e22,27,31,32, e17,27,32, e12,17,21,27,32)}, a square sum of at least 2−18.13
for the probabilities of the differentials from either of the two cases (∆R34,∆R35,
∆R36) ∈ {(e22,27,31,32, e17,27,32, e12,17,21,22,27), (e22,27,31,32, e17,27,32, e12,17,21,22,27,
32)}, and a square sum of at least 2−18.22 for the probabilities of the differentials
from each of the eight cases with ∆R34 = e22,27,31.
Thus, with the three cases above, we can compute a square sum for the probabilities
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of the differentials α→ β∗ of at least (2−4.16×2−1.52×2−10.62)2×(2−8.31×2×2−13.25+
2−8.31×2× 2−14.04+2−8.31×2× 2−15.55+2−8.31×2× 2−16.26+2× 2−8.31×2× 2−17.11+
2× 2−8.31×2 × 2−18.13 + 8× 2−7.46×2 × 2−18.22) ≈ 2−60.92.
As the 8-round related-key differential ∆γ → ∆δ for E1 has a probability of 1, this
distinguisher has a probability of at least
∑
β∗ [Pr(∆α→ ∆β∗)2 × 2−64] = 2−60.92 ×
2−64 = 2−124.92 for the correct key, while it has a probability of (2−64)2 = 2−128 for
a wrong key.
9.5 Attacking Rounds 16 to 51 of XTEA
In this section we describe a related-key rectangle attack on 36 rounds of XTEA.
9.5.1 Preliminary Results
We first give three properties of XTEA.
The following result follows from inspection of Table 9.1.
Property 9.1 In the key schedule of XTEA, only 64 user key bits (W1,W2) are
used in Rounds 16 to 20 and 48 to 51.
The following property follows from the structure of the XTEA round function.
Property 9.2 Suppose two blocks are encrypted using XTEA with a pair of keys
for which the subkeys for Rounds i, i + 1, i + 2 and i + 3 are either the same or
differ by e32 (for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 61). Then, if the difference just after Round i
is (0, e32), then the difference just after Round (i+ 1) has the form (e32, e27,∼), the
difference just after Round (i+2) has the form (e27,∼, e22,∼), and the difference just
after Round (i+ 3) has the form (e22,∼, e17,∼).
We know that the addition modulo operation definitely preserves the least significant
differences in the original positions, and may preserve the other differences in the
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original positions or propagate them to the more significant positions, but never to
the less significant positions. Thus, we can get the following property.
Property 9.3 Given a pair of 64-bit values (xl, xr) and (x̂l, x̂r) with difference
(ej+5,∼, ej,∼) after Round i (1 ≤ j ≤ 27), to determine whether it could produce a
difference with the form (ξ, ej+5,∼) just before Round i, we only need to guess the
most significant (32 − j) bits of K˜i and the carry bit occurred in the (j − 1)th bit
of the left addition modulo 232 operation in Round i, where ξ denotes a (possible)
specific 32-bit difference.
Property 9.1 enables us to travel through the nine rounds from Rounds 16 to 20
and Rounds 48 to 51 by guessing only 64 user key bits (W1,W2). Properties 9.2
and 9.3 allow us to break Rounds 45 and 47 by using the early abort technique. We
guess only part of the 32 bits of an unknown K˜i when conducting an early abort;
otherwise, our attack would be impossible.
We use plaintext structures in our attack. For a plaintext pair to produce the
difference (e22,27,31, e27) just before Round 21, the input difference to Round 16
should have the form (?, e2,∼).
9.5.2 Attack Description
As a result, the above analysis enables us to give the following attack procedure to
break the 36 rounds from Rounds 16 to 51 of XTEA. The attack procedure is as
follows.
1. Choose a structure S, which is defined to be a set of 262.96 plaintexts Pl with
the second rightmost bits fixed, (l = 1, · · · , 262.96). In a chosen-plaintext
attack scenario, obtain all the ciphertexts for the 262.96 plaintexts encrypted
with KA and KC , respectively; let Cl and C ′l be the ciphertexts for plaintext
Pl encrypted with KA and KC , respectively. Choose another structure Ŝ,
which contains the 263 plaintexts P̂j with the second rightmost bits fixed to
be the complement of the second rightmost bit value in S, (j = 1, · · · , 263).
In a chosen-plaintext attack scenario, obtain all the ciphertexts for the 263
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plaintexts in Ŝ encrypted with KB and KD; we denote by Ĉ∗j and Ĉ
′∗
j the
ciphertexts for plaintext P̂j , encrypted with KB and KD, respectively. Here,
KA⊕KB = KC⊕KD = (0, 0, 0, e32), and KA⊕KC = KB⊕KD = (0, 0, e32, 0).
2. Guess a value for the 64-bit user key (W1,W2), compute the subkeys (K16, · · · ,
K20), and perform Steps (a) and (b) below.
(a) Partially encrypt every plaintext Pl in S with (K16, · · · ,K20) through
Rounds 16 to 20 to get its corresponding value just after Round 20;
we denote it by εl. Then, partially decrypt εl ⊕ (e22,27,31, e27) with
(K16, · · · ,K20) through Rounds 16 to 20 to get its plaintext; we denote
it by P˜l. Find P˜l in Ŝ. We denote by C˜∗l and C˜
′∗
l the corresponding
ciphertexts of P˜l encrypted under KB and KD, respectively. This step
generates a total of 262.96 plaintext pairs with difference (e22,27,31, e27)
after Round 20 for every guess for (W1,W2), which can propose about(
262.96
2
) ≈ 262.96×22 = 2124.92 candidate quartets.
(b) Compute the subkeys (K48, · · · ,K51) with the guessed value for (W1,W2).
Partially decrypt all the 264 ciphertexts with (K48, · · · ,K51) through
Rounds 48 to 51 to get the corresponding values just before Round 48; we
denote the corresponding values for the ciphertexts Cl, C˜∗l , C
′
l and C˜
′∗
l by
Tl, T˜ ∗l , T
′
l and T˜
′∗
l , respectively. Store (Tl, T
′
l , T˜
∗
l , T˜
′∗
l ) in a hash table. Fi-
nally, choose only the quartets (Tl1 , T˜
∗
l1
, T ′l2 , T˜
′∗
l2
) such that both Tl1 ⊕ T ′l2
and T˜ ∗l1 ⊕ T˜ ′∗l2 have the form (e22,∼, e17,∼), where 1 ≤ l1 ≤ l2 ≤ 262.96.
If one or more quartets (Tl1 , T˜
∗
l1
, T ′l2 , T˜
′∗
l2
) pass this test, execute Step 3
with the quartets meeting this condition; otherwise, repeat Step 2 with
another guess.
3. Guess a value for the most significant 16 bits K˜47,[17,32] of the 32-bit value K˜47,
and perform Steps (a) and (b) below.
(a) For each remaining quartet (Tl1 , T˜
∗
l1
, T ′l2 , T˜
′∗
l2
), partially decrypt Tl1 and
T ′l2 with K˜47,[17,32] under the two possibilities 0 and 1 of the carry bit
occurred in bit (16) of the left add modulo operation to get the corre-
sponding values for the most significant 16 bits of both the left and right
halves just before Round 47; we denote them by Qm,l1 and Q
′
m,l2
, re-
spectively, where m ∈ {0, 1} denotes the two possibilities of the carry
bit; and check whether Qm,l1 ⊕ Q′m,l2 has the form (ρ1611,∼, ρ166,∼). If not,
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repeat this step with another quartet; otherwise, partially decrypt T˜ ∗l1
and T˜ ′∗l2 with K˜47,[17,32] ⊕ ρ1616 under the two possibilities 0 and 1 of the
carry bit occurred in bit (16) of the left add modulo operation to get the
corresponding values for the most significant 16 bits of both the left and
right halves just before Round 47; we denote them by Q˜∗n,l1 and Q˜
′∗
n,l2
,
respectively, where n ∈ {0, 1} denotes the two possibilities of the carry
bit. Finally, check whether Q˜∗n,l1 ⊕ Q˜′∗n,l2 has the form (ρ1611,∼, ρ166,∼). If
one or more quartets (Tl1 , T˜
∗
l1
, T ′l2 , T˜
′∗
l2
) pass this test, record the quar-
tets (Qm,l1 , Q˜
∗
n,l1
, Q′m,l2 , Q˜
′∗
n,l2
), and execute Step 3(b) with the quartets
(Tl1 , T˜
∗
l1
, T ′l2 , T˜
′∗
l2
) that meet this condition; otherwise, repeat Step 3 with
another guess for K˜47,[17,32].
(b) Guess a value for the least significant 16 bits K˜47,[1,16] of K˜47. For every
remaining quartet (Tl1 , T˜
∗
l1
, T ′l2 , T˜
′∗
l2
), partially decrypt Tl1 and T
′
l2
with
K˜47(= K˜47,[1,16]||K˜47,[17,32]) to get the corresponding values just before
Round 47; we denote them by Ql1 and Q
′
l2
, respectively; and check
whether Ql1⊕Q′l2 has the form (e27,∼, e22,∼). If not, repeat this step with
another quartet; otherwise, partially decrypt T˜ ∗l1 and T˜
′∗
l2
with K˜47 ⊕ e32
to get the corresponding values just before Round 47; we denote them
by Q˜∗l1 and Q˜
′∗
l2
, respectively. Finally, check whether Q˜∗l1 ⊕ Q˜′∗l2 has the
form (e27,∼, e22,∼). If one or more quartets (Tl1 , T˜ ∗l1 , T
′
l2
, T˜ ′∗l2 ) pass this
test, execute Step 4 with the quartets (Ql1 , Q˜
∗
l1
, Q′l2 , Q˜
′∗
l2
) that meet this
condition; otherwise, repeat this step with another guess for K˜47,[1,16].
4. Compute the subkey K˜46 with the W2 guessed in Step 2. For every remaining
quartet (Ql1 , Q˜
∗
l1
, Q′l2 , Q˜
′∗
l2
), partially decrypt (Ql1 , Q
′
l2
) with K˜46 to get the
corresponding values just before Round 46; we denote them by (Rl1 , R
′
l2
),
respectively; and check whether Rl1 ⊕ R′l2 has the form (e32, e27,∼). If not,
repeat this step with another quartet; otherwise, partially decrypt (Q˜∗l1 , Q˜
′∗
l2
)
with K˜46 to get the corresponding values just before Round 46; we denote
them by (R˜∗l1 , R˜
′∗
l2
), respectively. Finally, check whether R˜∗l1⊕ R˜′∗l2 has the form
(e32, e27,∼). If one or more quartets (Ql1 , Q˜∗l1 , Q
′
l2
, Q˜′∗l2) pass this test, execute
Step 5 with the quartets (Rl1 , R˜
∗
l1
, R′l2 , R˜
′∗
l2
) that meet this condition; otherwise,
repeat Step 3(b) with another guess for K˜47,[1,16].
5. Guess a value for the most significant 6 bits K˜45,[27,32] of the 32-bit value K˜45,
and perform Steps (a) and (b) below.
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(a) For each remaining quartet (Rl1 , R˜
∗
l1
, R′l2 , R˜
′∗
l2
), partially decrypt Rl1 and
R′l2 with K˜45,[27,32] and K˜45,[27,32] ⊕ ρ66, respectively, under the two pos-
sibilities 0 and 1 of the carry bit occurred in bit (26) of the left add
modulo operation to get the corresponding values for the most significant
6 bits of the left and right halves just before Round 45; we denote them
by Us,l1 and U
′
s,l2
, respectively, and partially decrypt R˜∗l1 and R˜
′∗
l2
with
K˜45,[27,32] and K˜45,[27,32] ⊕ ρ66, respectively, under the two possibilities 0
and 1 of the carry bit occurred in bit (26) of the left add modulo opera-
tion to get the corresponding values for the most significant 6 bits of the
left and right halves just before Round 45; we denote them by U˜∗t,l1 and
U˜ ′∗t,l2 , respectively, where s, t ∈ {0, 1} denote the two possibilities of the
carry bit. Finally, check whether Us,l1 ⊕ U ′s,l2 = U˜∗t,l1 ⊕ U˜ ′∗t,l2 = (0, ρ66). If
one or more quartets (Rl1 , R˜
∗
l1
, R′l2 , R˜
′∗
l2
) pass this test, execute Step 5(b)
with the quartets (Rl1 , R˜
∗
l1
, R′l2 , R˜
′∗
l2
) that meet this condition; otherwise,
repeat Step 5 with another guess for K˜45,[27,32].
(b) Guess a value for the least significant 26 bits K˜45,[1,26] of K˜45. For every
remaining (Rl1 , R˜
∗
l1
, R′l2 , R˜
′∗
l2
), partially decrypt Rl1 and R
′
l2
with K˜45(=
K˜45,[1,26]|| K˜45,[27,32]) and K˜45⊕e32, respectively, to get the corresponding
values just before Round 45; we denote them by Ul1 and U
′
l2
, respectively;
and check whether Ul1 ⊕ U ′l2 = (0, e32). If not, repeat this step with
another quartet; otherwise, partially decrypt R˜∗l1 and R˜
′∗
l2
with K˜45 and
K˜45⊕e32, respectively, to get the corresponding values just before Round
45; we denote them by U˜∗l1 and U˜
′∗
l2
, respectively. Finally, check whether
U˜∗l1 ⊕ U˜ ′∗l2 = (0, e32). If one or more quartets (Rl1 , R˜∗l1 , R′l2 , R˜′∗l2) pass this
test, execute Step 6 with the quartets (Ul1 , U˜
∗
l1
, U ′l2 , U˜
′∗
l2
) that meet this
condition; otherwise, repeat this step with another guess for K˜45,[1,26].
6. Compute the subkey K˜21 with the W3 indicated by K˜45. For every plaintext
quartet (Pl1 , P˜
∗
l1
, P ′l2 , P˜
′∗
l2
) corresponding to a remaining (Ul1 , U˜
∗
l1
, U ′l2 , U˜
′∗
l2
), par-
tially encrypt εl1 and εl1 ⊕ (e22,27,31, e27) with K˜21 to get the corresponding
values just after Round 21; we denote them by Vl1 and V˜
∗
l1
, respectively; and
check whether Vl1⊕ V˜ ∗l1 = (e27, e32). If not, repeat this step with another quar-
tet; otherwise, partially encrypt εl2 and εl2 ⊕ (e22,27,31, e27) with K˜21 ⊕ e32 to
get the corresponding values just after Round 21; we denote them by Vl2 and
V˜ ∗l2 , respectively. Finally, check whether Vl2 ⊕ V˜ ∗l2 = (e27, e32). If one or more
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quartets (Pl1 , P˜
∗
l1
, P ′l2 , P˜
′∗
l2
) pass this test, then record (W1,W2, K˜47, K˜45), and
execute Step 7; otherwise, repeat Step 5(b) with another guess for K˜45,[1,26].
7. For a recorded value for (W1,W2, K˜47, K˜45), do a trial encryption with three
plaintext/ciphertext pairs to determine the correct user key of the 36-round
XTEA, (If all the possible guesses during any of Steps 3 to 5 are tested, repeat
its previous steps with other guess).
9.5.3 Complexity Analysis
The attack requires 2 × (262.96 + 263) ≈ 264.98 related-key chosen plaintexts. The
required memory for this attack is dominated by the ciphertexts, which is approxi-
mately 264.98 × 8 = 267.98 memory bytes.
Step 2(a) has a time complexity of about 2 × 262.96 × 264 × 536 ≈ 2125.12 36-round
XTEA encryptions. The time complexity of Step 2(b) is dominated by the partial
decryptions, which is about 264 × 264 × 436 ≈ 2124.83 36-round XTEA computations.
Besides, Step 2(b) requires about 264 × 262.96 ≈ 2126.96 memory accesses, which is
negligible compared with the 2124.83 computations (actually it can be done more
efficiently using computers of today). In Step 2(b), the probability that a quartet
meets the filtering condition is ( 1
222
× 1
217
)2 = 2−78, so it follows that the expected
number of the quartets passing the test for each guess is 2124.92 × 2−78 = 246.92.
The probability that one or more quartets pass the test for a wrong guess is about∑2124.92
i=1 [
(
2124.92
i
) · (2−78)i · (1 − 2−78)2124.92−i] ≈ 1, thus, almost all the 264 possible
values of (W1,W2) pass Step 2(b).
In Step 3(a), the probability that a remaining quartet meets either of the filtering
conditions is 1
210
+ 1
210
= 2−9, thus the time complexity of Step 3(a) is about 2×264×
216× 246.92× 2× 12 × 136 +2× 264× 216× 237.92× 2× 12 × 136 ≈ 2122.75, where 12 means
the average fraction of the key bits that are tested. In this step, the probability that
a remaining quartet meets both the filtering conditions is ( 1
210
+ 1
210
)2 = 2−18, so the
expected number of the quartets passing the test for each guess is 246.92 × 2−18 =
228.92, and the probability that one or more quartets pass the test for a wrong guess
is about 1. Thus, it is expected that almost all the 280 possible (W1,W2, K˜47,17−32)
pass this step. In Step 3(b), the probability that a remaining quartet meets either of
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the filtering conditions is 2−1, because both the pairs in a remaining quartet should
produce the required carry bits occurred in bit 15 of the left add modulo operation;
thus the time complexity of Step 3(b) is about 2× 280 × 216 × 228.92 × 2× 12 × 136 +
2× 280× 216× 227.92× 2× 12 × 136 ≈ 2121.34; the probability that a remaining quartet
meets both the filtering conditions is 2−1×2 = 2−2, so the expected number of the
quartets passing the test for each guess is 228.92 × 2−2 = 226.92, and almost all the
296 possible values of (W1,W2, K˜47) pass Step 3(b).
In Step 4, the probability that a remaining quartet meets either of the filtering
conditions is 2−10, thus the time complexity of Step 4 is about 2× 296× 226.92× 12 ×
1
36 +2×296×216.92× 12 × 136 ≈ 2117.75. In this step, the probability that a remaining
quartet meets both the filtering conditions is 2−10×2 = 2−20, so the expected number
of the quartets passing the test for each guess is 226.92 × 2−20 = 26.92, and the
probability that one or more quartets pass the test for a wrong guess is about 1.
Thus, it is expected that almost all the 296 possible values of (W1,W2, K˜47) pass
this step.
In Step 5(a), the time complexity is about 4 × 296 × 26 × 26.92 × 2 × 12 × 136 ≈
2105.75, and the probability that a remaining quartet meets the filtering condition
is ( 1
25
+ 1
25
)2 = 2−8, so the expected number of the quartets passing the test for
each guess is 26.92 × 2−8 = 2−1.08. The probability that one or more quartets
pass the test for a wrong guess is about
∑26.92
i=1 [
(
26.92
i
) · (2−8)i · (1 − 2−8)26.92−i] ≈
2−1.08. Hence, it is expected that about 296 × 26 × 2−1.08 = 2100.92 possible values
of (W1,W2, K˜47, K˜45,[27,32]) pass Step 5(a). In Step 5(b), the probability that a
remaining quartet meets either of the filtering conditions is 2−1; as a result, it is
expected that 2100.92×226×2−1 = 2125.92 possible values of (W1,W2, K˜47, K˜45) pass
the first filtering condition in Step 5(b). Therefore, the time complexity of Step 5(b)
is about 2 × 2100.92 × 226 × 12 × 136 + 2 × 2125.92 × 12 × 136 ≈ 2122.34. In this step, it
is expected that about 2126.92 × 2−2 = 2124.92 possible values of (W1,W2, K˜47, K˜45)
pass Step 5(b).
In Step 6, as the probability that a remaining quartet meets either of the filtering
conditions is 2−4.16, it follows that about 2124.92 × 2−4.16 = 2120.76 possible values of
(W1,W2, K˜47, K˜45) are expected to pass the first filtering condition in this step. The
time complexity of this step is about 2×2124.92×12× 136+2×2120.76×12× 136 ≈ 2119.83. In
171
9.6 Summary
this step, the probability that a remaining quartet meets both the filtering conditions
is 2−4.16×2 = 2−8.32, so it follows that about 2124.92 × 2−8.32 = 2116.6 possible values
of (W1,W2, K˜47, K˜45) are expected to pass this step, which result in about 2116.6
trials in Step 7.
Therefore, this attack has a total of approximately 2126.3 36-round XTEA compu-
tations.
The probability that a wrong key is suggested in Step 7 is approximately 2−192, so
the expected number of suggested wrong 128-bit keys is about 2−192×2116.6 = 2−75.4,
which is extremely low. In Step 6, the expected number of quartets for the correct
key guess is 2124.92 × 2−124.92 = 1, and the probability that one or more quartets
pass the test for the correct key guess is approximately
∑2124.92
i=1 [
(
2124.92
i
) · (2−124.92)i ·
(1 − 2−124.92)2124.92−i] ≈ 0.63. Therefore, with a success probability of 63%, the
related-key rectangle attack can break the 36-round XTEA, marginally faster than
exhaustive key search.
9.6 Summary
In this chapter we have presented a related-key rectangle attack on 36 rounds of
XTEA. This is better than any previously published cryptanalytic results on XTEA
in terms of the number of attacked rounds. Table 9.3 summarises the published
cryptanalytic results on XTEA, where CP and RK-CP refer to the required numbers
of chosen plaintexts and related-key chosen plaintexts, respectively; and Encryptions
refers to the required number of encryption operations of the relevant reduced-round
version of XTEA.
Table 9.3: Cryptanalytic results on XTEA
Attack Type Rounds Data Time Source
Impossible differential 14 262.5CP 285Encryptions [86]
Differential 15 259CP 2120Encryptions [38]
Truncated differential 23 220.55CP 2120.65Encryptions [38]
Related-key truncated 25 116RK-CP 2110.05Encryptions [61]
differential 27 220.5RK-CP 2115.15Encryptions [61]
Related-key rectangle 34† 262RK-CP 231.94Encryptions [70]
36 264.98RK-CP 2126.3Encryptions Section 9.5
†: Under weak key assumptions
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Chapter 10
Cryptanalysis of Reduced HIGHT
HIGHT is a 64-bit block cipher with a 128-bit user key. In this chapter, we present
an impossible differential attack on 25-round HIGHT, a related-key rectangle attack
on 26-round HIGHT, and a related-key impossible differential attack on 28-round
HIGHT. The 25-round HIGHT attack requires 260 chosen plaintexts and has a time
complexity of 2126.78 encryptions; the 26-round HIGHT attack requires 249.7 related-
key chosen plaintexts and has a time complexity of 2120.41 encryptions; the 28-round
HIGHT attack requires 260 related-key chosen plaintexts and has a time complex-
ity of 2125.54 encryptions. These attacks are better than any previously published
cryptanalytic results on HIGHT in terms of the number of attacked rounds.
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10.1 Introduction
Recently, cryptographic techniques suitable for use in embedded and ubiquitous
computing systems has received extensive attention. In 2006, Hong, Sung, Hong,
Lim, Lee, Koo, Lee, Chang, Lee, Jeong, Kim, Kim and Chee [37] proposed a 64-bit
block cipher known as HIGHT, meaning “high security and light weight”. HIGHT
has a Feistel structure with four branches, a 128-bit user key, and a total of 32
rounds. It is especially efficient in hardware implementations, and is most suitable
for various real-life resource-constrained application environments, such as RFID
(Radio-Frequency IDentification) [47].
In this chapter we describe certain 16-round impossible differentials for HIGHT, and
use them to mount an impossible differential attack on 25-round HIGHT requiring
260 chosen plaintexts and has a time complexity of 2126.78 encryptions. We next
describe an 18-round related-key rectangle distinguisher with probability 2−92.4 for
HIGHT, and then use it to construct a related-key rectangle attack on 26-round
HIGHT which requires 249.7 related-key chosen plaintexts and has a time complexity
of 2120.41 encryptions. Finally, we describe certain 19-round related-key impossible
differentials for HIGHT, and use them to mount a related-key impossible differential
attack on 28-round HIGHT which requires 260 related-key chosen plaintexts and has
a time complexity of 2125.54 encryptions. The attacks use the early abort technique
described in Chapter 4.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 10.2 we describe
HIGHT. In Section 10.3 we briefly review previous cryptanalytic results on HIGHT.
In Section 10.4 we introduce two properties of HIGHT. In Sections 10.5, 10.6 and
10.7 we present our cryptanalytic results on HIGHT. Section 10.8 summarises the
results of this chapter.
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10.2 The HIGHT Block Cipher
In this section we briefly describe the HIGHT block cipher [37]. Note that in order to
maintain consistency of presentation throughout the thesis, the description below is
different from (but equivalent to) that given in [37]; in particular, we use a different
numbering of the bits of a value.
10.2.1 Notation
In this chapter, a 64-bit value is represented as a sequence of eight bytes, numbered
from 1 to 8 from left to right; and the bits of a byte are numbered from 1 to 8 from
left to right, where the least significant bit is referred as the 1st bit, and the most
significant bit is referred as the 8th bit. We use the following notation.
• ¢: addition modulo 28
• ej : an 8-bit value with zeros everywhere except for bit position j (1 ≤ j ≤ 8)
• ei1,··· ,ij : the 8-bit value equal to ei1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ eij (1 ≤ i1, · · · , ij ≤ 8)
• ej,∼ : an 8-bit value that has zeros in bit positions 1 to j − 1, a one in bit
position j and indeterminate values in bit positions (j + 1) to 8, 1 ≤ j ≤ 8
• ej,∼: an 8-bit value that has zeros in bit positions 1 to j and indeterminate
values in bit positions (j + 1) to 8, 1 ≤ j ≤ 8
• ? : an arbitrary 8-bit value, where two values represented by the ? symbol
may be different
10.2.2 Functions
The HIGHT round function uses the following two elementary functions:
• F0 : {0, 1}8 → {0, 1}8. If X is a 8-bit block, then F0(X) = (X ≫ 1)⊕ (X ≫
2)⊕ (X ≫ 7).
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• F1 : {0, 1}8 → {0, 1}8. If X is a 8-bit block, then F1(X) = (X ≫ 3)⊕ (X ≫
4)⊕ (X ≫ 6).
10.2.3 Generation of Subkeys
HIGHT uses a total of eight 8-bit whitening subkeys KW j (1 ≤ j ≤ 8), and 128
8-bit round subkeys KS i, (1 ≤ i ≤ 128), all derived from a 128-bit user key K. Let
K be represented as a sequence of as sixteen bytes (W1,W2, · · · ,W16).
The whitening subkeys KW j are defined as follows.
KW j =Wj+12 for j = 1, 2, 3, 4;
KW j =Wj−4 for j = 5, 6, 7, 8.
The round subkeys KS i are as follows, where λ16·l+j−16 and λ16·l+j−8 are public
constants, (1 ≤ l, j ≤ 8).
KS 16·l+j−16 =Wj−l mod 8+1 ¢ λ16·l+j−16;
KS 16·l+j−8 =W(j−l mod 8)+9 ¢ λ16·l+j−8.
Table 10.1 lists the user key byte used to compute the round subkey KS i for every
i, (1 ≤ i ≤ 128).
We writeWi,l for the lth bit ofWi,Wi,[l1,l2] for bits (l1, · · · , l2) ofWi, KS i,l for the lth
bit of KS i, and KS i,[l1,l2] for bits (l1, · · · , l2) of KS i, where 1 ≤ l ≤ 8, 1 ≤ l1 ≤ l2 ≤ 8.
10.2.4 Encryption Procedure
HIGHT takes as input a 64-bit plaintext block P , and has a total of 32 rounds.
Its encryption procedure is as follows, where X0,1, X0,2, · · · , X0,8, Xi,1, · · · , Xi,8 are
8-bit variables.
1. Represent P as eight bytes P = (P1, P2, · · · , P8).
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Table 10.1: The key byte used to generate the round subkey KS i
i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
KS i W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W8 W9 W10 W11 W12 W13 W14 W15 W16
i 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
KS i W8 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W16 W9 W10 W11 W12 W13 W14 W15
i 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48
KS i W7 W8 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W15 W16 W9 W10 W11 W12 W13 W14
i 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64
KS i W6 W7 W8 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W14 W15 W16 W9 W10 W11 W12 W13
i 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80
KS i W5 W6 W7 W8 W1 W2 W3 W4 W13 W14 W15 W16 W9 W10 W11 W12
i 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96
KS i W4 W5 W6 W7 W8 W1 W2 W3 W12 W13 W14 W15 W16 W9 W10 W11
i 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112
KS i W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W8 W1 W2 W11 W12 W13 W14 W15 W16 W9 W10
i 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128
KS i W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W8 W1 W10 W11 W12 W13 W14 W15 W16 W9
2. (X0,1, X0,2, X0,3, X0,4, X0,5, X0,6, X0,7, X0,8) = (P1 ¢ KW 1, P2, P3 ⊕ KW 2, P4,
P5 ¢KW 3, P6, P7 ⊕KW 4, P8).
3. For i = 1 to 32:
Xi,1 = Xi−1,8 ⊕ (F0(Xi−1,7)¢KS 4i),
Xi,2 = Xi−1,1,
Xi,3 = Xi−1,2 ¢ (F1(Xi−1,1)⊕KS 4i−1),
Xi,4 = Xi−1,3,
Xi,5 = Xi−1,4 ⊕ (F0(Xi−1,3)¢KS 4i−2),
Xi,6 = Xi−1,5,
Xi,7 = Xi−1,6 ¢ (F1(Xi−1,5)⊕KS 4i−3),
Xi,8 = Xi−1,7.
4. Ciphertext = (X32,2 ¢ KW 5, X32,3, X32,4 ⊕ KW 6, X32,5, X32,6 ¢ KW 7, X32,7,
X32,8 ⊕KW 8, X32,1).
The ith iteration of Step 3 in the above description is referred to below as Round
i, (1 ≤ i ≤ 32), the transformation in Step 2 is referred to below as the initial
transformation, and the transformation in Step 4 is referred to below as the final
transformation. Figure 10.1 depicts an encryption round.
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⊕F0
KS4i−2
Xi−1,8Xi−1,7Xi−1,6Xi−1,5Xi−1,4Xi−1,3Xi−1,2Xi−1,1
Xi,8Xi,7Xi,6Xi,5Xi,4Xi,3Xi,2Xi,1
⊕F0
KS4i
⊕F1
KS4i−3
⊕F1
KS4i−1
Figure 10.1: The ith encryption round of HIGHT
10.3 Previous Cryptanalytic Results
The HIGHT proposers Hong et al. [37] describe a differential attack, a linear attack
and a boomerang attack on 13-round HIGHT, a truncated differential attack and a
saturation attack on 16-round HIGHT, an impossible differential attack on 18-round
HIGHT, and a related-key boomerang attack on 19-round HIGHT. These are the
only previously published cryptanalytic results on HIGHT.
10.4 Properties of HIGHT
We first give the following general property of the ¢ and ⊕ operations.
Property 10.1 The ¢ operation definitely preserves the least significant differences
in the original positions, and may preserve the other differences in the original po-
sitions or propagate them to the more significant positions, but never to the less
significant positions, while the ⊕ operation always preserves all the differences in
their original positions.
HIGHT has a Feistel-like round structure with four branches, which can be efficiently
implemented. However, we observe that this round structure is much less effective
in diffusing bit/byte changes than other commonly used Feistel structures. This
property of limited diffusion can be formalised in the following way.
Property 10.2 A byte value (or difference) input to Round i will affect at most
two bytes of the output of Round i; two byte value (or difference) input to Round
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i will affect at most four bytes of the output of Round i; and three byte value (or
difference) input to Round i will affect at most six bytes of the output of Round i,
(1 ≤ i ≤ 31).
Property 10.2 implies that, in order to learn a byte value (or difference) input to a
round, we need not guess all the twelve 8-bit subkeys in the following three rounds.
Also we can determine whether a candidate pair is useful in a byte by byte way, and
even bit by bit, because of the round structure and the operations involved. This
observation is another example of the application of the early abort technique.
10.5 Impossible Differential Attack on 25-Round HIGHT
In this section, we describe certain 16-round impossible differentials of HIGHT, and
then use them to conduct an impossible differential attack on 25-round HIGHT.
10.5.1 16-Round Impossible Differentials
We describe certain 16-round impossible differentials: (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, ei,∼)9 (e8, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, e1,4,6,7,8), where 2 ≤ i ≤ 8. Note that the 16-round differentials (0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, e1,4,6,7,8, e8) → (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, ei,∼, 0) are also impossible. These 16-round im-
possible differentials arise because of Property 10.1.
The 16-round impossible differentials are built in a miss-in-the-middle manner [5]:
a 8-round differential (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, ei,∼) → (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ei,∼) with probabil-
ity 1 is concatenated with another 8-round differential (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 0, e1,∼) ←
(e8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, e1,4,6,7,8) with probability 1, but the rightmost bytes of the in-
termediate differences of these two differentials contradict one another. Table 10.2
shows more details of the two 8-round differentials.
The input difference (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, ei,∼) of the first 8-round differential propagates
to a difference (ei,∼, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) after one round of HIGHT, which then propa-
gates to a difference (0, ei,∼, ?, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) after another round. As a result, the dif-
ference (0, ei,∼, ?, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) finally propagates to a difference (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ei,∼)
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Table 10.2: The two 8-round differentials in the 16-round impossible differential
Round(i) ∆Xi−1,1 ∆Xi−1,2 ∆Xi−1,3 ∆Xi−1,4 ∆Xi−1,5 ∆Xi−1,6 ∆Xi−1,7 ∆Xi−1,8
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ei,∼
2 ei,∼ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 ei,∼ ? 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 ei,∼ ? ? 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 ei,∼ ? ? ? 0
6 ? 0 0 0 ei,∼ ? ? ?
7 ? ? ? 0 0 ei,∼ ? ?
8 ? ? ? ? ? 0 ei,∼ ?
output ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ei,∼
9 ? ? ? ? ? ? 0 e1,∼
10 e1,∼ ? ? ? ? ? 0 0
11 0 e1,∼ ? ? ? ? 0 0
12 0 0 e1,∼ ? ? ? 0 0
13 0 0 0 e1,∼ ? ? 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 e1,∼ ? 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 e1,∼ 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 e1,4,6,7,8 0
output e8 0 0 0 0 0 0 e1,4,6,7,8
after a further six rounds.
On the other hand, when we roll back the difference (e8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, e1,4,6,7,8)
through one round of HIGHT in the reverse direction, we definitely get the dif-
ference (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, e1,4,6,7,8, 0), as the difference e1,4,6,7,8 becomes (e1,4,6,7,8 ≫
1) ⊕ (e1,4,6,7,8 ≫ 2) ⊕ (e1,4,6,7,8 ≫ 7) = e1,2,5,7,8 ⊕ e1,2,3,6,8 ⊕ e3,5,6,7,8 = e8 after
the F0 function. The difference (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, e1,4,6,7,8, 0) propagates to a difference
(?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 0, e1,∼) when we roll it back through seven more rounds.
We now have a contradiction if i 6= 1, as the rightmost byte difference of one of the
two intermediate differences is ei,∼ while the leftmost byte difference of the other is
e1,∼.
These impossible differentials apply to any set of sixteen consecutive rounds of
HIGHT.
10.5.2 Attacking Rounds 6 to 30
We can use the 16-round impossible differentials to break 25-round HIGHT. We
attack Rounds 6 to 30 of HIGHT with only the final transformation. We use the
16-round impossible differentials described in the previous section applied to Rounds
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11 to 26. The attack procedure is as follows.
10.5.2.1 Attack Description
1. Choose 213 structures Si, (i = 1, 2, · · · , 213), where a structure Si is defined
to be a set of 247 plaintexts Pi,j with the first two bytes and bit (1) of the
third byte fixed, and the other 47 bit positions taking all the possible values,
(j = 1, 2, · · · , 247). In a chosen-plaintext attack scenario, obtain all the 260
ciphertexts for the 247 plaintexts in each of the 213 structures; let Ci,j be the
ciphertext for plaintext Pi,j . Choose only the ciphertext pairs (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2)
such that Ci,j1 ⊕ Ci,j2 = (0, 0, e1,∼, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?), where 1 ≤ j1 6= j2 ≤ 247.
2. Guess a value for the two key bytes (W1,W4), then compute the subkeys
(KW 8,KS 120), and perform Steps (a)–(h) below.
(a) Partially decrypt every remaining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) with (KW 8,
KS 120) to get the corresponding values for bytes (7,8) just before Round
30, and check whether they have a difference (?, 0). Keep only the pairs
that meet this condition.
(b) Guess a value for the two key bytes (W3,W8), then compute the sub-
keys (KW 7,KS 119), and compute the subkey KS 115 with the W4 guessed
above. Partially decrypt every remaining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) with
(KW 7,KS 115,KS 119) to get the corresponding values for bytes (5,6) just
before Round 29.1 Check whether they have a difference (?, 0). Keep
only the pairs that meet this condition.
(c) Guess a value for the key byteW2, compute the subkeyKW 6, and perform
the following two sub-steps.
i. Guess a value for the least significant bit W7,1 of the key byte W7,
and compute the least significant bit KS 118,1 of the subkey KS 118.
Partially decrypt every remaining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) with
(KW 6,KS 118,1) to get the corresponding values for bit (1) of byte
(4) just before Round 30, and check whether they have a non-zero
difference. Keep only the pairs that meet this condition.
1The other required corresponding values have been obtained in the previous steps. The same
statement applies to certain subsequent steps, as well as the attacks in the next two sections,
although we do not make any further explicit statements.
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ii. Guess a value for the most significant seven bits W7,[2,8] of W7, and
compute the subkey KS 118 (together with the W7,1 guessed above).
Partially decrypt every remaining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) with
(KW 6,KS 118) to get the corresponding values for bytes (3,4) just
before Round 30.
(d) Compute the subkey KS 114 with the W3 guessed above. For every re-
maining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2), partially decrypt the corresponding
values for bytes (4,5) just before Round 30 with KS 114 to get the corre-
sponding values for bytes (3,4) just before Round 29, and check whether
they have a difference (e1,∼, e3,∼). Keep only the pairs that meet this
condition.
(e) For l = 1 to 8:
• Guess a value for the lth bit W16,l of the key byte W16, and compute
the l-bit subkey KS 110,[1,l] of the subkey KS 110.
• For every remaining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2), partially decrypt
the corresponding values for bytes (4,5) just before Round 29 with
KS 110,[1,l] to get the corresponding values for bits (1, 2, · · · , l) of byte
(4) just before Round 28, and check whether they have a zero differ-
ence. Keep only the pairs that meet this condition.
(f) Guess a value for the key byte W6, compute the subkey KS 117, and com-
pute the subkeys (KW 5,KS 113) with the (W1,W2) guessed above. Par-
tially decrypt every remaining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) with (KW 5,
KS 113,KS 117) to get the corresponding values for bytes (1,2) just before
Round 29, and check whether they have the difference (0, e1,4,6,7,8). Keep
only the pairs that meet this condition.
(g) Guess a value for the least significant bit W15,1 of the key byte W15. For
l = 2 to 8, perform the following two sub-steps.
• Guess a value for the lth bit W15,l of W15, and compute the l-bit
subkey KS 109,[1,l] of the subkey KS 109.
• For every remaining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2), partially decrypt
the corresponding values for bytes (2,3) just before Round 29 with
KS 109,[1,l] to get the corresponding values for bits (1, 2, · · · , l) of byte
(2) just before Round 28. If l 6= 8, check whether they have a zero
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difference; if l = 8, check whether they have difference e8. Keep only
the pairs that meet this condition.
(h) Guess a value for the least significant 3 bits W11,[1,3] of the key byte W11.
For l = 4 to 8, perform the following two sub-steps.
• Guess a value for the lth bit W11,l of W11, and compute the l-bit
subkey KS 105,[1,l] of the subkey KS 105.
• For every remaining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2), partially decrypt
the corresponding values for bytes (2,3) just before Round 28 with
KS 105,[1,l] to get the corresponding values for bits (1, 2, · · · , l) of byte
(2) just before Round 27, and check whether they have a zero differ-
ence. Keep only the pairs that meet this condition.
3. Compute the subkey KS 24 with the W7 guessed in Step 2, and perform Steps
(a)–(e) below.
(a) Partially encrypt every plaintext pair (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) corresponding to a re-
maining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) with KS 24 to get the corresponding
values for bytes (1,8) just after Round 6, and check whether they have a
difference (0, ?). Keep only the plaintext pairs that meet this condition.
(b) Compute the subkeys (KS 23,KS 28) with the (W6,W11) guessed in Step
2. Partially encrypt every remaining plaintext pair (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) with
(KS 23,KS 28) to get the corresponding values for bytes (1,8) just after
Round 7, and check whether they have a difference (0, ?). Keep only the
plaintext pairs that meet this condition.
(c) Guess a value for the two key bytes (W5,W10), compute the subkeys
(KS 22,KS 27), and compute the subkey KS 32 with the W15 guessed in
Step 2. Partially encrypt every remaining plaintext pair (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) with
(KS 22,KS 27, KS 32) to get the corresponding values for bytes (1,8) just
after Round 8, and check whether they have a difference (0, ?). Keep only
the plaintext pairs that meet this condition.
(d) Guess a value for the two key bytes (W9,W14), compute the subkeys
(KS 26,KS 31), and compute the subkeys (KS 21,KS 36) with the (W2,W4)
guessed in Step 2. Partially encrypt every remaining plaintext pair (Pi,j1 ,
Pi,j2) with (KS 21,KS 26,KS 31,KS 36) to get the corresponding values for
bytes (1,8) just after Round 9, and check whether they have a difference
(0, ?). Keep only the plaintext pairs that meet this condition.
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(e) Guess a value for the key byte W13, compute the subkey KS 30, and com-
pute the subkeys (KS 25,KS 35,KS 40) with the (W1,W6,W16) guessed in
Step 2. Partially encrypt every remaining plaintext pair (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) with
(KS 25, KS 30,KS 35,KS 40) to get the corresponding values for bytes (1,8)
just after Round 10, and check whether they have a difference (0, e1,∼).
If none of the remaining plaintext pairs meets this condition, record the
guessed value for (W1, · · · ,W11,W13, · · · ,W16), and execute Step 4; oth-
erwise, discard this guess, and try another.
4. For a recorded value for (W1, · · · ,W11,W13, · · · ,W16), exhaustively search for
the remaining 8 key bits using three known pairs of plaintexts and ciphertexts.
If a 128-bit key is suggested, output it as the user key of the 25-round HIGHT;
otherwise, go to Step 2.
10.5.2.2 Complexity Analysis
The attack requires 260 chosen plaintexts, which take a time complexity of 260 25-
round HIGHT encryptions.
In Step 1, a structure Si yields
(
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) ≈ 247×22 = 293 plaintext pairs (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2)
with difference (0, 0, e1,∼, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?), (i = 1, 2, · · · , 213, 1 ≤ j1 6= j2 ≤ 247), thus
the 213 structures yield a total of 2106 plaintext pairs (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2). There is a 17-
bit filtering condition over the candidate ciphertext pairs, so it follows that about
2106 × 2−17 = 289 ciphertext pairs (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) remain after Step 1.
In Step 2(a) there is an 8-bit filtering condition over the candidate ciphertext pairs,
so it follows that about 289 × 2−8 = 281 ciphertext pairs (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) pass Step 2(a)
for every guess of (W1,W4). Step 2(a) has a time complexity of 2×289×216× 14× 125 ≈
299.36 25-round HIGHT encryptions.
In Step 2(b) there is an 8-bit filtering condition over the candidate ciphertext pairs,
so it follows that about 281 × 2−8 = 273 ciphertext pairs (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) pass Step 2(b)
for every guess of (W1,W3,W4,W8). Step 2(b) has a time complexity of 2 × 281 ×
232 × 14 × 225 ≈ 2108.36 25-round HIGHT encryptions.
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In Step 2(c) there is a 1-bit filtering condition over the candidate ciphertext pairs
(in Step 2(c)-i), so it follows that about 273×2−1 = 272 ciphertext pairs (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2)
pass Step 2(c) for every guess of (W1,W2,W3,W4,W7,W8). Step 2(c) has a time
complexity of 2 × 273 × 241 × 14 × 125 + 2 × 272 × 248 × 14 × 125 ≈ 2114.36 25-round
HIGHT encryptions.
In Step 2(d) there is a 3-bit filtering condition over the candidate ciphertext pairs,
so it follows that about 272 × 2−3 = 269 ciphertext pairs (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) pass Step 2(d)
for every guess of (W1,W2,W3,W4,W7,W8). Step 2(d) has a time complexity of
2× 272 × 248 × 14 × 125 ≈ 2114.36 25-round HIGHT encryptions.
In Step 2(e) there is a 1-bit filtering condition over the candidate ciphertext pairs in
every iteration, so it follows that about 269×2−8 = 261 ciphertext pairs (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2)
pass Step 2(e) for every guess of (W1,W2,W3,W4,W7,W8,W16). Step 2(e) has a
time complexity of
∑7
l=0(2 × 269−l × 248+l+1 × 14 × 125) ≈ 2115.36 25-round HIGHT
encryptions.
In Step 2(f) there is a 7-bit filtering condition over the candidate ciphertext pairs, so
it follows that about 261× 2−7 = 254 ciphertext pairs (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2) pass Step 2(f) for
every guess of (W1,W2,W3,W4,W6,W7,W8,W16). Step 2(f) has a time complexity
of 2× 261 × 264 × 14 × 225 ≈ 2120.36 25-round HIGHT encryptions.
In Step 2(g) there is a 1-bit filtering condition over the candidate ciphertext pairs in
every iteration, so it follows that about 254×2−7 = 247 ciphertext pairs (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2)
pass Step 2(g) for every guess of (W1,W2,W3,W4,W6,W7,W8,W15,W16). Step 2(g)
has a time complexity of
∑6
l=0(2 × 254−l × 264+2+l × 14 × 125) ≈ 2117.16 25-round
HIGHT encryptions.
In Step 2(h) there is a 1-bit filtering condition over the candidate ciphertext pairs in
every iteration, so it follows that about 247×2−5 = 242 ciphertext pairs (Ci,j1 , Ci,j2)
pass Step 2(h) for every guess of (W1,W2,W3,W4,W6,W7,W8,W11,W15,W16). Step
2(h) has a time complexity of
∑4
l=0(2× 247−l× 272+4+l× 14 × 125) ≈ 2119.68 25-round
HIGHT encryptions.
In Step 3(a) there is an 8-bit filtering condition over the candidate plaintext pairs,
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so it follows that about 242×2−8 = 234 plaintext pairs (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) pass Step 3(a) for
every guess of (W1,W2,W3,W4,W6,W7,W8,W11,W15,W16). Step 3(a) has a time
complexity of 2× 242 × 280 × 14 × 125 ≈ 2116.36 25-round HIGHT encryptions.
In Step 3(b) there is an 8-bit filtering condition over the candidate plaintext pairs,
so it follows that about 234×2−8 = 226 plaintext pairs (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) pass Step 3(b) for
every guess of (W1,W2,W3,W4,W6,W7,W8,W11,W15,W16). Step 3(b) has a time
complexity of 2× 234 × 280 × 14 × 225 ≈ 2109.36 25-round HIGHT encryptions.
In Step 3(c) there is an 8-bit filtering condition over the candidate plaintext pairs,
so it follows that about 226×2−8 = 218 plaintext pairs (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) pass Step 3(c) for
every guess of (W1, · · · ,W8,W10,W11,W15,W16). Step 3(c) has a time complexity
of 2× 226 × 296 × 14 × 325 ≈ 2117.94 25-round HIGHT encryptions.
In Step 3(d) there is an 8-bit filtering condition over the candidate plaintext pairs,
so it follows that about 218 × 2−8 = 210 plaintext pairs (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) pass Step 3(d)
for every guess of (W1, · · · ,W11,W14,W15,W16). Step 3(d) has a time complexity
of 2× 218 × 2112 × 14 × 425 ≈ 2126.36 25-round HIGHT encryptions.
In Step 3(e) there is an 8-bit filtering condition over the candidate plaintext pairs,
so it follows that about 2120 × (1 − 2−8)210 ≈ 2120 × e−22 ≈ 2114.24 guesses for
(W1, · · · ,W11,W13, · · · ,W16) are recorded in Step 3(e), where e(= 2.71828 . . .) is
the base of the natural logarithm. Thus, the expected number of wrong keys in Step
4 is about 2114.24× 28× 2−192 = 2−73.76. Therefore, it is very likely that we can find
the correct key guess. Step 3(e) has a time complexity of about 2× 2120 × [1 + (1−
2−8) + · · · + (1 − 2−8)210 ] × 14 × 425 ≈ 2124.36 25-round HIGHT encryptions. Step 4
has a time complexity of about 2122.24 25-round HIGHT encryptions.
Therefore, the attack has a total time complexity of approximately 2126.78 25-round
HIGHT encryptions.
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10.6 Related-Key Rectangle Attack on 26-Round HIGHT
In this section, we describe certain 18-round related-key rectangle distinguishers
with probability 2−92.4 of HIGHT, such that we can mount a related-key rectangle
attack on 26-round HIGHT.
10.6.1 18-Round Related-Key Rectangle Distinguishers with Probability
2−92.4
Let E0 denote Rounds 3 to 12 of HIGHT, and E1 denote Rounds 13 to 20 of HIGHT.
The 18-round related-key rectangle distinguisher involves four cipher keys (TYPE
1 as described in Section 2.2.9), which we assume are KA,KB,KC ,KD. The first
related-key differential making up this 18-round distinguisher is the related-key dif-
ferential ∆α → ∆β with probability 2−12 for E0: (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, e8, e1,2,7, e2,4,6) →
(0, 0, 0, 0, e8, e1,7,8, e2,6,7, 0), where the key difference KA ⊕ KB = KC ⊕ KD =
(0, 0, e8, 0, · · · , 0). The second related-key differential making up this 18-round
distinguisher is the related-key differential ∆γ → ∆δ with probability 2−9 for
E1: (0, e8, e1,7,8, e3,6,7, 0, 0, 0, 0) → (e1,2,7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, e8), where the key difference
KA ⊕ KC = KB ⊕ KD = (0, · · · , 0, e8, 0). See 10.3 for details of two related-key
differentials.
We can compute a square sum of at least 6× (2−12)2+20× (2−13)2+20× (2−14)2+
72 × (2−15)2 ≈ 2−19.98 for the probabilities of all the possible 10-round related-key
differentials ∆α → ∆β′ for E0, as there are at least 6 possible β′ with probability
2−12, at least 20 possible β′ with probability 2−13, at least 20 possible β′ with
probability 2−14, and at least 72 possible β′ with probability 2−15. We can also
compute a square sum of at least 5× (2−9)2 + 18× (2−10)2 + 40× (2−11)2 ≈ 2−14.42
for the probabilities of all the possible 8-round related-key differentials ∆γ′ → ∆δ
for E1, as there are at least 5 possible γ′ with probability 2−9, at least 18 possible
γ′ with probability 2−10, and at least 40 possible γ′ with probability 2−11.
Therefore, this 18-round related-key rectangle distinguisher has a probability of at
least 2−19.98 × 2−14.42 × 2−64 = 2−98.4 for the correct key, while it has a proba-
bility of (2−64)2 = 2−128 for a wrong key. We can further improve it by counting
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Table 10.3: The two related-key differentials in the 18-round related-key rectangle
distinguisher
Round(i) ∆Xi−1,1∆Xi−1,2∆Xi−1,3∆Xi−1,4∆Xi−1,5∆Xi−1,6∆Xi−1,7∆Xi−1,8 subkey difference Prob.
3 0 0 0 0 0 e8 e1,2,7 e2,4,6 (0, 0, 0, 0) 2−3
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 e8 e1,2,7 (0, 0, 0, 0) 2−3
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 e8 (0, 0, 0, e8) 1
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0, 0, 0, 0) 1
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0, 0, 0, 0) 1
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0, 0, 0, 0) 1
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0, 0, 0, 0) 1
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (e8, 0, 0, 0) 1
11 0 0 e8 0 0 0 0 0 (0, 0, 0, 0) 2−3
12 0 0 0 e8 e1,7,8 0 0 0 (0, 0, 0, 0) 2−3
output 0 0 0 0 e8 e1,7,8 e2,6,7 0 / /
13 0 e8 e1,7,8 e3,6,7 0 0 0 0 (0, 0, 0, 0) 2−3
14 0 0 e8 e1,7,8 0 0 0 0 (0, 0, 0, 0) 2−3
15 0 0 0 e8 0 0 0 0 (0, e8, 0, 0) 1
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0, 0, 0, 0) 1
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0, 0, 0, 0) 1
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0, 0, 0, 0) 1
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0, 0, e8, 0) 1
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 e8 0 (0, 0, 0, 0) 2−3
output e1,2,7 0 0 0 0 0 0 e8 / /
many possible 8-round related-key differentials ∆γ′ → ∆δ′ for every related-key
differential ∆γ′ → ∆δ for E1. We count those that only have the output differ-
ence (∆X20,0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, e8) different from the 8-round differential ∆γ′ → ∆δ;
an analysis of this one-round differentials reveals that there are 4 possible ∆X20,0
(i.e. e1,2,7, e1,7, e1,7,8, e1,2,7,8) with probability 2−3, 4 possible ∆X20,0 with proba-
bility 2−4, 4 possible ∆X20,0 with probability 2−5, 4 possible ∆X20,0 with prob-
ability 2−6, and 8 possible ∆X20,0 with probability 2−7. Actually, these are all
the 24 possible output differences of the last one-round differentials; we denote
them by the set Ω. As a result, the distinguisher now has a probability of at least
2−19.98×(4×2−7.21+4×2−8.21+4×2−9.21+4×2−10.21+8×2−11.21)2×2−64 = 2−92.4
for the correct key, while it has a probability of (24× 2−64)2 ≈ 2−118.83 for a wrong
key.
We note that this distinguisher can be extended to a distinguisher that operates
on more rounds, by appending one or more rounds at the ends; however, we will
conduct a key recovery on these rounds such that a less data complexity is required.
Similar related-key rectangle distinguishers exist for some other series of 18 rounds.
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10.6.2 Attacking Rounds 1 to 26
The output difference (x, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, e8) of this distinguisher will propagate to a
difference (e8, x, ?, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) just after Round 21, where x ∈ Ω, which will then
propagate to a difference (0, e8, e1,∼, ?, ?, 0, 0, 0) just after Round 22, to a difference
(e8, 0, e8, e1,∼, ?, ?, ?, 0) just after Round 23 (due to the subkey difference in Round
23), and a difference (?, e8, e3,∼, e8, e1,∼, ?, ?, ?) just after Round 24. This property
allows us to use the early abort technique described in Section 4.4 to break Rounds
21 and 24.
The above analysis enables us to give the following related-key rectangle attack
on the first 26 rounds of HIGHT with the final transformation only. Note that
the same 64 user key bits are used in Rounds 1, 2, 25 and 26 as well as the final
transformation. To get the difference (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, e8, e1,2,7, e2,4,6) just before Round
3, the input difference to Round 1 must have the form (0, 0, 0, e8, e1,∼, ?, e1,∼, ?),
with 31 bits definitely being zero. We conduct the early abort in an optimized
order, according to the output differences of the distinguishier.
10.6.2.1 Attack Description
1. Choose 216.2 structures Si, (i = 1, 2, · · · , 216.2), where a structure Si is defined
to be a set of 233 plaintexts Pi,l with the first three bytes and bits (1,2,· · · ,7) of
the fourth byte fixed, and the remaining 33 bit positions taking all the possible
values, (l = 1, 2, · · · , 233). In a chosen-plaintext attack scenario, obtain all the
ciphertexts for the 233 plaintexts in each of the 216.2 structures encrypted
with KA,KB,KC ,KD, where KA ⊕KB = KC ⊕KD = (0, 0, e8, 0, · · · , 0) and
KA ⊕KC = KB ⊕KD = (0, · · · , 0, e8, 0). We denote by Ci,l, C∗i,l, C ′i,l, C ′∗i,l the
ciphertexts for plaintext Pi,l encrypted respectively with KA,KB,KC ,KD.
2. Guess a value for the 8 key bytes (W1, · · · ,W8), compute the subkeys (KS 1, · · · ,
KS 8), and perform Steps (a) and (b) below.
(a) Partially encrypt every plaintext Pi,l through Rounds 1 and 2 with (KS 1,
· · · ,KS 8) to get the corresponding value just after Round 2; we denote it
by xi,l. Then, partially decrypt xi,l ⊕ (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, e8, e1,2,7, e2,4,6) through
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Rounds 1 and 2 with (KS 1,KS 2,KS 3⊕e8,KS 4, · · · ,KS 8) to get its plain-
text; we denote it by P˜i,l. Find P˜i,l in Si. We denote by C˜i,l, C˜∗i,l, C˜
′
i,l and
C˜ ′∗i,l the corresponding ciphertexts for P˜i,l encrypted under KA,KB,KC
and KD, respectively.
(b) Compute the subkeys (KS 97, · · · ,KS 104,KW 5, · · · ,KW 8) with the (W1,
· · · ,W8) guessed above. Then, partially decrypt all the Ci,l and C ′i,l
with these subkeys to get the corresponding values just before Round
25; we denote them by Ti,l and T
′
i,l, respectively. Partially decrypt all
the C˜∗i,l and C˜
∗′
i,l with the related subkeys (KS 97 ⊕ e8,KS 98,KS 99, · · · ,
KS 104,KW 5,KW 6,KW 7 ⊕ e8,KW 8) to get the corresponding values
just before Round 25; we denote them by T˜ ∗i,l and T˜
∗′
i,l , respectively.
Store (Ti,l, T
′
i,l, T˜
∗
i,l, T˜
∗′
i,l) in a hash table. Finally, choose only the quartets
(Ti1,l1 , T˜
∗
i1,l1
, T
′
i2,l2
, T˜ ′∗i2,l2) such that both Ti1,l1 ⊕ T
′
i2,l2
and T˜ ∗i1,l1 ⊕ T˜ ′∗i2,l2
have the form (?, e8, e3,∼, e8, e1,∼, ?, ?, ?), where 1 ≤ i1 ≤ i2 ≤ 216.2 and
1 ≤ l1, l2 ≤ 233. If six or more quartets (Ti1,l1 , T˜ ∗i1,l1 , T
′
i2,l2
, T˜ ∗′i2,l2) pass this
test, execute Step 3 with the quartets meeting this condition; otherwise,
repeat Step 2 with another guess.
3. Perform Steps (a) and (b) below for j = 1 to 8:
(a) Guess a value for the jth bit W11,j of the key byte W11, and compute the
j-bit subkey KS 96,[1,j] of the subkey KS 96.
(b) For every remaining quartet (Ti1,l1 , T˜
∗
i1,l1
, T
′
i2,l2
, T˜ ∗′i2,l2), partially decrypt
bytes (1,8) of Ti1,l1 and T
′
i2,l2
with KS 96,[1,j] to get the corresponding
values for bits (1, 2, · · · , j) of byte (8) just before Round 24, and check
whether they have a zero difference. If not, repeat this step with another
quartet; otherwise, partially decrypt bytes (1,8) of T˜ ∗i1,l1 and T˜
∗′
i2,l2
with
KS 96,[1,j] to get the corresponding values for bits (1, 2, · · · , j) of byte (8)
just before Round 24, and check whether they have a zero difference as
well. If six or more quartets pass this condition, execute next iteration
(Step 4 when j = 8) with the quartets meeting this condition; otherwise,
repeat Step 3(a) with another guess.
4. Guess a value for the key byte W10, and compute the subkey KS 95. Perform
Steps (a) and (b) below for j = 1 to 8.
(a) Guess a value for the jth bit W14,j of the key byte W14, and compute the
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j-bit subkey KS 91,[1,j] of the subkey KS 91.
(b) For every remaining quartet (Ti1,l1 , T˜
∗
i1,l1
, T
′
i2,l2
, T˜ ∗′i2,l2), partially decrypt
bytes (6,7) of Ti1,l1 and T
′
i2,l2
with (KS 95,KS 91,[1,j]) to get the corre-
sponding values for bits (1, 2, · · · , j) of byte (6) just before Round 23,
and check whether they have a zero difference. If not, repeat this step
with another quartet; otherwise, partially decrypt bytes (6,7) of T˜ ∗i1,l1
and T˜ ∗′i2,l2 with (KS 95,KS 91,[1,j]) to get the corresponding values for bits
(1, 2, · · · , j) of byte (6) just before Round 23, and check whether they
have a zero difference as well. If six or more quartets pass this condition,
execute next iteration (Step 5 when j = 8) with the quartets meeting
this condition; otherwise, repeat Step 4(a) with another guess, (if all the
guesses for W14,j are tested, repeat Step 4 with another guess for W10).
5. Guess a value for the least significant 3 bits W16,[1,3] of the key byte W16.
Perform Steps (a) and (b) below for j = 4 to 8.
(a) Guess a value for the jth bit W16,j of W16, and compute the j-bit subkey
KS 93,[1,j] of the subkey KS 93.
(b) For every remaining quartet (Ti1,l1 , T˜
∗
i1,l1
, T
′
i2,l2
, T˜ ∗′i2,l2), partially decrypt
bytes (2,3) of Ti1,l1 and T
′
i2,l2
with KS 93,[1,j] to get the corresponding
values for bits (1, 2, · · · , j) of byte (2) just before Round 24, and check
whether they have a zero difference. If not, repeat this step with another
quartet; otherwise, partially decrypt bytes (2,3) of T˜ ∗i1,l1 and T˜
∗′
i2,l2
with
KS 93,[1,j] to get the corresponding values for bits (1, 2, · · · , j) of byte (2)
just before Round 24, and check whether they have a zero difference as
well. If six or more quartets pass this condition, execute next iteration
(Step 6 when j = 8) with the quartets meeting this condition; otherwise,
repeat Step 5(a) with another guess.
6. Guess a value for the key bytes (W9,W13), compute the subkeys (KS 90,KS 94),
and compute the subkey KS 86 with the W1 guessed in Step 2. For every re-
maining quartet (Ti1,l1 , T˜
∗
i1,l1
, T
′
i2,l2
, T˜ ∗′i2,l2), partially decrypt bytes (4,5) of Ti1,l1
and T
′
i2,l2
with (KS 94,KS 90,KS 86) to get the corresponding values for bytes
(3,4) just before Round 22, and check whether they have a difference (?, 0). If
not, repeat this step with another quartet; otherwise, partially decrypt bytes
(4,5) of T˜ ∗i1,l1 and T˜
∗′
i2,l2
with (KS 94,KS 90,KS 86) to get the corresponding val-
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ues for bytes (3,4) just before Round 22, and check whether they have a dif-
ference (?, 0) as well. If six or more quartets pass this condition, execute Step
7 with the quartets meeting this condition; otherwise, repeat this step with
another guess.
Now, for every remaining quartet (Ti1,l1 , T˜
∗
i1,l1
, T
′
i2,l2
, T˜ ∗′i2,l2), we obtain the cor-
responding values just before Round 24 under the guess for (W1, · · · ,W11,W13,
W14,W16); we denote them by (Qi1,l1 , Q˜
∗
i1,l1
, Q
′
i2,l2
, Q˜∗′i2,l2), respectively.
7. Guess a value for the key byte W12, compute the subkey KS 89, and com-
pute the subkey KS 85 with the W8 guessed in Step 2. For every quartet
(Qi1,l1 , Q˜
∗
i1,l1
, Q
′
i2,l2
, Q˜∗′i2,l2), partially decrypt bytes (2,3) of Qi1,l1 and Q
′
i2,l2
with (KS 89,KS 85) to get the corresponding values for bytes (1,2) just be-
fore Round 22, and check whether they have a difference belonging to the
set {(e8, x)|x ∈ Ω}. If not, repeat this step with another quartet; otherwise,
partially decrypt bytes (2,3) of Q˜∗i1,l1 and Q˜
∗′
i2,l2
with (KS 89,KS 85) to get the
corresponding values for bytes (1,2) just before Round 22, and check whether
they have a difference belonging to the set {(e8, x)|x ∈ Ω}. If six or more quar-
tets (Qi1,l1 , Q˜
∗
i1,l1
, Q
′
i2,l2
, Q˜∗′i2,l2) pass this test, execute Step 8 with the quartets
meeting this condition; otherwise, repeat this step with another guess forW12.
8. Compute the subkey KS 81 with theW4 guessed in Step 2. For every remaining
quartet (Qi1,l1 , Q˜
∗
i1,l1
, Q
′
i2,l2
, Q˜∗′i2,l2), since we already obtain the corresponding
values for bytes (1,2) just before Round 22, we can partially decrypt them
with KS 81 to check whether the corresponding values for byte (2) just before
Round 21 for (Qi1,l1 , Q
′
i2,l2
) have a zero difference, and check whether the
corresponding values for byte (2) just before Round 21 for (Q˜∗i1,l1 , Q˜
∗′
i2,l2
) have
a zero difference as well. If six or more quartets (Qi1,l1 , Q˜
∗
i1,l1
, Q
′
i2,l2
, Q˜∗′i2,l2)
pass this test, record the guessed value for (W1, · · · ,W14,W16), and go to Step
9; otherwise, repeat Step 7 with another guess for W12.
9. For a recorded value for (W1, · · · ,W14,W16), exhaustively search for the re-
maining 8 key bits using a known plaintext/ciphertext pair. If a 128-bit key
is suggested, output it as the user key of the 26-round HIGHT; otherwise, go
to Step 2 (If all the guesses are tested during any of Steps 3 to 8, repeat its
previous steps with another guess).
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10.6.2.2 Complexity Analysis
The attack requires 251.2 (related-key) chosen plaintexts, which take a time com-
plexity of 251.2 26-round HIGHT encryptions.
In Step 2(a), about 216.2 × 2332 = 248.2 plaintext pairs are yielded for every guess of
(W1, · · · ,W8), which produce the difference (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, e8, e1,2,7, e2,4,6) just before
Round 3 under the key guess, thus about
(
248.2
2
) ≈ 248.2×22 = 295.4 candidate quartets
are constructed for every guess of (W1, · · · ,W8). To produce the output difference
(x, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, e8) just before Round 21, where x ∈ Ω, the two pairs (Ti1,l1 , T
′
i2,l2
)
and (T˜ ∗i1,l1 , T˜
′∗
i2,l2
) in a candidate quartet (Ti1,l1 , T˜
∗
i1,l1
, T
′
i2,l2
, T˜ ′∗i2,l2) must have a dif-
ference of the form (?, e8, e3,∼, e8, e1,∼, ?, ?, ?) just before Round 25, so a candidate
quartet that does not meet this filtering condition is an incorrect quartet. Step 2(a)
has about 2 × 249.2 × 264 × 12 × 226 ≈ 2109.5 26-round HIGHT encryptions, where 12
means the average fraction of the guessed keys that are tested in the step.
In Step 2(b), either of the pairs (Ti1,l1 , T
′
i2,l2
) and (T˜ ∗i1,l1 , T˜
′∗
i2,l2
) meets the condition
with a probability of 2−20, thus about 295.4 × (2−20)2 = 255.4 candidate quartets
(Ti1,l1 , T˜
∗
i1,l1
, T
′
i2,l2
, T˜ ′∗i2,l2) remain after 2(b) for every guess of (W1, · · · ,W8). The
probability that 6 or more quartets pass the condition is
∑295.4
i=6 [
(
295.4
i
) · (2−40)i · (1−
2−40)295.4−i] ≈ 1, so it is expected that almost all the 264 guesses for (W1, · · · ,W8)
will pass Step 2(b). The time complexity of Step 2(b) is dominated by the partial
decryptions, which is about 4 × 249.2 × 264 × 12 × 226 ≈ 2110.5 26-round HIGHT
encryptions.
In Step 3(b), the probability that a quartet meets either of the filtering conditions
in every iteration is 2−1, so it follows that all the 272 guesses for (W1, · · · ,W8,W11)
will past Step 3, and for a wrong guess it is expected about 255.4 × 2−1×2×8 = 239.4
quartets remain after Step 3. Step 3 has a time complexity of about
∑7
l=0(2 ×
255.4−2×l × 265+l × 12 × 14 × 126 + 2 × 255.4−(2×l+1) × 265+l × 12 × 14 × 126) ≈ 2115.28
26-round HIGHT encryptions.
In Step 4(b), the probability that a quartet meets either of the filtering conditions
in every iteration is 2−1, so it is expected that all the 288 guesses for (W1, · · · ,W8,
W10,W11,W14) will past this step, and for a wrong guess about 239.4 × 2−1×2×8 =
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223.4 quartets remain after Step 4. Step 4 has a time complexity of about
∑7
l=0(2×
239.4−2×l × 281+l × 12 × 14 × 226 + 2 × 239.4−(2×l+1) × 281+l × 12 × 14 × 226) ≈ 2116.28
26-round HIGHT encryptions.
In Step 5(b), the probability that a quartet meets either of the filtering conditions in
every iteration is 2−1, so it is expected that all the 296 guesses for (W1, · · · ,W8,W10,
W11,W14,W16) will past this step, and for a wrong guess about 223.4 × 2−1×2×5 =
213.4 quartets remain after Step 5. Step 5 has a time complexity of about
∑4
l=0(2×
223.4−2×l × 292+l × 12 × 14 × 126 + 2 × 223.4−(2×l+1) × 292+l × 12 × 14 × 126) ≈ 2110.24
26-round HIGHT encryptions.
In Step 6, the probability that a quartet meets the filtering conditions is 2−8×2 =
2−16, so for a wrong guess about 213.4 × 2−16 = 2−2.6 quartets remain after Step
6, and the probability that 6 or more quartets pass the tests for a wrong guess is
approximately
∑213.4
i=6 [
(
213.4
i
) · (2−16)i · (1− 2−16)213.4−i] ≈ 2−25.09, thus it is expected
that about 2112×2−25.09 = 286.91 guesses for (W1, · · · ,W11,W13,W14,W16) pass Step
6. Step 6 has a time complexity of about 2× 213.4 × 2112 × 12 × 14 × 326 + 2× 25.4 ×
2112 × 12 × 14 × 326 ≈ 2120.28 26-round HIGHT encryptions.
In Step 7, the probability that a quartet meets the filtering conditions is (24
27
)2 =
2−4.83, and the probability that 6 or more quartets pass the tests for a wrong guess is
approximately (2−4.83)6 ≈ 2−28.98, so it is expected about 286.91+8 × 2−28.98 = 265.93
guesses for (W1, · · · ,W14,W16) pass Step 7. Step 7 has a time complexity of about
2 × 6 × 294.91 × 12 × 14 × 226 + 2 × 6 × 292.5 × 12 × 14 × 226 ≈ 292.05 26-round HIGHT
encryptions.
In Step 8, the probability that 6 or more quartets pass the tests for a wrong guess
is approximately (2−8×2)6 = 2−96, thus it is expected about 265.93 × 2−96 = 2−30.07
guesses for (W1, · · · ,W14,W16) pass Step 8. Therefore, it is expected that we can
find the correct user key with 28 trials in Step 9. Step 8 has a time complexity of
about 4× 6× 265.93 × 12 × 14 × 126 ≈ 262.81 26-round HIGHT encryptions.
Therefore, the attack has a total time complexity of about 2120.41 26-round HIGHT
encryptions.
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In Step 8, it is expected about 295.4×2−92.4 = 8 quartets pass the filtering condition
for the correct key, and the probability that 6 or more quartets pass the test for the
correct key guess is approximately
∑295.4
i=6 [
(
295.4
i
) · (2−92.4)i · (1− 2−92.4)295.4−i] ≈ 0.8.
Therefore, the related-key rectangle attack can break the 26-round HIGHT with a
success probability of 80%.
10.7 Related-Key Impossible Differential Attack on 28-Round
HIGHT
In this section, we describe certain 19-round related-key impossible differentials of
HIGHT, which enable us to conduct a related-key impossible differential attack on
28-round HIGHT.
10.7.1 19-Round Related-Key Impossible Differentials
We describe certain 19-round related-key impossible differentials: (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, e8)
9 (e1,∼, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), where the key difference (∆W1,∆W2, · · · ,∆W16) is (0, · · · ,
0, e8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), which start from Round 7 and end at Round 25.
They are also built in a miss-in-the-middle manner: a 12-round related-key dif-
ferential with probability 1 is concatenated with a 7-round related-key differential
with probability 1, where the second byte of the output difference of the 12-round
related-key differential is e1,∼, and the second byte of the difference of the 7-round
related-key differential is e1,∼, which contradict with each other. See 10.4 for more
details of the two related-key differentials.
Due to the key difference, the input difference (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, e8) to Round 7 will
be canceled to zero by the subkey difference in Round 7. The zero difference will be
kept until the input of Round 12, for the subkey differences in Rounds 8 to 11 are all
zero. Since the subkey difference (∆KS 45,∆KS 46,∆KS 47,∆KS 48) in Round 12 is
(e8, 0, 0, 0), the input difference to Round 13 is (0, 0, e8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), which propagates
to a difference (0, 0, 0, e8, e1,∼, 0, 0, 0) just after Round 13. Then, the difference
(0, 0, 0, e8, e1,∼, 0, 0, 0) propagates to a difference (?, 0, 0, 0, 0, e8, e1,∼, ?) just before
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Table 10.4: The two related-key differentials in the 19-round related-key impossible
differential
Round(i) ∆Xi−1,1 ∆Xi−1,2 ∆Xi−1,3 ∆Xi−1,4 ∆Xi−1,5 ∆Xi−1,6 ∆Xi−1,7 ∆Xi−1,8 subkey difference
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 e8 (0, 0, 0, e8)
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0, 0, 0, 0)
..
.
..
.
..
.
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0, 0, 0, 0)
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (e8, 0, 0, 0)
13 0 0 e8 0 0 0 0 0 (0, 0, 0, 0)
14 0 0 0 e8 e1,∼ 0 0 0 (0, 0, 0, 0)
15 0 0 0 0 e8 e1,∼ ? 0 (0, 0, 0, 0)
16 ? 0 0 0 0 e8 e1,∼ ? (0, e8, 0, 0)
17 ? ? ? 0 e8 0 e8 e1,∼ (0, 0, 0, 0)
18 e1,∼ ? ? ? ? e8 e3,∼ e8 (0, 0, 0, 0)
output ? e1,∼ ? ? ? ? ? e3,∼ (0, 0, 0, 0)
19 0 e1,∼ ? ? ? ? ? ? (0, 0, 0, 0)
20 0 0 e1,∼ ? ? ? ? ? (0, 0, e8, 0)
21 0 0 0 e1,∼ ? ? ? ? (0, 0, 0, 0)
22 0 0 0 0 e1,∼ ? ? ? (0, 0, 0, 0)
23 0 0 0 0 0 e1,∼ ? ? (0, 0, 0, 0)
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 e1,∼ ? (0, 0, 0, e8)
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 e1,∼ (0, 0, 0, 0)
output e1,∼ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0, 0, 0, 0)
Round 16. Since the subkey difference (∆KS 61,∆KS 62,∆KS 63,∆KS 64) in Round
16 is (0, e8, 0, 0), the output difference of Round 16 is (?, ?, ?, 0, e8, 0, e8, e1,∼), which
propagates to a difference (e1,∼, ?, ?, ?, ?, e8, e3,∼, e8) just after Round 17. Finally,
we can learn that the output difference of Round 18 has the form (?, e1,∼, ?, ?, ?,
?, ?, e3,∼).
On the other hand, when we roll back the output difference (e1,∼, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) of
Round 25 through seven rounds of HIGHT in the reverse direction, we will definitely
get an input difference (0, e1,∼, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?) to Round 19.
Now, a contradiction occurs between the intermediate differences of these two differ-
entials, because the second byte of the output difference of the 12-round related-key
differential is e1,∼, while the second byte of the difference of the 7-round related-key
differential is e1,∼. Therefore, these 19-round related-key differentials are impossible.
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10.7.2 Attack Rounds 2 to 29
The 19-round related-key impossible differentials can be used to break the 28 rounds
from Rounds 2 to 29 of HIGHT with only the final transformation, similar to that
given in Section 10.5.2. The main difference between them lies in that here we
compute the related-key difference between a pair of data. The attack procedure is
as follows.
10.7.2.1 Attack Description
1. Choose 219 structures Si, (i = 1, 2, · · · , 219), where a structure is defined to
be a set of 240 plaintexts Pi,j with the first two bytes, bits (1,2,· · · ,7) of the
third byte and bit (1) of the fourth byte fixed, and the other 40 bit positions
taking all the possible values, (j = 1, 2, · · · , 240). In a chosen-plaintext attack
scenario, obtain all the ciphertexts of the 240 plaintexts in each of the 219 struc-
tures encrypted with KA and KB, where KA⊕KB = (0, · · · , 0, e8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
we denote by Ci,j and C˜i,j for the ciphertexts for Pi,j encrypted respectively
withKA andKB. Choose only the ciphertext pairs (Ci,j1 , C˜i,j2) with difference
(0, 0, 0, e1,∼, ?, ?, ?, ?), where 1 ≤ j1 6= j2 ≤ 240.
2. Guess a value for the key bytes (W4,W5), compute the subkeys (KW 8,KS 116),
and perform Steps (a)–(c) below.
(a) Partially decrypt every remaining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , C˜i,j2) with (KW 8,
KS 116) to get the corresponding values for bytes (7,8) just before Round
29, and check whether they have a difference (?, 0). Keep only the pairs
that meet this condition.
(b) Guess a value for the two key bytes (W3,W9), compute the subkeys
(KW 7,KS 111), and compute the subkey KS 115 with the W4 guessed
above. Partially decrypt every remaining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , C˜i,j2) with
(KW 7,KS 111,KS 115) to get the corresponding values for bytes (5,6) just
before Round 28, and check whether they have a difference (?, 0). Keep
only the pairs that meet this condition.
(c) Guess a value for the three key bytes (W2,W12,W16), compute the sub-
keys (KW 6, KS 106,KS 110), and compute the subkey KS 114 with the W3
197
10.7 Related-Key Impossible Differential Attack on 28-Round HIGHT
guessed above. Partially decrypt every remaining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 ,
C˜i,j2) with (KW 6,KS 106,KS 110,KS 114) to get the corresponding values
for bytes (3,4) just before Round 27, and check whether they have a
difference (?, 0). Keep only the pairs that meet this condition.
3. Perform Steps (a)–(c) below for a plaintext pair (Pi,j1 , P˜i,j2) corresponding to
a remaining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , C˜i,j2).
(a) Guess a value for the key byte W8, and compute the subkey KS 8. Par-
tially encrypt every plaintext pair (Pi,j1 , P˜i,j2) with KS 8 to get the cor-
responding values for bytes (1,8) just after Round 2, and check whether
they have a difference (0, ?). Keep only the pairs that meet this condition.
(b) Guess a value for the key byte W7, compute the subkey KS 7, and com-
pute the subkey KS 12 with the W12 guessed above. Partially encrypt
every remaining plaintext pair (Pi,j1 , P˜i,j2) with (KS 7,KS 12) to get the
corresponding values for bytes (1,8) just after Round 3, and check whether
they have a difference (0, ?). Keep only the pairs that meet this condition.
(c) Guess a value for the two key bytes (W6,W11), compute the subkeys (KS 6,
KS 11), and compute the subkey KS 16 with the W16 guessed above. For
every remaining pair plaintext (Pi,j1 , P˜i,j2), partially encrypt Pi,j1 with
(KS 6,KS 11,KS 16) to get the corresponding value for bytes (1,8) just
after Round 4, and partially decrypt P˜i,j2 with (KS 6,KS 11 ⊕ e8,KS 16)
to get the corresponding value for bytes (1,8) just after Round 4. Check
whether they have a difference (0, ?). Keep only the pairs that meet this
condition.
4. Guess a value for the key bytes (W1,W15), compute the subkeys (KW 5,KS 109),
and compute the subkeys (KS 101,KS 105,KS 113) with the (W2,W7,W11) guessed
above. For every ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , C˜i,j2) corresponding to a remaining
plaintext pair (Pi,j1 , P˜i,j2), partially decrypt Ci,j1 with (KW 5,KS 101,KS 105,
KS 109,KS 113) to get the corresponding value for bytes (1,2) just before Round
26, and partially decrypt C˜i,j2 with (KW 5,KS 101,KS 105 ⊕ e8,KS 109, KS 113)
to get the corresponding value for bytes (1,2) just before Round 26. Check
whether they have a difference (e1,∼, 0). Keep only the pairs that meet this
condition.
5. Perform Steps (a) and (b) below for a plaintext pair (Pi,j1 , P˜i,j2) corresponding
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to a remaining ciphertext pair (Ci,j1 , C˜i,j2).
(a) Guess a value for the key byte W10, compute the subkey KS 10, and
compute the subkeys (KS 5,KS 15,KS 20) with the (W3,W5, W15) guessed
above. Partially encrypt every remaining plaintext pair (Pi,j1 , P˜i,j2) with
(KS 5,KS 10, KS 15,KS 20) to get the corresponding values for bytes (1,8)
just after Round 5, and check whether they have a difference (0, e1,∼).
Keep only the pairs that meet this condition.
(b) Guess a value for the key byte W14, compute the subkey KS 14, and
compute the subkeys (KS 9,KS 19,KS 24) with the (W2,W7,W9) guessed
above. For every remaining plaintext pair (Pi,j1 , P˜i,j2), partially encrypt
the corresponding values for bytes (1,2) just after Round 2 with (KS 9,
KS 14,KS 19,KS 24) to get the corresponding values for bytes (1,8) just
after Round 6. Check whether they have a difference (0, e8). If none
of the plaintext pairs meet this condition, record the guessed value for
(W1, · · · ,W12,W14,W15,W16), and execute Step 6; otherwise, discard this
guess, and try another.
6. For a recorded value for (W1, · · · ,W12,W14,W15,W16), exhaustively search for
the remaining 8 key bits using three known pairs of plaintexts and ciphertexts.
If a 128-bit key is suggested, output it as the user key of the 28-round HIGHT;
otherwise, go to Step 2.
10.7.2.2 Complexity Analysis
The attack requires 260 (related-key) chosen plaintexts, which take a time complexity
of 260 28-round HIGHT encryptions.
In Step 1, a structure Si yields
(
240
2
) ≈ 279 plaintext pairs (Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) with difference
(0, 0, e8, e1,∼, ?, ?, ?, ?), thus the 219 structures yield a total of 298 plaintext pairs
(Pi,j1 , Pi,j2) with difference (0, 0, e8, e1,∼, ?, ?, ?, ?), (1 ≤ j1 6= j2 ≤ 240). There is a
25-bit filtering condition over the candidate ciphertext pairs, so it follows that about
298 × 2−25 = 273 ciphertext pairs (Ci,j1 , C˜i,j2) remain after Step 1.
In Step 2(a) there is an 8-bit filtering condition over the candidate ciphertext pairs,
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so it follows that about 273 × 2−8 = 265 ciphertext pairs (Ci,j1 , C˜i,j2) pass Step 2(a)
for every guess of (W4,W5). Step 2(a) has a time complexity of 2×273×216× 14× 128 ≈
283.2 28-round HIGHT encryptions.
In Step 2(b) there is an 8-bit filtering condition over the candidate ciphertext pairs,
so it follows that about 265 × 2−8 = 257 ciphertext pairs (Ci,j1 , C˜i,j2) pass Step 2(b)
for every guess of (W3,W4,W5,W9). Step 2(b) has a time complexity of 2 × 265 ×
232 × 14 × 228 ≈ 292.2 28-round HIGHT encryptions.
In Step 2(c) there is an 8-bit filtering condition over the candidate ciphertext pairs,
so it follows that about 257 × 2−8 = 249 ciphertext pairs (Ci,j1 , C˜i,j2) pass Step 2(c)
for every guess of (W2,W3,W4,W5,W9,W12,W16). Step 2(c) has a time complexity
of 2× 257 × 256 × 14 × 328 ≈ 2108.78 28-round HIGHT encryptions.
In Step 3(a) there is an 8-bit filtering condition over the candidate plaintext pairs,
so it follows that about 249×2−8 = 241 plaintext pairs (Pi,j1 , P˜i,j2) pass Step 3(a) for
every guess of (W2,W3,W4,W5,W8,W9,W12,W16). Step 3(a) has a time complexity
of 2× 249 × 264 × 14 × 128 ≈ 2107.2 28-round HIGHT encryptions.
In Step 3(b) there is an 8-bit filtering condition over the candidate plaintext pairs,
so it follows that about 241 × 2−8 = 233 plaintext pairs (Pi,j1 , P˜i,j2) pass Step 3(b)
for every guess of (W2,W3,W4,W5,W7,W8,W9,W12,W16). Step 3(b) has a time
complexity of 2× 241 × 272 × 14 × 228 ≈ 2108.2 28-round HIGHT encryptions.
In Step 3(c) there is an 8-bit filtering condition over the candidate plaintext pairs,
so it follows that about 233 × 2−8 = 225 plaintext pairs (Pi,j1 , P˜i,j2) pass Step 3(c)
for every guess of (W2, · · · ,W9,W11,W12,W16). Step 3(c) has a time complexity of
2 × 233 × 288 × 14 × 12 × 328 ≈ 2115.78 28-round HIGHT encryptions, where 12 means
the average fraction of the guessed keys that are tested.
In Step 4 there is an 8-bit filtering condition over the candidate ciphertext pairs, so
it follows that about 225 × 2−8 = 217 ciphertext pairs (Ci,j1 , C˜i,j2) pass Step 4 for
every guess of (W1, · · · ,W9,W11,W12,W15,W16). Step 4 has a time complexity of
2× 225 × 2104 × 14 × 12 × 428 ≈ 2124.2 28-round HIGHT encryptions.
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In Step 5(a) there is an 8-bit filtering condition over the candidate plaintext pairs,
so it follows that about 217 × 2−8 = 29 plaintext pairs (Pi,j1 , P˜i,j2) pass Step 5(a)
for every guess of (W1, · · · ,W12,W15,W16). Step 5(a) has a time complexity of
2× 217 × 2112 × 14 × 12 × 428 ≈ 2124.2 28-round HIGHT encryptions.
In Step 5(b) there is a 7-bit filtering condition over the candidate plaintext pairs,
so it is expected that about 2120 × (1 − 2−7)29 ≈ 2120 × e−22 ≈ 2114.24 guesses for
(W1, · · · ,W12,W14,W15,W16) are recorded in Step 5(b). Thus, the expected number
of suggested wrong keys in Step 6 is about 2114.24× 28× 2−192 = 2−69.76. Thus, it is
very likely that we can find the correct key guess. Step 5(b) has a time complexity
of about 2× 2120× [1+ (1− 2−7)+ · · ·+(1− 2−7)29 ]× 12 × 14 × 428 ≈ 2122.19 28-round
HIGHT encryptions. Step 6 has about 2122.24 28-round HIGHT encryptions.
Therefore, the attack has a total time complexity of about 2125.54 28-round HIGHT
encryptions.
10.8 Summary
In this chapter we have presented an impossible differential attack on 25-round
HIGHT, a related-key rectangle attack on 26-round HIGHT, and a related-key im-
possible differential attack on 28-round HIGHT. These attacks are better than
any previously published cryptanalytic results on HIGHT in terms of the number
of attacked rounds. Table 10.5 summarises the published cryptanalytic results on
HIGHT, where CP, KP and RK-CP refer to the required numbers of chosen plain-
texts, known plaintexts and related-key chosen plaintexts, respectively; and En-
cryptions refers to the required number of encryption operations of the appropriate
reduced version of HIGHT.
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Table 10.5: Cryptanalytic results on HIGHT
Attack Type Rounds Data Time Source
Differential 13 262CP not specified
Linear 13 257KP not specified
Boomerang 13 262CP not specified
Truncated differential 16 214.1CP 2108.69Encryptions [37]
Saturation 16 242CP 251Encryptions
Related-key boomerang 19 not specified not specified
Impossible differential 18 246.8CP 2109.2Encryptions
25 260CP 2126.78Encryptions Section 10.5
Related-key rectangle 26 251.2RK-CP 2120.41Encryptions Section 10.6
Related-key impossible differential 28 260RK-CP 2125.54Encryptions Section 10.7
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Chapter 11
Conclusions and Future Research
In this chapter we summarise the cryptanalytic results presented in the thesis and
give some possible directions for future research.
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11.1 Conclusions
In this thesis we propose a new extension of differential cryptanalysis, which we
call the impossible boomerang attack. We describe the early abort technique for
(related-key) impossible differential cryptanalysis and rectangle attacks. Finally, we
analyse the security of a number of block ciphers that are currently being widely
used or have been recently proposed for use in emerging cryptographic applications.
The main cryptanalytic results are as follows.
• We give an impossible differential attack on 7-round AES when used with 128
or 192 key bits, and an impossible differential attack on 8-round AES when
used with 256 key bits. We also present an impossible boomerang attack on 6-
round AES when used with 128 key bits, and an impossible boomerang attack
on 7-round AES when used with 192 or 256 key bits. Finally, we describe
a related-key impossible boomerang attack on 8-round AES when used with
192 key bits, and a related-key impossible boomerang attack on 9-round AES
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when used with 256 key bits, both using two keys.
• We give an impossible differential attack on 11-round reduced Camellia when
used with 128 key bits, an impossible differential attack on 12-round reduced
Camellia when used with 192 key bits, and an impossible differential attack
on 13-round reduced Camellia when used with 256 key bits.
• We give a related-key rectangle attack on the full Cobra-F64a, and a related-
key differential attack on the full Cobra-F64b.
• We give a related-key rectangle attack on 44-round SHACAL-2.
• We give a related-key rectangle attack on 36-round XTEA.
• We give an impossible differential attack on 25-round reduced HIGHT, a
related-key rectangle attack on 26-round reduced HIGHT, and a related-key
impossible differential attack on 28-round reduced HIGHT.
In terms of either the attack complexity or the numbers of attacked rounds, the
attacks presented in the thesis are better than any previously published cryptanalytic
results for the block ciphers concerned, except in the case of AES. For AES, the
impossible differential attacks on 7-round AES used with 128 key bits and 8-round
AES used with 256 key bits are the best currently published results on AES in
a single key attack scenario, and the presented related-key impossible boomerang
attacks on 8-round AES used with 192 key bits and 9-round AES used with 256 key
bits are the best currently published results on AES in a related-key attack scenario
using two keys.
11.2 Possible Directions for Future Research
We give some possible directions for future research on block cipher cryptanalysis,
and it would be interesting to investigate these directions.
• As mentioned in Chapter 3, the impossible boomerang attack can potentially
be used to cryptanalyse other block ciphers, in particular analysing those with
a simple key schedule in a related-key attack scenario. For example, IDEA [66]
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is a widely used block cipher with a linear key schedule, thus it is desirable
to check whether some good cryptanalytic results can be obtained when we
apply the impossible boomerang attack to IDEA. Actually, this is part of my
ongoing work.
• Other than those described in Chapter 4, there exist a variety of other exam-
ples of the application of the early abort technique to (related-key) impossible
differential and rectangle attacks, as well as other cryptanalytic methods, de-
pending on the specific design of the round function of a block cipher; for
instance, the way we exploit Properties 9.3 and 10.2 when conducting the at-
tacks on XTEA and HIGHT. As a result, it may be possible to improve certain
existing cryptanalytic results for block ciphers using the early abort technique.
• Cryptology is a very fast moving field. It is possible to improve the results
presented in this thesis.
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